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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation seeks to better understand and predict the behaviors of technology-based 
entrepreneurial ventures operating under conditions of high uncertainty. To do this, I take a deep 
dive into the innovative process of de novo ventures built around university inventions through a 
series of three related essays. The first essay links insights from the innovation literature with the 
entrepreneurial opportunity literature to examine the effects of founders’ prior experience and 
level of expertise on the technology-driven search process. I find that founder effects are quite 
different for experiential search for market opportunities, when compared to opportunity 
identification. The second essay builds on these findings through use of a mixed-methods 
approach to examine how the strength of founders’ experience, level of expertise and logics 
(their attention-focusing worldviews) affect the time in which it takes the technology-based 
venture to (successfully) commercialize. The third essay employs an experimental approach to 
unpack the relationship between individual functional expertise and uncertainty in the 
opportunity evaluation process. The findings suggest that individual’s experience can limit the 
attention and focus they give to loci of uncertainty falling outside of their functional expertise. 
Overall, the dissertation highlights the role of founder’s experience, expertise and logics in 
shaping the direction of the venture’s early start-up stages, the unexpected role of founders with 
little expertise in these processes, and the link between uncertainty and functional experience in 
entrepreneurial efforts.   
Keywords: opportunity evaluation, expertise, experiential search, institutional logics, top 
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This dissertation takes a close look at the effect of founder makeup in technology-based 
startups1 and calls attention to the concern that the individual theories of entrepreneurship, 
innovation, and management do not map particularly well onto the context of technically-
oriented teams commercializing their inventions via entrepreneurship. The dissertation examines 
the role of founder experience, logics, and expertise on the evaluation, exploration, and 
commercialization of technology-driven market opportunities. Much of the theorizing in this 
work was inspired by, and takes advantage of, the highly uncertain and technical nature of 
academic technologies, as well as the concomitant struggle of the technically-trained 
entrepreneurs to evaluate and pursue the market applications of their inventions.   
 
BACKGROUND 
A primary factor in entrepreneurship is the entrepreneur’s knowledge and expertise (Foss 
& Klein, 2012; Kor, Mahoney, & Michael, 2007; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Particularly for 
ventures without the routines, resources, and experiences of established firms, the entrepreneur’s 
knowledge and experience play an important role in early strategy formation and outcomes 
(Beckman & Burton, 2008; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Fern, Cardinal, & O'Neill, 2012; Haynie, 
Shepherd, & McMullen, 2009; Nelson & Winter, 1982). It is well known that the recognition, 
evaluation, and exploitation of market applications varies drastically according to founder 
knowledge and experience (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Grégoire, Barr, & Shepherd, 2010; Shane, 
2000; Shepherd & DeTienne, 2005; Shepherd, Williams, & Patzelt, 2015; Wood, McKelvie, & 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this dissertation, a technology-based startup is a de-novo firm formed to translate an invention 




Haynie, 2014). Founder background does not simply affect the initial direction taken by the firm, 
but has a strong imprinting effect on the venture’s future behavior (Beckman, Burton, & 
O'Reilly, 2007; Eesley, Hsu, & Roberts, 2014a; Marquis & Lee, 2013; Stinchcombe, 1965).  
The link between an entrepreneur’s experience and the early behaviors of the startup are 
unclear. Empirical evidence has been mixed, exhibiting both positive and negative effects of 
experience on entrepreneurship (Baron & Ensley, 2006; Delmar & Shane, 2006; Dencker & 
Gruber, 2015; Eesley et al., 2014a; Eggers & Song, 2015; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008). While, 
intuitively, it seems that experience should reduce uncertainty, improve evaluation, and improve 
firm outcomes, extant research finds that the effects of experience differ depending on the 
environment (Eggers & Song, 2015; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). While expertise has been 
cited as especially beneficial in familiar (less-uncertain) environments (Argote & Ingram, 2000), 
expertise in situations of uncertainty may create a “knowledge corridor,” or focus entrepreneurs’ 
attention on criteria relevant to their expertise, but the performance effects of this corridor effect 
are unclear in the various stages of idea evaluation, exploration and exploitation (Dane, 2010; 
Denrell & March, 2001; Eesley & Roberts, 2012; McKelvie, Haynie, & Gustavsson, 2011; 
Ronstadt, 1989; Shane, 2000).  
 
OVERVIEW 
This dissertation seeks to unpack the conflicting findings of experience by combining the 
entrepreneurial lens with a broader view that explicitly takes the environmental uncertainty into 
account (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). Specifically, I analyze how the individual-level factors, 
such as entrepreneurial knowledge, expertise and logics, differentially affect an entrepreneur’s 




Technology-based entrepreneurship is a good candidate for this research goal. 
Technology-based ideas represent complex problems where the future value is unknown 
(Fleming & Sorenson, 2001). Entrepreneurs seeking to commercialize their inventions labor 
under high levels of uncertainty, competing in upstream markets at the early stages of the 
industry life cycle (Agarwal & Shah, 2014; Jensen & Thursby, 2001; Rothaermel, Agung, & 
Jiang, 2007; Shane, 2004). The necessity of entrepreneurs’ technical knowledge, expertise and 
logics has resulted in the literature’s emphasis on their technical expertise (Agarwal & Shah, 
2014; Gittelman & Kogut, 2003; Gruber, MacMillan, & Thompson, 2013b; Jensen & Thursby, 
2001; Powell & Sandholtz, 2012; Rothaermel et al., 2007). While necessary, technical expertise 
may not be sufficient, as technically-led teams struggle to survive and commercialize their 
products successfully (Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005; Lowe & Ziedonis, 2006; Wennberg, Wiklund, 
& Wright, 2011). This suggests a need for theoretically-driven studies that combine the 
individual-level insights from entrepreneurship, innovation and management research with the 
contextual factors of technology-driven entrepreneurship and its high level of uncertainty. 
In this dissertation, I seek to unpack what entrepreneurs do under conditions of 
uncertainty, how their choices and views change with team dynamics, and how they approach 
uncertainty depending on their past experience. Using a mixed-methods, longitudinal approach, I 
take a nuanced look at the early stages of the entrepreneurial process undertaken by technically-
minded entrepreneurs and their cofounders.   
The first study is an examination of how founder traits drive the firm to engage in the 
costly experiential search for market applications. The paper draws from two main bodies of 
literature, that on the firm’s search for innovation, and that explaining the identification and 




cognitive search performed by individuals (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Maggitti, Smith, & 
Katila, 2013), or established firm’s experimental search for innovation (Ganco & Hoetker, 2009; 
Li, Maggitti, Smith, Tesluk, & Katila, 2012). Notably, much of the entrepreneurial opportunity 
literature can be related to the “cognitive search” construct, as it focuses on the recognition of 
entrepreneurial opportunities (Davidsson, 2015; Haynie et al., 2009; Short, Ketchen, Shook, & 
Ireland, 2010). This leaves a gap in our understanding as to what kind of search is required to 
evaluate whether a technical invention should be developed, as well as the mechanisms driving 
this evaluation process. Because technology-driven ventures must experiment with their 
technology to sufficiently evaluate whether a specific market application is feasible 
technologically and desirable to a substantial market (Shane, 2004), this essay employs context-
motivated theory to explain the early stages of the technology-to-market linking process as an 
experiential search for market applications of the technology, rather than as opportunity 
identification or cognitive search (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004). The main drivers 
in this model are the combinatory effect of the founders’ knowledge, logics and functional 
expertise. 
The second essay builds on the prior study, examining the effect of founders’ collective 
knowledge, logics and expertise on the time it takes the venture to commercialize its technology. 
Past research suggests that founder experience affects the new firm’s outlook, routines and 
strategies in both the short- and long-run (Beckman & Burton, 2008; Burton & Beckman, 2007; 
Fern et al., 2012). Entrepreneurs with technical experience, for instance, can struggle to create an 
organization that simultaneously develops technological and market capabilities (Fini, Lacetera, 
& Shane, 2010; Lockett, Siegel, Wright, & Ensley, 2005). These two sets of capabilities require 
diverging routines, logics, and strategies (Dasgupta & David, 1994; Sauermann & Stephan, 
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2013; Wry, Lounsbury, & Jennings, 2014). However, as yet, the difficulty experienced by 
technically-trained entrepreneurs attempting to successfully commercialize their inventions 
hasn’t been linked to technical entrepreneurs’ need to combine distinct, and in some ways 
diverging, market- and research-based routines and expertise. To shed light on this issue, this 
paper adds insights from the budding literature on hybrid institutional logics2, which grapples 
with why hybrid organizations often fail (Battilana & Dorado, 2010), using the founders’ past 
logics as a lens with which to view the technology-based ventures’ struggle to commercialize in a 
timely fashion. The strength of founders’ logics is derived, in part, from the depth of their 
expertise (Wry et al., 2014). Founders’ logics influence the approach they take in making firm-
related decisions, providing a powerful link between the founders and their young firm’s actions 
and success (Almandoz, 2014). By theoretically linking individual processes with broader 
external patterns, this essay’s approach, using founder knowledge, logics, and expertise, provides 
an understanding of firm actions than cannot be obtained solely by explanations using incentives, 
knowledge or capabilities (Pahnke, Katila, & Eisenhardt, 2015). This study gets at the heart of 
the issue by examining how founder logics and experience combine to shape the firm’s ability to 
cultivate an early-stage invention into a revenue-generating innovation. This examination 
requires a micro-level understanding of the actors, the institutions and the phenomenon 
(Carpenter et al., 2004). Therefore, this study combines 25 field interviews with a unique dataset 
following technology-based ventures from the early-stages of founding through 
commercialization.  
2 In an entrepreneurial context, founders import logics from past experiences to the new firm. These logics influence 
firm goals and routines by affecting which actions are perceived as rational, necessary and appropriate (Greenwood 
et al., 2011; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). 
6 
The third study takes a step back in the process, using an experimental design to test the 
relationship between an individual’s functional experience and the evaluation of uncertainty in 
new venture ideas. This study developed from a desire to understand how individual experience 
affects the evaluation of opportunities with respect to the attention given to different loci of 
uncertainty. Research linking uncertainty external to the venture and individual characteristics 
remains scant, yet this evaluation stage is precisely where entrepreneurial judgment is most 
needed (Gruber, Kim, & Brinckmann, 2015; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). As a result, we know 
little about how entrepreneurs evaluate different elements of uncertainty when making judgments 
concerning the attractiveness of a new venture idea. This essay first lays out a framework of 
relevant loci of uncertainty embedded in an entrepreneurial opportunity. This essay theorizes that 
an individual’s experience will affect the attention and weight the entrepreneurs give to the loci 
of uncertainty; this will ultimately shape their ability to properly evaluate new venture ideas 
(Dearborn & Simon, 1958; Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Gavetti, Levinthal, & 
Rivkin, 2005; Shane, 2000).  
The dissertation examines micro-level factors of team composition, such as founders’ 
knowledge, expertise and logics, and their effect on the firm’s evaluation of new venture ideas, 
their experiential search behaviors in developing market applications for the new business ideas, 
and the rate at which those business ideas are commercialized. There is a need to better 
understand and resolve the technology-market linking problem in technology-based 
entrepreneurship. The context-driven theoretical approach of this dissertation should assist in 
analyzing the technology-market linking problem and hopefully add insight to the discussion 
surrounding how to improve the entrepreneurial technology-to-market linking process. 
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CHAPTER 2: TESTING THE WATERS: PROLONGED EXPERIENTIAL SEARCH IN 
TECHNOLOGY-BASED ENTREPRENEURIAL VENTURES 
INTRODUCTION  
A fundamental principle underlying entrepreneurship is that entrepreneurial action stems 
from individual judgment about the value potential of market opportunities. This has led to a 
number of studies analyzing how entrepreneurs search for, and evaluate, opportunities (Haynie et 
al., 2009; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006), with a recent emphasis on how variations in 
entrepreneurs’ prior knowledge, experience and expertise impact their opportunity beliefs 
(Gruber et al., 2015; McMullen, 2015; Wood et al., 2014). Similarly, studies seeking to 
understand how individuals search out and recombine ideas to generate innovative products have 
also focused on how that search is driven by the depth (e.g. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Furr, 
Cavarretta, & Garg, 2012) and breadth (Leiponen & Helfat, 2010; Singh & Fleming, 2010) of 
searcher knowledge and experience.  
Given the emphasis on making accurate decisions under uncertain conditions, it is 
perhaps surprising that few entrepreneurial studies have focused on contexts of high uncertainty 
such as technology-driven entrepreneurship (Shepherd et al., 2015).  We know from related work 
that past experience affects early entrepreneurial decision-making (e.g., Busenitz & Barney, 
1997), and it has been suggested that individuals acting under uncertainty operate differently 
depending on prior knowledge experience (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). Therefore, it is highly 
likely that the interaction between search behaviors and individual background may differ under 
high levels of uncertainty (Smith & Di Gregorio, 2003), though this idea has not been tested in 
the technology-based entrepreneurial context.  For instance, related studies from the innovation 
literature performed in contexts where uncertainty is high, such as knowledge recombination, 
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suggest that knowledge expertise may discourage further search and result in knowledge 
corridors—a focused attention on issues related to their expertise—(Baron & Ensley, 2006; 
Ronstadt, 1989; Taylor & Greve, 2006); this finding is quite distinct from that typically expected 
in the entrepreneurship literature.  
This study addresses this puzzle by examining the drivers of entrepreneurial search in 
uncertain environments. One particular setting where the link between entrepreneurship and 
uncertainty is particularly strong is technology-based ventures commercializing university 
technology (Markman, Phan, Balkin, & Gianiodis, 2005; Phan, Siegel, & Wright, 2005; 
Rothaermel et al., 2007). Compared to other technology-based firms, academic startups 
emerging from universities often fail to locate a viable market application for their technological 
opportunity (Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005; Lowe & Ziedonis, 2006; Markham, 2002; Vohora, 
Wright, & Lockett, 2004). However, the reasons why they fail to find market applications that 
will lead to market success are not clear. From an entrepreneurship perspective, these academic 
start-ups have the specialized technical knowledge that should enable a superior search and 
recognition process (Shane, 2000; Shane & Stuart, 2002; Unger, Rauch, Frese, & Rosenbusch, 
2011). From a resource-based perspective (Mahoney, 1995; Teece, 1986), these academic 
startups have tacit knowledge, complementary resources from their universities (e.g., Siegel & 
Phan, 2005) , and valuable, inimitable knowledge that can be paired with market knowledge to 
lead them towards superior market applications of their technology. The innovation perspective 
suggests that the knowledge necessary for invention is different than that required for innovation 
(Fleming, 2001; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Penrose, 1959). Taken together, these three perspectives seem to suggest that one reason why 




commercialization is that technological expertise may not be sufficient to allow technology-
based startups to successfully search for market applications of their technology, but how to 
remedy this issue is unclear.  
The focus of this paper is how founder experience influences the experiential search for 
market applications. Experiential search is a hands-on experimentation process focused around 
the neighborhood of current activity (Cyert & March, 1963b; March & Simon, 1958). The 
experiential search process referred to here is described by Gavetti and Levinthal (2000), and 
requires at least a partial implementation of a market application (i.e., a prototype, lab-scale 
experimental results, the beta-version of a software application, etc.) in order to evaluate its 
efficacy. Cognitive, or local search, is the most common type of search used in the literature 
(Ganco & Hoetker, 2009), but experiential search serves as a useful theoretical lens in the 
context of technology-based entrepreneurship because experiential search requires a costly, 
lengthy development effort prior to the commercialization of an invention (Jensen & Thursby, 
2001). Bringing search into close contact with the context, this paper seeks to uncover how the 
knowledge, experience and expertise of founders affects the firm’s level of experiential search.  
In addition, the lack of construct clarity in the opportunity literature (Suddaby, 2010) suggests a 
need to move away from the term “opportunity” to more theoretically grounded construct 
(Davidsson, 2015). Therefore, we define the term “market application” to refer to the end-result 
of the process which translates a technology or invention to a specific market. The embryonic 
nature of university inventions is such that any one invention often has multiple possible market 
applications (Ziedonis, 2007); for example, Shane (2000) describes eight different market 




This paper takes a nuanced approach to the question of how founders’ knowledge and 
experience drive the firm’s experiential search for market applications under highly uncertain 
conditions. Focusing on the essential, yet difficult process academic entrepreneurs must undergo 
to identify a market application in which their technology can create value (Gruber et al., 2013b; 
Kor et al., 2007; Penrose, 1959), this paper can potentially speak to both the innovation and 
entrepreneurship literatures by unpacking the factors leading to the poor performance of ventures 
seeking to commercialize their technology. This paper contributes to entrepreneurial literature by 
responding to recent critiques of “entrepreneurial opportunities” (Davidsson, 2015; Short et al., 
2010) with a well-defined construct—market applications—that is more tightly connected to the 
process of experimentally producing technological applications for target markets, which can be 
utilized for research moving forward. Additionally, the focus on the mechanisms and processes 
underlying the evaluation of opportunities, especially in an uncertain context, fills a gap in the 
entrepreneurship literature (Gruber et al., 2013b; Haynie et al., 2009; McMullen & Shepherd, 
2006; Short et al., 2010). This paper also makes contributions to the search and innovation 
literatures by explicitly linking the effects of founder experience on experiential search within 
entrepreneurial organizations with limited attention and resources (Baer, Dirks, & Nickerson, 
2013; Katila, Chen, & Piezunka, 2012). Moreover, because prior theorizing focuses on cognitive, 
rather than experiential search (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000), this paper sheds light on whether 
different theoretical mechanisms underlie the experiential search process required to evaluate an 
invention’s many potential market applications (Li et al., 2012) . 
In the quest to uncover the relationship between firm experiential search and founder 




entrepreneurship3 so as to better guide the literature discovery process and to be consistent 
with calls to tailor research questions to specific contexts in the study of founders and managers 
and firm behavior (Carpenter et al., 2004). This paper will first develop a theory of experiential 
search and market applications, tying them to technology-driven entrepreneurship. Using this 
context-driven theorizing, the paper then develops hypotheses using a perspective colored by 
both innovation and entrepreneurship literatures. The empirical analysis of experiential search is 
based on a unique dataset that links the individual experience and expertise of founders with the 
firm’s experiential behavior over a period of 30 years, and is followed by a discussion of future 
directions for this exploratory research.   
HYPOTHESIS DEVLOPMENT 
Link Technologies to Market Applications through Increased Experiential Search 
Bringing about the successful transition from scientific invention to marketable 
innovation in uncertain environments requires a hands-on, experimental search process (Li et al., 
2012; Nelson & Winter, 1982). This search takes two main forms in the innovation literature, 
cognitive and experiential, respectively referring to A) search where the solution may be derived 
from cognitively evaluating potential solutions, or B) where the solution must be evaluated 
experientially (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000). While cognitive search enables individuals to skip 
the trial-and-error experiential search (Gavetti, 2005; Kauffman, 1993), the ability to 
cognitively scan the environment is limited in more complex and uncertain situations 
                                                 
3 This paper refers to “technology-based” and “academic” startup interchangeably, and follows convention (Shane, 
2004), by classifying those startups as de novo ventures established by faculty, research staff and/or students, who found 
the firm to directly exploit knowledge emerging from their scientific research. However, while academic startups can be 
classified as technology-based, many technology-based startups are run by founders with industry and/or functional 




because individuals’ ability to evaluate the future is constrained (Ganco & Hoetker, 2009).  
Entrepreneurs seeking to innovate in uncertain conditions face a daunting task, as they cannot 
simply import past routines from prior organizations (Cyert & March, 1963; Nelson & Winter, 
1982) or rely solely on their knowledge and experience to provide a solution. Entrepreneurs 
attempting to develop market applications from scientific breakthroughs struggle to anticipate 
which potential products or services can be generated from a technology, or which markets 
would be best suited for those applications (Afuah, 2002; Danneels, 2007; Dougherty, 
1992)4.  
As the potential market applications arising from new technologies are not self-evident,  
ongoing structuring and sensemaking is required to evaluate the likelihood of success and 
whether the new technologies can be made “market-ready” (Fini et al., 2010; Gavetti & 
Levinthal, 2000; Simon, 1976; Weick, 1990). Thus, the chance of discovering a successful 
application is expected to rise with increased search efforts (McGrath, 1999). Much like real 
options, increased efforts at experiential search can lead to large potential wins (Ziedonis, 2007). 
Recent work on technology-based ventures suggests practical rewards to search; ventures that 
identify multiple opportunities prior to commercialization appear to increase their chances of 
survival and growth (Gruber, MacMillan, & Thompson, 2008; Gruber et al., 2013b).  However, 
the experiential search process is more cost prohibitive than cognitive search (Adner & 
Levinthal, 2004; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000). When search is costly, such as in novel or 
uncertain situations, there is a trade-off between acquiring more information and 
“satisficing,’” or restricting search efforts from high-performance to adequate metrics (Greve 
                                                 
4 Even highly successful inventors acknowledge their inability to predict which of their inventions would 
lead to a market breakthrough, and in which markets they would have an impact (Schwartz, 2004). 
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& Taylor, 2000; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Simon, 1947). The risks involved in the tradeoff for 
more or less information are especially salient for the resource-strapped entrepreneurial venture 
(Katila et al., 2012; Li et al., 2012). A useful analogy for gaining insight into the sensemaking 
process technology-based firms undertake to translate a technology into a market application is 
that of beachcombers who roam the sand for buried treasure. The initial ping of the metal 
detector is sufficient for surface-level search; but the explorer must decide whether to invest the 
effort to dig through the sand before finding out whether there is treasure or trash underneath, or 
whether the search should be continued. This analogy describes the experiential search routine, 
where the invention is the startup’s metal detector that serves as a catalysis for potentially value-
creating market applications. As in the search for buried treasure, upon initial identification 
(ping!) of a potential market application, firm founders must decide whether to “dig down” and 
commit resources to exploring the market application, or continue the search for other (possibly 
superior) applications.  
The inherent differences between cognitive and experiential search suggest that different 
theoretical mechanisms may underlie the in-depth experiential search process performed by 
founders of technology-based ventures than that of typical5 entrepreneurs cognitively exploring 
opportunities. Cognizant of this difference, we draw from insights in the innovation and 
entrepreneurship literatures, which both suggest that individuals’ knowledge and experience 
shape the opportunities they perceive and (therefore) pursue. While most of the innovation 
literature has been conducted at the firm level (Miller, Fern, & Cardinal, 2007; Rosenkopf & 
Almeida, 2003), examinations at the individual level suggest that inventor experience can 
5 While it is debated whether there is any type of “typical” entrepreneur, the entrepreneurial opportunity 
that is often used in the literature (i.e., Kirzner) is one that can be evaluated with a business plan and deep thinking. 
Technology-based ventures differ from this standard in that they require some sort of experimentation as part of a 




help facilitate successful new combinations (Gruber, Harhoff, & Hoisl, 2013a). Specifically, 
individual and group search for innovation is molded—both aided and constrained—by the 
innovators’ existing knowledge sets and experience (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Kaplan & 
Tripsas, 2008; Leiponen & Helfat, 2010). 
Similarly, the entrepreneurial literature posits founder knowledge and experience play an 
important role in cognitive search in the uncertain, complex situation of technological 
commercialization, where individual attention guides the firm’s decision-making process 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Baer et al., 2013; Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000). As 
individuals’ attention is largely governed by their knowledge and experience (Gavetti et al., 
2005; Kahneman, 1973; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008), this article seeks to examine how founders’ 
knowledge, experience and expertise drive firm experiential search (Gavetti, Levinthal, & 
Ocasio, 2007; Kaplan, 2008; Simon, 1947). Particularly for entrepreneurial ventures without the 
past routines and experiences of established firms, founders’ knowledge and experience plays an 
important role in early strategy formation and outcomes (Beckman & Burton, 2008; Fern et al., 
2012; Penrose, 1959). The open question for entrepreneurial ventures commercializing new 
technologies is what configuration of founder knowledge, experience and expertise will lead to 
increased experiential evaluation so as to construct a superior choice set. While a larger choice 
set is not necessarily always better, a larger set should provide for a better evaluation, as the 
comparison set increases, so also does the likelihood of a positive outcome (Greve, 2003). 
Specifically, what is the effect of different combinations of knowledge, experience, and expertise 
on the venture’s willingness and ability to evaluate multiple alternative market applications?   




An important factor affecting technology-based venture’s experiential search behavior is 
the breadth of founders’ technical knowledge. In linking technologies to markets, founders’ 
knowledge shapes the perceived relevancy of received information, directing their attention 
toward certain aspects of the problem, channeling organizational search (Gavetti et al., 2005). A 
broad technical knowledge set may enable founders to view the decision problem in an 
expansive light, helping the team overcome the tendency for founders to filter out information 
that doesn’t match their existing knowledge set (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Kaplan & Tripsas, 
2008). In the related context of product and service innovation, knowledge breadth is vital, as 
lack of knowledge breadth leads to myopic problem-solving techniques that constrain founders’ 
and teams’ ability to explore product opportunities outside their area of expertise (Bercovitz & 
Feldman, 2011; Fleming, 2001; Fleming, Mingo, & Chen, 2007). While few founders 
acknowledge market opportunities outside their current pursuit (Shane, 2000), founding teams 
holding more diverse knowledge backgrounds should have greater ability to leverage each 
founder’s distinct knowledge set towards a wider search for valuable market application 
opportunities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Dahlin, Weingart, & Hinds, 2005).  
The prior argument emphasizes the expansive effect of heterogeneous knowledge sets on 
experiential search, supporting the established wisdom that founder diversity should lead to 
greater levels of both cognitive and experiential search. Digging deeper into heterogeneity 
among the founders, however, may suggest situations where the nature of this heterogeneous 
experience leads to decreased levels of experiential search. In the context of technology-based 
entrepreneurship, founding teams revolve around technical expertise of some kind, requiring at 
least one technical founder, but in many cases, technical founders collaborate with non-technical 
founders who have expertise in sales, finance or marketing. Should we expect that diversity 
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always has an expansive effect on search, or does background experience have different effects 
on experiential and cognitive search? While the literatures on opportunity identification and 
cognitive search have concentrated their efforts on measuring the positive relationship between 
the heterogeneity of founder experiences and the breadth of opportunity identification and search 
(Baer et al., 2013; Gruber, MacMillan, & Thompson, 2012; Maggitti et al., 2013), the same 
effect may not hold in cases where entrepreneurs engage in experiential search to confirm 
commercial opportunity. 
Founders’ heterogeneous backgrounds may lead to different levels of experiential search 
in settings where norms and values are embedded in specific activities (Thornton, Jones, & Kury, 
2005). For instance, in the setting of academic entrepreneurship, academic founders are trained 
and incentivized to give priority to the production of scientific knowledge (Dasgupta & David, 
1994), resulting in relatively high levels of experiential search, especially at the “proof of 
concept level” (Miner, Gong, Baker, & O’Toole, 2011). Academic norms and values lead these 
academic scientists—turned entrepreneurs—to measure their venture’s progress in terms of 
knowledge gained (Dubinskas, 1992; Gittelman & Kogut, 2003), which often leads to a 
preference for novel, rather than market-driven, scientific knowledge (Dasgupta & David, 1994; 
Fini et al., 2010; Gittelman & Kogut, 2003). Academic scientists’ drive for knowledge 
production should exceed even their industry research counterparts, who have learned that 
managers and investors, beholden to short-term milestones and financial results, do not value 
knowledge purely for the sake of knowledge (Blank & Dorf, 2012; Samsom & Gurdon, 1993)6 .  
6 Informal interviews reveal that founders with industry experience focus more on financially measurable goals and 
knowledge that advances their current products and technologies. Herbert Boyer, UCSF professor and founder of 
Genentech, the first biotech firm formed to commercialize academic science, also said: “Why is an entrepreneurial 
organization more likely to [produce knowledge]? Well, I think it’s the nature of large, established companies, that 
the first objective of that company is to maintain market share. Much of the R & D spend of large companies is 
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Firms led by technical founders with both academic and industry backgrounds may also 
explore fewer market applications than those composed of solely academics due to different 
innate capabilities. When compared to academic founders, industry-experienced founders may 
have been exposed to a larger array of potential market applications, providing industry-
experienced technical founders the ability to cognitively evaluate market opportunities that 
founders without such experience must evaluate experientially (Dew, Read, Sarasvathy, & 
Wiltbank, 2009; Franklin, Wright, & Lockett, 2001; Maitland & Sammartino, 2015). Particularly 
in technology-based ventures, teams with prior industry experience have superior capabilities in 
sensing (Gruber et al., 2013b) and seizing (Kor, 2003) new growth opportunities. Founders tend 
to focus their attention on exploring identified market alternatives (Ronstadt, 1989; Shane, 2000), 
suggesting that diverse founder organizational backgrounds may constrain the firm’s search, 
even if that diversity may lead to an improved ability to pick the superior market applications 
(Fern et al., 2012). 
Heterogeneous experience among founders may also lead to less experiential search due 
to the founders ascribing to different underlying logics. An individual’s institutional logic 
embodies one’s taken-for-granted worldview and the concomitant goals and routines enacted in 
that worldview (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012; Wry et al., 2014).  Logics are 
particularly salient for professions such as academia, where professionals not only self-select 
into the given logic, but are incentivized and socialized to ascribe to the logic over time (Pache & 
Santos, 2012; Roach & Sauermann, 2010). As laid out in Table 2.1 (below), academic founders 
with a “research” logic not only have different goals, but they also enact diverging approaches to 
allocated to what we would call sustainable engineering, or sustainable science. It’s all science and improvement 
and endeavor to improve the existing products and to sustain them, because it’s better to protect and reduce the cost 




innovation than founders from industry (Dougherty, 1992; Gittelman & Kogut, 2003; Sauermann 
& Stephan, 2013).7 Specifically, academic scientists ascribing to a research logic will engage in 
increased experimentation when compared to founders from a market logic (Blank & Dorf, 2012; 
Samsom & Gurdon, 1993). Experimenting with multiple market applications involves both direct 
and indirect opportunity costs to ventures, taking founder time (Miner et al., 2011), attention 
(Gifford, 1992) and money away from other activities, which are contrary to a commercially-
focused market logic. Those teams with founders carrying both research and industry logic must 
engage in negotiating behaviors to keep the team at peace (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Powell & 
Sandholtz, 2012), and thus are expected to perform less experiential search than more 
homogenous teams of academic scientists (see Table 2.1). 
As a result of the divergent capabilities, logics, and norms of academic and industry 
scientists, there are reasons to assume that diversity in background experience will lead to less 
experimentation than homogeneity in academic startups. This effect is particularly salient for 
startups, as small firms can only attend to diverging tasks and goals—if at all—sequentially 
(Cyert & March, 1963a) Adding nuance to the established wisdom (and Hypothesis 1) that 
diversity generates increased experimentation, the mix of academic and industry scientific 
founders should lead to less experiential search:   
Hypothesis 1: Technology-based ventures led by a founding team with both academic and 
industry-experienced scientists will be less likely to engage in experiential search than 
those led solely by academics. 
                                                 
7 There is evidence that these differences go deeper than social conditioning; graduating scientists preferring 
industrial employment show a weaker “taste for science,” a greater concern for salary, and a stronger interest in 




The Role of Expertise 
The previous section examined the effect of heterogeneity of experience endowments on 
experiential search behaviors. Extending our theorizing, we explore the effects of varying levels 
of domain expertise in technical founders. In the context of technology-based university 
ventures, faculty founders hold deep domain knowledge and expertise. Research on domain 
experts suggests that they are more capable of understanding the underpinning structural features 
of a problem (Ericsson & Charness, 1994), which leads to superior pattern recognition skills, 
better anticipation of the future, and more robust solution maps (Furr et al., 2012). As a result, 
individuals with extensive domain experience may have a greater ability to recognize and 
integrate relevant information regarding technological applications (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
Eisenhardt, Furr, & Bingham, 2010). To be awarded tenure by their more experienced peers, 
faculty must demonstrate, via knowledge-outputs such as grants, projects, and publications, they 
have achieved a certain level of expertise that goes beyond mere degree status. Faculty founders’ 
considerable domain expertise should have the ability to engage in more experiential search than 
ventures with a mix of experts and non-experts, such as graduate students, especially in 
unpredictable markets where the technological landscape has considerable variation.  
Although university faculty are experts in their scientific domain, a closer examination of 
the mechanisms underlying their behavior suggests several reasons why their expertise may in 
fact result in less experiential search at the firm level. First, domain expertise may raise the 
quality, or depth, of cognitive search, which can in turn reduce the need for experiential search. 
In addition, there is limited evidence that greater expertise in a functional area, such research in 
microbiology, may in fact limit individuals’ interpretations of information within the confines of 




through which they interpret and act upon problems (Dearborn & Simon, 1958; Finkelstein et al., 
2009; Fiske & Taylor, 2013). Similarly, literature on scientists’ productivity indicates that their 
inventive behaviors become focused within a particular technological domain (due to financial 
incentives provided to specialists) during their life cycle (Leahey, 2006; Levin & Stephan, 1991). 
As time passes, the broad knowledge acquired by inventors during their education, the breadth of 
which guides technological search behaviors, has diminishing relevance which makes 
recombining technological knowledge across domains more difficult (Fleming & Sorenson, 
2004; Gruber et al., 2013a). This effect may be compounded when crossing the domain from 
technological to business opportunities, as expertise breeds over-reliance on one’s own 
experience and routines (Teece, 2007), especially in uncertain and demanding situations 
(Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005), as expertise can discourage further search in 
uncertain situations (Gustafsson, 2006; McKelvie et al., 2011; Taylor & Greve, 2006), or result 
in knowledge corridors (Ronstadt, 1989; Shepherd & DeTienne, 2005). Thus, while the 
knowledge set of expert scientists is considerable, there is evidence that the effect of expertise on 
search may be limited in this context, reducing the venture’s efforts to search for market 
applications. 
Extending this line of thinking, this paper proposes that founding teams composed of 
scientists with mixed levels of expertise may engage in more extensive experiential search. 
Scientists with a fresh scientific education have a broad map to guide their search efforts 
(Fleming & Sorenson, 2004), even into distant technological areas (Gambardella, 1995), which 
provides a ‘metalearning’ capability that facilitates assimilating technological knowledge from 
other domains. In other words, young scientists without a focused expertise maintain the 




which enables them to seek out the information they need among a complex and uncertain 
landscape. Similarly, the entrepreneurship literature tends to agree that a diversity of mental 
models helps facilitate group experimentation (Foss, Klein, Kor, & Mahoney, 2008), though past 
research has been limited to the study of diverse knowledge or experience backgrounds, and not 
the diversity of domain expertise in the venture. The innovation literature is also relatively quiet 
on the effect of mixed levels of expertise, though one study suggests that collaboration between 
domain experts and novices increases the probability of breakthrough innovations (Singh & 
Fleming, 2010). As scientists appear to sort themselves into different career trajectories based on 
their preferred research interests, basic or applied, (Agarwal & Ohyama, 2013), it would appear 
that graduating scientists interested in entrepreneurship may be better primed for entrepreneurial 
research, and less embedded in the routines of their field of study. Young scientists interested in 
founding a company are much more motivated by applied research and development than their 
peers seeking careers in academia (Roach & Sauermann, 2010), which is relevant as intrinsic 
motivation, along with knowledge, cognitive skills and abilities, is fundamental to achieving 
creative outcomes such as experiential search (Amabile, 1996). Technology-based ventures led 
by expert-level and novice-level scientists (such as re graduate student founders)8 should engage 
in greater experiential search efforts:   
H2: Technology-based ventures led by a founding team with mixed levels of scientific 
expertise are more likely to engage in experiential search than ventures composed solely 
of experts.  
The Role of Entrepreneurial Experience in Experiential Search 
                                                 
8 In the context of university entrepreneurship, most ventures led by faculty scientists have graduate students 




Established wisdom from the entrepreneurial literature suggests that individuals with 
prior entrepreneurial experience tend to invest more time in up-front search efforts prior to 
launching their firms. In general, it has been found that these experienced entrepreneurs identify 
more opportunities than first-time founders (Baron & Ensley, 2006; Gruber et al., 2008; 
Ucbasaran, Westhead, & Wright, 2009), and remain on the lookout for new ideas during the 
early stages of the venture’s existence (Gaglio, 2004). Part of the reason for this behavior is that 
the search process becomes less challenging and demanding for experienced founders (Baron & 
Ensley, 2006). Additionally, it is also due the dampening effect that prior entrepreneurial 
experience has on returning entrepreneurs’ optimism levels (Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright, & 
Flores, 2010). The reasoning behind this effect is that the vast majority of entrepreneurs are 
obliged to modify their initial idea—to pivot—prior to a successful market entry (Bhidé, 2000; 
Blank & Dorf, 2012; Gruber et al., 2012). Thus, prior experience tends to generate a routine of  
“chronic” alertness for new opportunities in experienced entrepreneurs (Gaglio & Katz, 2001). 
Therefore, this literature suggests that experienced entrepreneurs will generally engage in greater 
search than will novice entrepreneurs.  
While the above reasoning flows from the general entrepreneurship literature, a nuanced 
look at the context of technology-based entrepreneurship may suggest that teams with 
experienced entrepreneurs will perform less experiential search than teams without said 
experience. There are two principal mechanisms underlying this deviation from the general 
entrepreneurship literature: the shift in logics brought by an experienced entrepreneur and 
improved market perception of an experienced entrepreneur. To the first, academic scientists-
turned-entrepreneurs typically remain deeply embedded in the research logic, retaining their 




George, & Maltarich, 2009). As discussed previously, this logic defines success as knowledge 
production (O’Gorman, Byrne, & Pandya, 2008), which leads to higher-than-normal search 
behaviors for academic entrepreneurs. The strength of this mechanism is enhanced due to the 
nature of technology development in science-based entrepreneurship; university inventions 
typically consist of early stage technologies with highly uncertain prospects that require 
significant experimentation to bring to market (Jensen & Thursby, 2001). The initial stages of 
firm’s technological development process, therefore, are very similar to university research that 
the academic experiences difficulty leaving behind the research logic’s routines (Gittelman & 
Kogut, 2003; Miner et al., 2011; Stern, 2004)9 An experienced entrepreneur will recognize this 
tendency and take steps to avoid more search. The second mechanism is the improved perception 
of experienced entrepreneurs. Because the typical academic does not possess market knowledge 
(Agarwal & Shah, 2014), academics without this experience lack the ability to “frame” a 
technological breakthrough in “opportunity” terms (Vohora et al., 2004), increasing their search 
efforts relative to experienced entrepreneurs. Experienced entrepreneurs possess detailed insights 
on what makes an opportunity attractive, suggesting that they will recognize a good market 
application when they find it (Baron & Ensley, 2006). Gruber, Kim and Brinckmann (2013b) 
suggest that entrepreneurial experience narrows entrepreneurs’ focus, making them more 
sensitive to questions regarding cash flow and the speed of revenue generation, both of which 
may be undervalued by the first-time entrepreneur from a technical background.  Founding teams 
with an experienced entrepreneur may experiment less with market applications than purely 
                                                 
9 For this reason, many  university-based startups have been criticized for organizing more like university 
laboratories than firms, employing experimental research patterns rather than focused, industrial pursuits (Powell & 
Sandholtz, 2012; Smith-Doerr, 2004) 
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‘academic’ teams because serial entrepreneurs develop superior abilities to perceive successful 
market applications in uncertain environments (McGrath & MacMillan, 2000): 
H3: Technology-based ventures led by a founding team with previous entrepreneurial 
experience are less likely to engage in experiential search than those without said 
experience. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data & Sample 
Examining these hypotheses requires data on the experiential search activities for viable 
market applications in a highly-uncertain context, as well as detailed characteristics of the 
founding team. The context of academic entrepreneurship, where university scientists create 
firms to commercialize their scientific inventions, is well suited for this endeavor10. The 
uncertainty surrounding the market applications of these scientific inventions is very high, as 
academic founders seek to commercialize knowledge that pushes the scientific and technological 
boundaries. Technology-based ventures serve as fonts of product advances or new markets 
(Jensen & Thursby, 2001; Shane, 2004), but more particularly, ventures built to commercialize 
scientific breakthroughs have a great potential to advance societal innovation (Danneels, 2002; 
Shane, 2000). Inventions from university science often have several potential technological 
10 Academic startups tend to commercialize more basic (less applicable to commercial interest) and complex 
technologies than are typically licensed by universities. According to the Technology Transfer Officer at UIUC, “If 
the technology is a “one-off solution,” our Office prefers to license to a big company every time. Why risk not 
seeing a return? ... Narrow patents are licensed because it is easier to make a match. Broad or early-stage patents 
never made anybody anything; you need to build a company around it.” Informal discussions between the authors 
and various technology transfer officers in the University of Illinois and California systems match evidence gathered 
by Markman et al. 2005 in interviews with 91 university technology transfer offices (UTTOs), suggesting that 
universities prefer to license technology to large firms, as the idiosyncratic nature of new university technologies 




applications (Jensen & Thursby, 2001; Shane, 2000). Each requires costly exploration prior to 
resolving the related market and technological uncertainties (Gittelman & Kogut, 2003; Jensen & 
Thursby, 2001). The basic nature of university research, even when compared to non-university 
technology-based ventures (Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005), reduces potential endogeneity 
concerns found in the neighboring literature on opportunity identification (Markman et al., 
2005; Shane, 2002; Shane, 2004). The high uncertainty leads universities to treat technology 
assets like real options (McGrath, 1999), preferring to license their technologies to established 
firms (Markman et al., 2005; Shane, 2002) before making investments in technology-based 
ventures, with the hope of investing in both technology and venture (Feldman, Feller, Bercovitz, 
& Burton, 2002; Markman et al., 2005). In uncertain situations such as developing market 
applications from university science, we assume a trial-by-error pursuit is required to determine 
the viability of a market application of the firm’s technology.   
We incorporate a longitudinal research design for early-stage academic startups 
seeking to commercialize basic technology to observe experiential search behavior prior to 
late-round venture capital funding or product production. Because no public data set offers the 
information required for this study, we built a unique database11 of all technology-based ventures 
created by university-affiliated personnel at six public U.S. research universities (University of 
Illinois, University of Michigan, University Wisconsin, UC-Berkeley, UC-Santa Barbara, and 
UC-Davis). This study examines 598 technology-driven spin-offs from these six universities 
between the years 1983 and 2011. The universities comprising the sample were selected based 
                                                 
11 This study is indebted to Arvids Ziedonis, as well as Kenney and Patton (2011) for the initial list of ventures. On 
receipt of this list, we examined each venture to ensure that it was an entrepreneurial venture formed to 
commercialize a university invention and performed extensive research on the founding teams using such sources 
as: company websites, LinkedIn, CrunchBase, local press (NexusLexus), university technology transfer offices, 
“specialist” websites (i.e., www.inknowvation.com) and local business associations.  
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on convenience, as the author had ties to individuals in the various universities. However, these 
universities comprise a valid sample of the set of university start-ups from Tier-1 research 
universities12, as they differ in terms of size, region, and technological emphases. A good number 
of studies have been done on companies spinning out from MIT and Stanford, adding breadth to 
prior work by expanding the sample groups. Additionally, a large percentage of essays on 
academic entrepreneurship focus on the biotechnology industry; the inclusion of several 
universities where biotechnology is not the core focus adds external validity to the sample and 
helps improve a deficit in prior research. This is important as biotechnology firms are highly 
likely to be acquired, and are often formed with the sole intention of being acquired. In many 
instances, these firms do not create a product (or generate revenues) until after an acquisition has 
been made (Lowe & Ziedonis, 2006).  
As a central element of our theorizing is that the experiential search process required 
for these firms to innovate goes beyond the standard notion of opportunity identification, we 
sought to only capture high-potential entrepreneurial ventures, excluding life-style (Wright, 
Clarysse, Mustar, & Lockett, 2008), retail, housing, consulting (Shane, 2004), and internet 
website firms based on commerce (i.e., “Champaign Beer.com”). Thus, the venture could not be 
a spin-off from an existing firm, a subsidiary or a branch operation and had to be technology-
based. In addition to being classified as a new venture commercializing university technology, 
the firm had to have been founded by at least one individual affiliated with the university during 
or immediately13 prior to establishing the firm. An important reason for excluding firms 
12 The title “Tier 1” does not have an official definition; this paper uses the term as following the Center for 
Measuring University Performance; this study focuses on schools that rank highly on measures of federal research 
grants and expenditures. Each of these schools ranks highly, both on a national and a per-student ratio.  
13 If the founder or founders of a firm could not be identified, or if there was insufficient information to 
determine the employment background of the founder, these firms were not included in the database. This occurred 
in 15 of the original 648 cases. The time elapsed between the time an individual, usually a student, left the university 
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commercializing university science without university personnel is that examination of a number 
of these firms indicated that often they were established to commercialize a number of licenses 
from a variety of organizations, making it difficult to establish meaningful linkages between the 
firm formation and a particular university license. Due to the timeline of the dependent variable 
measure, firms founded before 1981 were also dropped from the analysis (n=35).  
Definition and Measurement of Variables 
  Dependent Variable 
To test these hypotheses in a relevant setting, we sought a measure that provides an 
adequate proxy for a technology-based venture’s experiential search (Carpenter et al., 2004). 
This study employs SBIR (Small Business Innovation Research) grant data as a proxy for the 
search for market applications.  Enacted in 1982, the SBIR program is a public program that 
provides grants to fund private sector R&D projects. It aims to help fulfill the government’s 
mission to enhance private sector R&D and to advance innovation in the basic sciences for 
ventures in very early stages of product development, a group generally ignored by private 
venture capital (Audretsch, 2003). Companies often use SBIR grants to fund alternative 
development strategies, exploring technological options in sequence or in parallel (Wessner, 
2007). Indeed, the stated purpose of the awards is to enable ventures to “explore their 
technological potential.”  
While the SBIR program provides awards in three phases, this study focuses on Phase I 
awards. The purpose of Phase 1 awards is to assist science-based firms as they assess their 
intellectual property’s scientific and commercial potential and feasibility. For resource-
                                                 
and founded a spin-off was determined by the individual's biography. If this time period was 1 year or less, and there 




constrained firms facing high levels of uncertainty, these grants serve as a means to explore and 
evaluate the technological and market feasibility of an array of product concepts based on the 
upstream technology. As the focus in this stage is on developing proof of concept, the awards 
normally range between $50,000 at $100,000 (Link & Scott, 2010). This is a small amount when 
compared to either the research grants academic founders apply for to further their research 
goals, or the venture capital amounts they could receive from investors, alleviating, to some 
degree, the worry that firms apply for these grants in a pure money-grab.  
Ventures face a tradeoff when considering whether to apply for a Phase 1 SBIR grant. 
The application process is arduous and uncertain; proposals are peer-reviewed and must address 
the invention’s potential for commercialization and detail how it ultimately leads to revenue 
generation. Thus, applications must be thorough enough to establish technical merit, feasibility 
and commercial potential of the invention,14 but do not help the faculty in tenure or service 
requirements. In addition, the financial capital awarded by these grants is low, only allowing for 
small feasibility tests of the technology (Link & Ruhm, 2009). Significantly, a firm is excluded 
from applying for SBIR grants if they are >50% backed by venture capital funding. Finally, each 
Phase 1 application must be distinct from the last, moving laterally to explore a different 
direction for the invention, and the awards are not tied to having previously been awarded a 
grant. The small financial amount of the awards, coupled with the difficult application process 
and the inability to receive coincidental venture capital introduces significant tradeoff for the 
new ventures. The experiential search for each additional market application, represented by 
these Phase 1 grants, introduces a tradeoff for the new ventures, as effort spent vetting a 
                                                 




market application may increase the likelihood that it will succeed, but will introduce non-
trivial attentional, temporal and financial costs for the firm (Murray & Tripsas, 2004). On the 
other hand, successfully-executed Phase 1 SBIR grants can lead to Phase 2 grants, which are 
often more than double the amount of Phase 1 grants. In addition, there is some evidence that 
awardees have a greater likelihood of receiving VC funding than matching firms (Lerner, 
1999), suggesting that Phase 1 grants may serve as a stopgap for firms prior to receiving VC 
funds. These ideas suggest that experiential search, as captured by Phase 1 grants, is a strategic 
choice15. 
  Number of Market Applications. This variable measures the number of Phase 1 SBIR grants 
awarded the firm, using the same underlying technology to proxy the venture’s search for market 
applications16. In finding appropriate measures of market opportunity development, the empirical 
measure must be both tied to the venture’s underpinning resource base (Penrose, 1959) and 
delineated from pure ideas (Short et al., 2010). That is, the proxy should be subject to some 
evaluative process before it can be labeled as a market application of an opportunity (Dimov, 
2007a). This study does not presume that this measure covers the whole ‘set’ of exploration 
                                                 
15  Anecdotally, one venture in the sample reported: “We didn’t want VC money initially because they want to see a 
prototype too soon, and the technology was still too fragile. If they don’t see a product coming up soon in the 
process, VCs get worried and can put unreasonable pressures on the company.” 
16 Because the grants are commitment-free, peer-reviewed, and on an award-bases, and the sample pool is comprised 
of only Tier-1 Research Institutions, we assume the rate of SBIR approval is constant across researchers. This 
assumption is bolstered by the reported grant awarding ratio across faculty, which is roughly 1/3 for university 
faculty at research-based institutions. Additionally, many students, faculty, and TTO personnel were interviewed on 
the subject of SBIR grants, and the common theme among them is that Phase 1 grants are not difficult to achieve if 
there is interesting technology behind the grant effort, but that roughly 1/3 of the grants are awarded to faculty, and 
that they consisted of a lot of hard work. Because the faculty and students belonged to universities requiring federal 
research grants as part of the tenure process—a much higher bar than SBIR grants—it is assumed that all of the 
faculty have achieved some measure of competence at earning grants, and while there are differences between 
faculty, that these differences would not skew the results too much because one member of the team had achieved a 




behaviors, as only successful grant attempts are counted. However, the proxy is a superior 
measure in many respects to measures of opportunity identification and search currently used in 
the literature, which measures cognitive search (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000), are subject to 
construct validity issues (Davidsson, 2015; Short et al., 2010), and are limited by recall-bias 
without an observable measure of experimentation. Because SBIR grants serve as a means of 
probing the direction of a technology, without the funds necessary to get the product 
commercialized, this measure serves as a means of exploration for the firm.   
  Independent Variables. A proper test of the paper’s hypotheses required detailed, individual-
level data on the early founders of the venture. While demographic measures do not covary 
perfectly with constructs such as knowledge, experience and expertise, they are important 
indicators of sources of cognition and behavior (Kaplan, 2008). For this reason, studies of 
founding and top management teams suggest that these measures can serve as useful proxies for 
the latter (Taylor & Greve, 2006; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), while offering the benefit of being 
assessed relatively objectively (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  For each venture, the data was 
restricted to “founders,” rather than the top management team, to achieve consistency across the 
sample, as rounds of venture capital funding often accompany obligatory changes in the 
leadership structure of the venture (Wasserman, 2003).   
Industry Experience. Industry experience refers to the number of founders with industry 
experience who were unaffiliated with a university, but joined as a founder of the academic start-
up from their employment at another firm.  
Entrepreneurial Experience Following the practice of extant research (Beckman et al., 2007; 
Gruber et al., 2015), ventures were coded as a 1 when at least one founder had previously 




Multi-Disciplinary Knowledge Set. Teams with diverse knowledge sets should not only have a 
greater ability to search for market applications, but should also have stronger incentives to 
evaluate potential applications experientially. Diverse knowledge sets should lead to increased 
dialogue as each founder will advocate the market application closest to their area of expertise 
(Cyert & March, 1963a; Eisenhardt, 1989b). Ventures were coded as 1 if the team had multiple 
scientific, faculty founders working in different academic departments. While a similar effect 
may be thought to exist in the case that one or more were graduate students with in different 
academic fields, this subset of firms (n=16) were kept in the Mixed Expertise Teams variable 
(below) to avoid bias in between-group comparisons.  
Expert; Mixed Expertise Teams. Faculty-founders are considered experts; ventures with only 
faculty founders are listed Expert-Only, and will be used as the base case against which the other 
types of teams will be measured. This is done due to the fact that most technology-based 
ventures emerging from universities are founded by only faculty members, and because faculty 
have heretofore been the focus of the literature (Rothaermel et al., 2007) and have deep levels of 
tacit knowledge that is critical to the continuing development of an invention (Jensen & Thursby, 
2001). Ventures’ founding teams are classified as ‘expert’ if they contain only faculty scientists, 
while ‘mixed’ teams are composed of scientists at both the faculty and graduate student levels. 
 Controls.  
Team Size. Because team size is an important indicator of the human capital available in a new 
venture, this study controls for founding team size. 
Licensing the Technology. Qualitative research suggests that ventures that license the technology 




can provide direction about potential market applications. It is thus important to control for 
whether the technology was licensed from the university, as this an observable measure of 
possible TTO assistance. This is coded as a dummy variable, 1 if the venture licensed the 
technology.  
Industry. The resource requirements to develop new technologies and other factors vary across 
technological fields. To parcel out such variation, we included dummies to control for the 
technological fields represented in our study: IT & software (30% of the sample), biotechnology 
(24%), wireless and communications (12%), engineering and measurement instruments (22%) 
and others (12%) including nanotechnology, semiconductors, etc. These categories were defined 
using the description of the company given by the university or by the company’s website. As 
the industry affects both strategy and performance, it is important to control for the technological 
background of the venture (Eesley, Hsu, & Roberts, 2014b). 
University. While scientists’ proclivity to participate in university technology transfer is highly 
dependent upon individual attributes, those personal traits are conditioned by the local work 
environment (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008). Universities vary, in terms of culture, in their attitude 
towards faculty and/or students participating in entrepreneurial behaviors, justifying a dummy 
control variable for each university to capture the effect of the university on venture behavior.   
Methods 
The dependent variable takes on only nonnegative integer values and includes many 
zeroes. Because ordinary least squares regression would lead to biased, inefficient, and 
inconsistent estimates in cases where the dependent variable is not normally distributed, we 




there is significant evidence of over dispersion (G2=1117, p<.01); that is, the variance was 
greater than the mean (Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 1984), the negative binomial regression 
model is preferred to the Poisson regression model.  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive Results 
The means, standard deviations, and correlations for all ventures in the sample are presented in 
Table 2.2. Correlations between dependent and independent variables, and among independent 
variables, are less than or equal to|0.42|, which is low enough to suggest collinearity should not 
be a concern. The variance inflation measures were computed for all variables and returned small 
variance inflation factor values (<3). As Table 2.2 indicates, founders in our sample explored, on 
average, 1.78 market applications through the SBIR program. Figure 1 shows that the 
distribution of the market applications variable is in line with that of similar studies (see Gruber 
et al., 2013b), but also that firms are not likely to assess multiple market opportunities initially 
(Schwenk, 1984).  
Multivariate Results 
Results of the negative binomial regressions analyzing the venture’s experiential search 
for market applications are presented in Models 1-4 of Table 2.3. The log-transformed over-
dispersion parameter (lnalpha) is listed below the test of coefficients, along with a likelihood 
ratio test that alpha equals zero. The associated chi-squared value is 1117, strongly suggesting 
that alpha is non-zero and the negative binomial model is more appropriate than the Poisson 
model. In addition, we added exposure (ln(age)) to the regression estimates, as the failure to do 




results shown in Table 2.3 are robust across the models, and the key predictor variables 
significantly increase the explanatory power of our models, as measured by the difference in the 
log likelihoods and when compared to a chi-square statistic with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of newly added variables. The directions and signs in the base model are what one 
expects: firms that licensed technology from the university engaged in greater search, firms 
commercializing in the software or electrical engineering field, as well as those with 
undergraduate students, engaged in less search. Perhaps surprisingly, the number of founders did 
not have a significant effect on search, though our hypotheses do suggest that the types of 
founder backgrounds may increase or reduce the firm’s search efforts, which will be discussed 
shortly.  Model 3 runs the same regression, but reports the incidence rate ratios (IRRs), which 
can facilitate in the interpretation of negative binomial regressions. Finally, to help shed more 
light on whether the high-technology venture applied for and received an SBIR award; we ran a 
logit model, with a dummy (DV=0/1) if whether the venture was awarded a grant in Model 4.  
As shown in the full models in Table 2.3, the patterns of experiential search are distinct 
and divergent between the combination types of founder experience and expertise. As expected 
from literature on innovation and entrepreneurship, firms led by founders with heterogeneous 
knowledge bases, but similar academic backgrounds, engaged in greater experiential search for 
market applications. The results show increased levels of market application search for these 
ventures (β=.60, p<.05) as compared to ventures led by experts of a single discipline. 
Specifically, the coefficient of 0.6 means that the difference in the logs of expected SBIR grants 
awarded is expected to be 0.6 higher for these ventures than for those ventures without the 
scientific breadth of knowledge, holding the other variables in the model constant. Using the 
incidence report ratios, we interpret this as ventures founded by multidisciplinary scientists are 
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expected to have a rate 1.82 times greater for successful experiential search. Moving to the role 
of mixed background experiences, however, we find that heterogeneity in individual’s 
background experiences and logics leads to a reduction of observed experiential search (β=-1.00, 
p<.05; IRR=.58), supporting H1. This finding expands prior understanding, suggesting that while 
diverse teams may identify a greater number of (narrowly-focused) opportunities (Gruber et al., 
2013b), the combination of individuals with distinct approaches to innovation, such as industry 
and academic scientists, can lead to reduced search efforts. Finding support for this lends 
strength to reasoning posited by other scholars on how the utility of scientific knowledge 
(Gittelman & Kogut, 2003; Sauermann & Stephan, 2010). 
We also find support for our assertion that heterogeneity in the levels of scientific 
expertise would lead to greater levels of experiential search for the technology-based ventures 
(β=.87, p<.01; IRR=2.35), supporting H2. While this supports some findings in entrepreneurship 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009), this study adds nuance to the finding that experts contribute the 
necessary vision to innovate (Eisenhardt et al., 2010), but suggesting heterogeneity of expertise 
as a way to boost the search capabilities of experts.  
Interestingly, the coefficient for entrepreneurial experience is positive but not statistically 
significant (β=.28, p>.1; IRR=1.5), failing to support H3. Past research finds that entrepreneurial 
experience leads to the identification of more opportunities prior to entry (e.g., Gruber et al., 
2008), suggesting that while this experience may improve the venture’s ability to perceive 
opportunities, it does not necessarily lead to increased levels of experiential search. However, 
given the nonlinear nature of my model, it is important to note that the estimated coefficients do 




of an effect—difficult (Hoetker, 2007). As a robustness check, we performed a probit estimation 
utilizing the dummy awarded SBIR grant as a dependent measure, finding consistent results.   
DISCUSSION  
By weaving together insights from literatures on search and innovation with 
entrepreneurship, we participate in the effort of building an entrepreneurial theory of the firm 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2007).  After collecting and analyzing a unique dataset capturing 
experiential search behavior for 598 technology-based firms using detailed founder data, this 
study has produced three main findings.  
First, the results confirm findings in the innovation literature that heterogeneous 
experience positively influences group search efforts (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2011; Singh & 
Fleming, 2010) and mirrors similar findings in the entrepreneurship literature with respect to 
heterogeneous experience and the ability to recognize opportunities (Davidsson, 2015; Gruber et 
al., 2013b). An individual’s ability to gather, process and recombine knowledge in different ways 
is constrained by his or her abilities and experiences (March & Simon, 1958). However, 
founding teams that draw from multiple perspectives in selecting a market application to pursue 
should have a more variable cognitive map of the possible technological landscape (Gavetti & 
Levinthal, 2000), and thus go through a more rigorous selection process than individuals (Singh 
& Fleming, 2010) or teams with less varied backgrounds. The novelty in this work lies in 
providing an extension to these ideas though an observable measure of experiential search for 
market applications, without respondent bias, in an entrepreneurial setting (Dimov, 2007a; Short 
et al., 2010). Rather than measuring the number of identified opportunities (Shane, 2012), this 
research proxies the efforts expended in experiential search for market applications in an 




of the vetting process required to commercialize potential technological applications into 
account. The finding that teams composed of founders from diverse knowledge sets, yet with 
similar backgrounds, led to more search, while on the one hand, teams with diverse knowledge 
and backgrounds did not perform more search, suggests that there is more nuance to the 
established wisdom of diversity and innovation.  
Second, although prior research has shown that people with different functional 
expertise look at organizational problems from distinct vantage points (Dougherty, 1992), we 
have lacked a detailed understanding of how this applies to opportunity evaluation and 
search. Specifically, the results shed light on how firms led by individuals with different 
knowledge backgrounds, experiences, and logics vary in their willingness to execute 
successful experiential search efforts. As the focus of research on search has been conducted at 
the firm level (Gruber et al., 2013a; Miller et al., 2007), measuring simple local search (Ganco & 
Hoetker, 2009), this paper contributes to this line of inquiry by shedding light on the individual-
level factors in the breadth of search for innovation. Speaking to the role of expertise on search 
(Dew et al., 2009; Fiske & Taylor, 2013), our findings suggest that one way to reduce the 
narrowing effect of expertise is through the addition of knowledgeable non-experts, such as 
graduate students. Further research looking into the effect of combining teams of experts, and the 
resulting effect of search breadth and depth, could uncover more insights into the effect of 
expertise on search. For instance, one benefit of graduate students could be that their recently-
acquired education provides them with search capabilities that lose value over time (Fleming & 
Sorenson, 2004; Gambardella, 1995; Gibbons & Johnston, 1974; Woolnough, 1994). Currently, 
educational degrees often proxy as the measure of scientific expertise in the literature (Hsu, 




educational degree. Finally, this research also adds support to search theory that different 
mechanisms may drive cognitive and experiential search (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000); 
specifically, that rather than pure positive effects of expertise on search, it appears that mixed 
levels of expertise may benefit experiential search.    
 Third, this article adds clarity to the technology-to-market linking problem by 
studying the impact of the graduate student. Given the low rate of commercialization in 
academic entrepreneurship, the decision to explore opportunities prior to commercialization is of 
utmost importance. Only a small percentage of academic startups successfully commercialize 
their technology (Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005; Jensen & Thursby, 2001; Lowe & Ziedonis, 
2006). Due to the vital role of new ventures in organizing the process of accelerating technology 
spillover and innovation in universities and the economy (Fuller, 2008), much work has been 
done to understand the crucial actors in this process (Markman et al., 2005; Siegel, Waldman, 
Atwater, & Link, 2004), but the majority of this work has focused on the impact of faculty 
founders (i.e., Fuller & Rothaermel, 2012; Murray , 2004; Thursby & Thursby , 2004). The 
mechanisms underlying the benefit of making the strategic choice to add student founders, who 
are less embedded in their academic domain, are still unclear. Graduate students who choose to 
pursue entrepreneurship have a unique set of preferences (Roach & Sauermann, 2010).  Graduate 
student founders may serve as a catalyst for moving the venture towards experiential search, 
since they will have had less time to be conditioned to basic research (Bercovitz & Feldman, 
2008) and it has been shown that experts favor information that enhances their existing 
competencies, filtering out competence-destroying changes (Bingham, Eisenhardt, & Furr, 2007; 
Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). While there is clearly much room for future research exploring the 
roles and motivations of less-embedded scientists in technology commercialization, this initial 
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foray is especially relevant in light of findings that technology-based ventures are extremely 
homogeneous, being composed of almost entirely of academics (Beckman, 2006; Clarysse & 
Moray, 2004; Fern et al., 2012; O’Gorman et al., 2008). 
This study also contributes to several discussions in the entrepreneurship literature. 
While the nexus of individuals and opportunities lies at the heart of the entrepreneurial process 
(Shane & Venkataraman, 2000), an “opportunity” remains an elusive concept (Davidsson, 2015). 
This work built on prior findings in opportunity identification (e.g., Gruber et al., 2013b) by 
developing the concept of market applications, or a technology’s expression in a specific market, 
of which several may exist for a single invention.  Moving beyond whether opportunities are 
discovered or created, emerging technologies must go through a rigorous and costly process prior 
to resolving uncertainty regarding whether the technological application be viable for that 
specific market opportunity. This study provides an alternative perspective for this issue. In 
addition, this study builds on recent findings that the level of uncertainty matters for the types 
of knowledge and experience required of technology-based entrepreneurs (e.g., Dencker & 
Gruber, 2015). The unique results in this study suggest that further exploration is warranted 
into how founders decide how much time, energy and effort to bring to bear testing different 
applications before “placing a bet” on one.  
Limitations and Future Research 
In interpreting the results of this study, certain limitations are apparent. First, because we 
cannot employ experimental data, various selection effects may be at work. In particular, certain 
technological breakthroughs may give rise to potentially greater number of market opportunities 
than others within the sample. In addition, there may be a quality effect confounding the results. 
Two conditions of the study partially alleviate these concerns. First, while there is certainly 
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heterogeneity in the teams and technologies, the sample context consists solely of technology-
based spin-offs from top-tier universities. Thus, the research underlying the technologies will 
skew towards ‘more basic’ research than the typical “high-technology” venture. This is 
especially helpful for potential selection bias, as the technological base for each firm in the 
sample should generate several potential market opportunities to pursue experientially. In 
addition, industry controls were used to help control for this potentiality; biomedical 
technologies, for instance, are often thought to be more basic than nonbiological technologies 
(i.e., electronics or computer software). The empirical analysis performed suggests that software-
based ventures performed less experiential search, which is not unexpected, but the remaining 
technology classifications were insignificant. As with all cases of non-experimental research, the 
relationships are correlational, not causal, though, it is hoped that the rigorous sample 
construction efforts and empirical controls will reduce the concern for bias. 
Second, this study is restricted to the observation of awarded SBIR grants rather than 
firms’ application for these grants. As we cannot observe the application behavior, this is 
certainly a worry that this measure is picking up a different effect. One alternative is that 
ventures of higher quality are able to receive more grants because they survive longer. The 
context partially relieves this concern, as academic start-ups are founded by faculty or students 
with concurrent jobs at the university, so the same up-or-out pressures that apply to “typical” 
start-ups do not exist for these firms. An important resulting assumption in the paper is therefore 
that across the ventures there was an equal ratio between SBIR applications and awards. Another 
alternative is that ventures based on better technology will be awarded more SBIR grants. Again, 
the context partially alleviates these concerns, as the university technologies in this sample are 




research-based institutions, who have attained a certain level of grant-receiving ability. The 
numbers of grants awarded across states suggests that this assumption is not too far-fetched: 
across California, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin, the average grant application had between 
an 18.8% and a 24.9% chance of being awarded. This matches casual interviews with SBIR and 
NSF personnel, who estimate that roughly 1/5-1/3 of SBIR proposals are awarded, and that 
faculty applications tend to be awarded about 1/3 of the time. Due to the low dollar amount of 
SBIR grants, firms applying for these grants are typically in the bootstrapping phase of venture 
funding, where ventures do a significant amount of search but are unlikely to move towards 
venture capital funding (Bhidé, 2000). The other two most likely source of funding—large 
government grants used for research purposes and venture capital—are unlikely to fit this 
method of search, as government grants strive for improving the underlying technology, and 
venture capital promotes a quick drive to the market (Murray & Tripsas, 2004).  
As we are unable to observe partnering or mentoring behavior, another area for future 
research is in conceptualizing the skills and information available beyond the founding team to 
the broader set of resource providers (i.e., investors, early employees and advisors). An open 
question is whether these resource providers bring some of the same benefits to the venture. 
Additionally, emerging technology-based firms face different needs during their growth, how do 
the evolving needs of the venture match the evolving team? How, if at all, should team 
composition change to enable the growth of the venture from a start-up to a profitable firm?  
A prolonged search for several market applications should increase the likelihood of 
finding an application that passes both technological- and market-feasibility tests. However, 
typical organizations rarely explore more than one application of a technology (Bromiley, 2009; 




findings are not limited to startups only, as the same reasoning can be applied to any set of 
individuals with limited rationality and expertise collaborating to solve complex problems: in 
essence, the modern firm (Baer et al., 2013).The trade-off between potentially picking a “loser” 
and the costs of searching for better applications represents a puzzle for future research. While 
this paper hoped to crack open the black box of search in complex situations, a much deeper 
understanding is needed.  
The findings also reveal a need for increased understanding of the effects of prior 
entrepreneurial experience, as scientists with entrepreneurial experience neither search more nor 
less than ventures led by their faculty colleagues, despite prior findings that experienced 
entrepreneurs identify more opportunities than their counterparts (Ucbasaran et al., 2009). 
Finally, recent studies of the effect of prior entrepreneurial experience on venture behavior and 
outcomes reveal mixed findings (Eggers & Song, 2015). These findings, when coupled with 
mixed performance effects (Eesley et al., 2014b) and a decrease the rate of VC funding 
(Beckman et al., 2007) for firms with prior entrepreneurial experience suggests that this 
experience has diverging types of effects. One possible explanation for this is that scientists with 
entrepreneurial experience may have learned to leave some of their academic routines behind 
(Blank & Dorf, 2012; Dasgupta & David, 1994; Dubinskas, 1992), resulting in less search. In 
addition, they may have acquire an improved “sensing” ability, which doesn’t require the same 
level of exploration as novice entrepreneurs. Another potential mechanism for this differential 
effect may be the success or failure of the prior venture. Future research could shed light on this 
by examining the potentially different behaviors between entrepreneurs who have had successful 




experience on the development of the high-technology venture as it grows over time would also 
be beneficial.  
Conclusion 
Technology-based entrepreneurial ventures are confronted with the decision of which 
market application to pursue, of the many potentials, while laboring under significant 
technological and market uncertainty (Kor et al., 2007). These firms should have a greater 
likelihood of success if that decision is made after several potential market applications have 
been explored (Gruber et al., 2013a), but it is costly for the resource-constrained firm to 
experientially search for the right applications (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Gittelman & Kogut, 
2003; Jensen & Thursby, 2001; Murray & Tripsas, 2004). This paper explores the link between 
the founders’ knowledge, experience, and expertise and the firm’s early experiential search 
behavior prior to commercialization. This study contributes to the recent discussions on the 
technology-to-market linking problem for entrepreneurial technology ventures, and in particular, 
for academic entrepreneurship, and it presents novel implications for the entrepreneurship and 
innovation literatures. If the goal is increased experiential search, it appears that founding teams 
be made up of individuals with diverse knowledge backgrounds and levels of scientific expertise 
give additional attention to the evaluation of market applications prior to commercialization. 
This study suggests that demography itself is not the key theoretical driver of strategic and 
entrepreneurial processes and choices; rather, the knowledge, experience and expertise of 
founders has a profound effect on the early decisions of the firm (Fern et al., 2012). In addition, 
by explicitly theorizing search with the constraints faced by small ventures, the study helps 
provide a novel bridge between the search literature at an individual (Maggitti et al., 2013), large 








“The perception had been that everything else would take care of itself if we had good science17.”  
 
Entrepreneurial firms formed to commercialize scientific knowledge have the daunting 
task of simultaneously developing technological breakthroughs and converting those 
breakthroughs into commercial products (Knockaert, Ucbasaran, Wright, & Clarysse, 2011; 
Shane, 2004). This invention to innovation process is neither straightforward nor simple, even 
for large firms, as is evident in the failure of technology giants like AT&T and Xerox to realize 
competitive advantages from the breakthrough technologies developed in their research 
laboratories. Creating a firm that develops both research and marketing capabilities is especially 
difficult for financially constrained entrepreneurs seeking to convert their science-based 
technology into products, such as academic entrepreneurs (Beckman, 2006; Lowe & Ziedonis, 
2006). Academic startups18, despite their technological expertise and strong intellectual 
protection, have particularly low commercialization rates for their inventions, even when 
compared to other technology-based startups (Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005; Wennberg et al., 2011) 
19. Several reasons are given for this phenomenon, such as the embryonic nature of the 
technologies commercialized by academic startups (Jensen & Thursby, 2001; Shane, 2000), 
                                                 
17 Jim Vincent, CEO of Biogen (see Feder, “Biogen Seeks Profits to Call its Own, New York Times, 1992:31) 
18 As defined by Shane (2004), academic entrepreneurship refers to new ventures established by faculty, staff or students 
who found a firm to directly exploit knowledge emerging from their scientific research. 
19 The AUTM  Licensing Survey report details how the number of new firms has raced ahead of the number of 




academics’ proclivity to maintain their academic position during the startup process (Jain et al., 
2009), as well as academics’ lack of commercial experience (Agarwal & Shah, 2014; Shane, 
2004; Vohora et al., 2004).  
The typical suggestion for academic startups is to have co-founders with business 
backgrounds. Taking a knowledge-based approach, the rationale is that by adding 
complementary knowledge to the founding team, academic startups will have both the necessary 
technical and commercial knowledge to manage the firm and direct the technology from the 
laboratory to the market (Shane & Stuart, 2002). While lack of industry knowledge and 
experience appear to constrain founding teams (Beckman et al., 2007), the presence of both 
technical and market knowledge, while necessary, appears to be insufficient for commercial 
success, which is very different than survival (Eesley et al., 2014a; Knockaert et al., 2011). The 
failure to find support for the knowledge-based approach points to a gap in the literature 
regarding founding team composition in technology-based entrepreneurship.   
This paper takes an institutional logics lens to the question of why academic startups with 
both technical and market-based expertise so often fail to commercialize their technology. 
Generally defined, an individual’s (or organization’s) institutional logic refers to the taken-for-
granted patterns of behavior, value and belief that guide individuals’ behavior (Thornton et al., 
2012). An individual’s ‘logic’ is based on prior knowledge and experience, and affects how 
information is perceived and interpreted, as well as the routines and practices enacted to respond 
to that information. This paper builds upon recent literature (e.g., Almandoz, 2014), by 
examining how founders’ logics influence the startup’s commercialization behavior as they build 
a firm around a university technology. If consistent at the organization level, founder’s logics can 




decisions that reinforce extant organizational identities and strategies (Thornton & Ocasio, 
2008). However, as recent inductive research suggests, disparity between two diverse logics may 
markedly lower the successful integration of each logic, leading to poor performance outcomes 
for the firm (Almandoz, 2012; Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013). 
Combining the logics approach with a deep-dive into the commercialization process, I 
find that academic startups co-founded by academics and business partners continue to struggle 
to commercialize their technology due to the distinctiveness of the “research” and “market” 
logics, the founders’ entrenchment in their own logic, and the high level of uncertainty involved 
in commercializing academic research. Recent work studying the formation of early academic 
startups suggests that commercializing an invention via startup requires more than good science 
and assembling a team of industry-experienced team of entrepreneurs (Powell & Sandholtz, 
2012).  In academic entrepreneurship, elements from both the research and the market logics are 
simultaneously needed both to develop the technology and make it market-ready (Fini et al., 
2010), but when pursued in silos are insufficient. In other words, academic startups must form a 
hybrid logic comprised of A) the scientific approach necessary to guide the initial development 
of the technology from prototype to working product (research logic), and B) a customer- and 
market-orientation to direct the firm’s activities and goals towards successful commercialization 
(market logic), and C) active integration of these two logics. Because “good science” is not 
always good for developing a technology for a consumer (Gittelman & Kogut, 2003), the 
integration of these two logics is much more difficult in practice than the simple presence of the 
two logics. How can academic startups successfully blend market and research logics, which 
differ as drastically as oil and water? 
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I test the hypotheses using a cross-industry sample of 437 academic startups 
commercializing technologies developed at six public universities across the United States over a 
24-year period. Similar to studies that develop context-specific hypotheses (e.g., Wry et al.,
2014), I also conducted 25 interviews to gain a deeper understanding of our context. These 
interviews suggest that the considerable variation in venture’s R&D strategies is largely due to 
founders with diverging logics championing drastically different approaches to opportunity 
exploitation. Empirical findings suggest that, similar to the emulsion of water and oil in the 
presence of mustard, graduate students, with the necessary research experience to understand the 
research logic without the strong-ties to that logic, emulsify the disparate logics to create a firm-
level hybrid logic which leads to significantly improved commercialization rates.  
This paper makes several contributions. It contributes to the academic entrepreneurship 
literature by explicitly testing for successful commercialization via sales data, as past research 
has emphasized the founding rates of these firms, giving less attention to whether the individual 
startups succeed (Agarwal & Shah, 2014; Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008; Rothaermel et al., 2007; 
Stuart & Ding, 2006).20 This research also contributes at the nexus of institutional theory and 
entrepreneurship by adding to recent inductive investigation regarding how firms may create 
hybrid logics. Surprisingly, scholars find that rather than compromise, hybrid firms selectively 
couple intact elements from each logic (Pache & Santos, 2013). This paper gives a mechanism 
for this process, suggesting that the emulsifying founder plays that critical coupling role. This 
novel finding adds clarity to both the largely-inductive institutional logics question of how 
hybrid firms successfully function, as well as provides an initial resolution to the conflicting 
20 A notable exception is Lowe & Ziedonis (2006), which finds that inventor-led academic startups spend more time 
in technology development than other technology-based startups. 
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findings in top management team literature between founding team diversity and innovation 
performance (e.g., Eesley et al., 2014).  
The paper examines the influence of founders’ prior institutional logics, due to the 
amount and the type of prior experiences (academic, business and/or entrepreneurial) on the 
speed with which new firms first generate sales from their invention. Given the context-specific 
nature of the study, in developing the hypotheses I utilize quotations from field experts and 
entrepreneurs to give background and provide some discussion of the setting. Next, I discuss the 
analytic method and results, as well as post-hoc analyses that add more color to our findings. I 
conclude by discussing the implications of the study for research on technology-based 
entrepreneurs, institutional logics, and the commercialization of new technologies.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The institutional logics approach provides a link between macro, institutional influences 
and micro, individual-level processes. The core assumption of the institutional logics approach is 
that the attention, assumptions, and goals of individuals and organizations are embedded within 
the prevailing logic; individual’s agency and decision-making is shaped by their prevailing logic 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Logics are embodied within practices 
and routines, influencing how individuals and firms perceive, pay attention to, evaluate, and 
respond to environmental stimuli (Pache & Santos, 2013; Thornton et al., 2012). Therefore, 
institutional logics structure attention, goals and actions into a coherent narrative that individuals 
and firms utilize in making decisions. By theoretically linking individual processes with 
institutional level patterns that affect one or multiple organizations, the logics approach provides 
a more accurate and complete understanding of firm actions than explanations like incentives, 




In an entrepreneurial context, founders’ logics influence firm practices and routines by 
affecting what firm actions are perceived as rational, necessary and appropriate (Greenwood, 
Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). Founders’ 
logics influence the approach they take in making firm-related decisions, providing a powerful 
link between the founders and their young firm’s actions and success (Almandoz, 2014; Pahnke 
et al., 2015). However, in some contexts founders bring different logics to the firm, resulting in 
conflicting pressures that can create strategic ambiguity in the young firm (Greenwood et al., 
2011).  To address such ambiguities, some firms attempt to combine elements of the 
contradictory logics into a “hybrid” logic that blends elements of the two contradictory logics. 
Hybrid logics are necessary in contexts where firms must interact with parties from multiple, 
conflicting logics, such as in microfinance (Battilana & Dorado, 2010) or in academic 
entrepreneurship (Thornton et al., 2012). Hybrid logics are essential in academic 
entrepreneurship, where academics form firms to commercialize research while retaining their 
academic positions at the university (Nicolaou & Birley, 2003), but must also integrate a market-
orientation into the startup.   
Despite the necessity of forming a hybrid logic, it can be quite difficult to achieve such a 
logic and run a successful hybrid organization. Founding a new venture is risky under any 
condition, but is made more so when the venture combines contrasting logics where founders are 
coming from distinct institutional backgrounds (Greenwood et al., 2011). New hybrid 
organizations face the challenge of avoiding “mission drift,” or shifting to one of the polar logics 
(Almandoz, 2014) as they struggle to establish their approach (Stinchcombe, 1965).  They also 
face the challenge of managing conflict, as coalitions tend to form around each logic (Pache & 




assumptions (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). To further unpack this difficulty, and to understand the 
importance of creating and maintaining a hybrid logic in this context (Almandoz, 2012; Battilana 
& Dorado, 2010), I next discuss the nature of and differences between the research and market 
logics. 
 
Research vs Market Logics 
 The distinctions between research and market logics are made manifest in material 
differences in founder goals and approaches to innovation (Dasgupta & David, 1994; Wry et al., 
2014). The broad, early-stage nature of academic research encourages scientists to adopt a 
research logic. The research logic adopts routines that emphasize concurrent experimentation in 
the early stages of the technology for each possible market application, to satisfy scientists’ long-
term focus on knowledge advancement and reputational incentives (Dasgupta & David, 1994). A 
research logic emphasizes on novelty and breakthroughs rather than replication and refinement 
(Fini et al., 2010; Merton, 1973). A market logic, on the other hand,  emphasizes quickly 
prototyping the “most promising” application to attain customer feedback, then pivoting to 
position the company according to feedback (Blank & Dorf, 2012). In contrast to the research 
logic, the market logic is consumer-focused, emphasizing short-term milestones and pecuniary 
rewards.  
  While these logics can differ in many respects, the following builds upon recent 
advances (Sauermann & Stephan, 2013), first explaining the necessity of each logic in academic 




enacted by founders, the nature of the work, and the goals, incentives and motivations of the 
individuals21 (see Table 3.1).  
Advancing scientific discoveries from the “prototype” stage to a point where they can be 
translated into a viable market application requires scientists with a research logic (Rothaermel 
& Thursby, 2005).22 Even compared to other technology-based ventures, academic 
entrepreneurship has a heightened need for the research logic because most university 
innovations—especially those licensed to academic startups—are novel discoveries in the 
embryonic stages of technology development (Jensen & Thursby, 2001; Markman et al., 2005; 
Rothaermel et al., 2007). 23 Academic science is therefore not available as ready-made inputs for 
products, but must be experimented with downstream in multiple applications to resolve both 
technological and market uncertainty (Gittelman & Kogut, 2003). All innovative technologies 
are subject to considerable uncertainty before they are market-ready; however, the “upstream” 
nature of university inventions often affords multiple potential market and technology 
applications arising from the technology. These different applications often develop along 
divergent trajectories, and may also differ with respect to robustness, performance and ability to 
satisfy (large) market needs (Shane, 2000). While each application of the technology does not 
                                                 
21 The following discussion, while limited to the differences between research in a university lab and that done in a 
down-stream focused technology-based firm, suggests significant parallels between this context and the difficulties 
within research and development (R vs. D), or upstream and downstream divisions within the firm, are noteworthy.   
22 Several sources estimate that the range of useful information for commercialization in a university patent is 20-50% of 
what is needed to successfully commercialize the invention (e.g., Fuller & Rothaermel, 2012; Jensen & Thursby, 2001). 
23 Academic startups tend to commercialize more basic and complex technologies than are typically licensed by 
universities. According to the Technology Transfer Officer at UIUC, “If the technology is a “one-off solution,” our 
Office prefers to license to a big company every time, why risk not seeing a return? ... Narrow patents are licensed 
because it is easier to make a match. Broad or early-stage patents never made anybody anything, you need to build a 
company around it.” This matches evidence gathered by Markman et al. 2005 in interviews with 91 university technology 
transfer offices (UTTOs), which suggests that the idiosyncratic nature of new university technologies makes it difficult to 
identify promising licensees. Many large firms are averse to sharing confidential details of their ‘technological 




require a major shift in a firm’s technological knowledge base, each application often entails a 
(costly) exploration process to make it “market-ready” (Fini et al., 2010).  
While the research logic’s exploratory outlook is necessary to initially develop the technology, 
unchecked, the routines of the research logic (pursuing multiple ideas at the “proof of concept” 
level) and goals (adding to the public stock of knowledge over commercial pursuits) of this logic 
may cause the venture to spend too much time and money in the exploratory phase and flounder 
in its progress (Gittelman & Kogut, 2003).  
 The tendency for academic scientists to focus on the routines of the research logic is also 
tied to academics’ goals and incentives. Scientists rooted in a research logic seek to add to the 
stock of public knowledge, conducting long-term, basic-research oriented research projects that 
and are rewarded by establishing intellectual priority (i.e., being first to make a discovery) 
through journal publication (Colyvas & Powell, 2006; Stern, 2004). The Mertonian ideals of 
basic science—communalism, universalism, disinterestedness and originality—are markedly 
different from those of the rational economic agent whose goal is to maximize utility and 
economic profit (Colyvas et al., 2002; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2001b). Similarly, the thought 
process for customer-oriented technological development also differs; at the research logic side 
of the spectrum is the goal of ‘discovery for discovery’s sake,’ while the market logic’s focus is 
on applied technology, and solving the question of whether the technology can be delivered in a 
practical way (Jain et al., 2009)24. 
                                                 
24 The shift required of an academic entrepreneur is exemplified by a “typical” response from Jain et al.’s interview 
pool: “There are 50 problems that are interesting from a technical perspective. The question is which one of those 50 
am I going to spend my next hour working on? I would probably make it a mix of is it interesting from a technology 
perspective, and is it high impact in our ability to transition this into the marketplace and to make it meaningful? So 




 These value differences in logics are material for young firms, as even “technical” 
measures such as performance and efficiency are institutionally embedded (Lounsbury, 2007). 
For instance, while an invention may generate several technology applications of varying 
attractiveness (in terms of performance and size of market) as a potential entrepreneurial 
opportunity (Shane, 2000), each of these same scientific applications may constitute an 
‘academic success’ if they result in a publication.   
 Therefore, the configuration of attributes required for successful commercialization 
necessitates a shifts towards a more market-oriented logic to test and fully develop an invention 
(Eisenhardt et al., 2010). As opposed to the long-term, knowledge-production and exploratory 
emphasis of the research logic (Sauermann & Stephan, 2013), the academic startups must also 
integrate a customer mindset and the more concrete, problem-solving-oriented market logic 
(Dasgupta & David, 1994). A market logic emphasizes quickly prototyping the “most 
promising” application to attain customer feedback, then pivoting to position the company 
according to feedback (Blank & Dorf, 2012). Thus, entrepreneurs with a market logic will expect 
radical changes to the product development process as customer input comes into focus, 
entrepreneurs with a research logic pursue multiple potential technology applications at the 
‘proof of concept’ level, with the goal of producing the ‘best technology’ (Miner et al., 2011). 
 To successfully move a product from the laboratory to the customer, an academic startup 
that incorporates elements of a market logic should be able to avoid the endless cycle of basic 
science development, instead solving concrete problems valued in the market place (Dasgupta & 
David, 1994; Lacetera, 2009). Despite the difficult nature of the transition, Herbert Boyer, 
academic co-founder of Genentech, the first biotech firm to IPO, was able to successfully “set up 




community, and put them together (Boyer, 2001; p. 87). Experienced venture capitalists25 in 
technology-based entrepreneurship also desire an integrated technical and commercial focus:   
In particular, the evidence that we want to see is evidence of a market insight. They 
all have technical insights—we don't invest in anything that doesn't have a technical 
basis—I think the strong takeaway is that the commercial considerations must be done 
in parallel with the technical considerations. It’s not an afterthought, it’s not 
something you come in later and tack on the end. If your goal is to get the technology 
out of the lab, it’s never too early to start thinking who the customer for that solution 
is.  
 
How can firms create a hybrid logic that can develop the early-stage technology while also 
integrating the market logic’s customer-oriented focus? 
 
Blending Research and Market Logics 
 Stylized wisdom suggests that high-technology founding teams with industry experience 
may improve survival rates (Shane & Stuart, 2002). Because academic scientists seldom possess 
operational and market knowledge (Agarwal & Shah, 2014), it is argued that academics should 
join founders with industry experience to ensure the firm pays attention to market cues, gains 
industry-specific information, and can integrate routines from industry (Delmar & Shane, 2006; 
Knockaert et al., 2011). Evolutionary economics gives another reason:  pre-entry knowledge 
moderates the ability of the firm to learn and adapt to its environment, such that pre-entry 
knowledge not only has a direct effect on firm survival, but an indirect and ongoing effect as 
                                                 
25 Taped Interview with Errol Arkilic: http://steveblank.com/2015/07/20/how-we-changed-the-way-the-u-s-




well (Dencker, Gruber, & Shah, 2009; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Unpacking this effect, recent 
work from the logics approach suggests a primary reason for this positive relationship is that 
industry experience is a positive signal for significant third parties, as VCs tend to view founding 
executives with technology commercialization experience positively (Pahnke et al., 2015; Wry et 
al., 2014). 
 While industry experience appears to be a critical factor for survival in technology-based 
entrepreneurship, there are mixed findings regarding the performance of academic and business 
co-founders in academic entrepreneurship (Eesley et al., 2014a; Shane & Stuart, 2002). Even 
academic startups with business partners tend to spend a longer time in technology development 
than non-academic, technology-based startups, but commercialize less (Lowe & Ziedonis, 2006; 
Shane, 2004).  
 Why is this? The logics approach, combined with a deep-dive into the commercialization 
process, suggests three reasons why academic startups co-founded by academics and business 
partners may continue to struggle to commercialize quickly. First, the small amount of overlap 
between the two logics provides little common ground from which to build a hybrid firm. 
Second, academic scientists are highly entrenched in the research logic, which increases the time 
and effort that must be expended to create a firm with a hybrid logic. Also affecting this process 
is high level of technological and market uncertainty involved in commercializing academic 
research. As will be shown below, the disparity between two diverse logics can markedly lower 
the successful integration of each logic, in turn decreasing the success rate of those firms trying 
to create a hybrid logic (Almandoz, 2012).   
 Diverse teams with firmly held logics, such as teams composed of academic and business 
partners, may suffer from communication and coordination costs (Williamson, 1981) and greater 
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potential for conflict (Williams & O'Reilly, 1998). Studies on technology-based firms, to date, 
have focused primarily on the diversity of experience among a firm’s managers (e.g., Eisenhardt 
& Schoonhoven, 1990), or the completeness of its team with regard to business functions 
(Beckman & Burton, 2008). However, organizations attempting to create a hybrid logic from 
diverse logics often suffer due to a lack of clear direction (Dunn & Jones, 2010). Too much 
diversity in terms of logics creates significant barriers to effectively recombining differing 
routines from individual founders (Knockaert et al., 2011; Stern, 2004). Tenured faculty 
scientists are confident in their research abilities, but may be less confident in their ability to 
judge their business partner’s abilities and even in the necessity of a business partner. A 
successful academic runs a lab of 10-40 people (employees), with post-docs and staff 
(management) who direct the research. They bring in thousands to millions of dollars of grant 
money per year (revenues), and generate publications (products). Due to their experience running 
labs, and the lack of research expertise on the part of the business partners, there often is a low 
trust level for the suggestions of the business partner.  
Academics and business partners are firmly and deeply ingrained in their respective 
logics, which increases the time and effort required reach the mutual understanding necessary to 
create a stable hybrid logic (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Powell & Sandholtz, 2012). In general, 
entrepreneurs are “imprinted” by their prior experience, mirroring the preferences and practices 
of prior firms (Almandoz, 2012; Beckman & Burton, 2008) and resisting templates foreign their 
prior logic’s core assumptions (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). The strength of this imprinting effect 
increases with tenure and rank at the firm (Feldman, Ozcan, & Reichstein, 2015; Phillips, 2002). 
These limitations on founding team diversity are especially relevant with academic 




firm (Jain et al., 2009) and simultaneously engage in both academic and entrepreneurial pursuits 
(Owen-Smith & Powell, 2001a). Retaining their tenured, academic status also implies that these 
founders are concurrently working on their academic research while starting a firm. Logics and 
routines that are currently utilized, legitimate and accessible are very difficult to leave behind 
(Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008; Ding & Choi, 2011; Thornton et al., 2012).  
  The more basic nature of academic research, when compared to other technology-based 
startups, also increases the time and effort needed to create a hybrid logic. One reason for this is 
that it is difficult for scientists to pick industry professionals who sufficiently understand the 
technology and can help guide it towards a beneficial market (Clarysse & Moray, 2004; Vohora 
et al., 2004).26 The high levels of technological and market uncertainty inherent in these 
university-based technologies increases the difficulty of knowing which norms and elements of 
the market logic to adopt (Almandoz, 2012). Relatedly, the uncertain, exploratory nature of the 
technology development is so similar to the scientist’s current research in the lab, that academic 
scientists have a difficult time transitioning out those scientific routines (Gittelman & Kogut, 
2003; Miner et al., 2011; Stern, 2004). Indeed, research suggests that university-based startups 
often organize more like university laboratories and engage in basic research than industrial 
pursuits (Powell & Sandholtz, 2012; Smith-Doerr, 2004).  Finally, the transition for academics to 
a hybrid logic is made even more difficult due to the lack of job descriptions, training programs, 
written rules and other externalized forms of the legitimate norms and behaviors (Aldrich, 2006). 
In the absence of a proscribed set of routines, individuals tend to rely on familiar behaviors 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982; Wennberg et al., 2011). 
                                                 
26 Another concern, though outside of the scope of this paper, is that those startups who hire an industry partner some 
time after founding may have already established a dominant research logic developed during the startup’s formative 
years. Often, this proves durable; many academic startups (inadvertently) create a business run like an academic lab, only 




  Two quotes from academic scientists, the first with extensive entrepreneurial experience, 
the other a first-time founder, describe the difficulty in changing outlooks27: 
Particularly in an entrepreneurial environment, there's a laser-beam focus, there's a 
single fact of attention. There's usually something that is right now in the critical path 
that needs all your focus. In the academic world, you're on multiple fronts at the same 
time. You're teaching one day, you're working with your research group the next day, 
you probably have more than one research activity going. So you're bouncing between 
ideas; it's mentally very stimulating; you have this wonderful parade of students 
coming through to constantly renew things. (George & Bock , 2009, p. 74) 
 
We actually have a suite of technologies that are related only in the broadest sense; 
they are all biomechanical. I like the fact that my lab is very broad and diverse because 
of that--we have a suite of technologies that could allow a company a lot of flexibility 
in development….This leads to some difficulties….In terms of funding, a lot of people 
want to see you focus on one thing so they can truly understand what this company is 
about. Another way to think about it is that the investor would have to trust 
management because there would be these decisions to make to meet the challenges. 
(Academic Scientist at UIUC)    
 
This paper suggests that a diverse founding team is not sufficient to create a hybrid logic. 
Rather, it develops an argument that firms are more quickly able to achieve a hybrid logic when 
                                                 
27 As with other studies that develop context-specific hypotheses (e.g., Wry et al., 2014 ), we consulted archival materials and 
conducted interviews to gain insights into how our focal actors, academic founders, VCs and others perceived the path to 
commercialization. As with these studies, the purpose of our interviews was to add context and help to illustrate key arguments. They 




the academic founders A) already have experience operating under the hybrid research-market 
logic, and/or B) are joined with a trusted co-founder who is less tied to either logic, and can 
therefore integrate both logics. 
 
Role of Entrepreneurial Experience   
Although it has been suggested that startups founded by only academics will have an 
especially difficult time transitioning to a hybrid logic, prior entrepreneurial experience may 
still enhance academic entrepreneurs’ ability to blend logics. Entrepreneurs who are 
predisposed to choosing certain actions, or seeing the world in a certain way, are likely to 
continue doing so until strong evidence to the contrary is presented (Suen, 2004). While such 
entrepreneurs naturally import the outlooks and routines from their prior (and current) logic 
(e.g., Almandoz, 2012), it is a stylized fact in the entrepreneurship literature that prior 
experience constitutes “experiential learning” (Wennberg et al., 2011). Prior entrepreneurial 
experience exposes these serial entrepreneurs to the outlook, values and routines of a 
different logic, which provides the entrepreneur an opportunity to change his dominant logic, 
with its assumptions, values and routines (Gavetti, 2011; Gavetti et al., 2005). Experienced 
entrepreneurs should have gained “backward-looking” experiential wisdom as a result of 
positive and negative reinforcement of prior choices (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000). 
Entrepreneurial experience may provide the academic with a hands-on, on-the-ground 
experiential learning which cannot easily be acquired otherwise (Jain et al., 2009).  
Entrepreneurial experience may be particularly vital for academic entrepreneurs, as time 
constraints and lack of familiarity with business resources (Shane & Stuart, 2002) amplify the 




academic’s understanding of and attention to the market logic, which makes it difficult for the 
first-time academic entrepreneur to see the benefit of changing their mindset and routines 
(Owen-Smith & Powell, 2001b). Entrepreneurial experience can impart the academic the 
mindset and values of the market logic, as well as higher-order routines and skills necessary to 
transition the technology from the laboratory to the market (Delmar & Shane, 2006). For 
instance, the ability to “frame” a technological breakthrough in “opportunity” terms is very 
difficult for the inexperienced academic entrepreneur (Vohora et al., 2004); this is especially 
relevant in the case of academic and business partners, as the academic who can precisely define 
the applications of the technology can find appropriate partners and willing customers. One 
experienced academic entrepreneur28 described the importance of entrepreneurial experiences in 
the transition to a hybrid logic: 
People who are in engineering disciplines and spend their whole time in academia really don't 
understand what it's like in companies. They don't understand how people make decisions. You 
realize the difference between a product and something you have in a laboratory. You learn 
about leading people and managing teams; you learn a lot about focus. And you learn that there 
is a great reward when you build a product and people use it. 
 
When compared to startups co-founded by academic scientist and business partners, those 
firms founded by experienced academic scientists may be able to more quickly commercialize 
their technology. While the majority of the organizational innovation literature agrees that 
diverse teams are superior to homogenous teams in their ability to produce innovative outcomes 
(eg., Beckman, 2006; Eesley et al., 2014), there is some evidence to suggest that individuals may 
                                                 




be able to better combine diverse knowledge and routines more effectively than teams (Taylor & 
Greve, 2006). Firms led by an academic with entrepreneurial experience require less time 
blending the different logics, as the academic’s prior experience enables an internalization of 
both research and market logics. This effect, however, should not necessarily hold for mixed 
teams of academics and business partners. Due to their lack of research expertise, the business 
partner, with or without entrepreneurial experience, doesn’t have the technological expertise to 
be trusted by the academic.  Therefore, I suggest that an individual or team composed of solely 
academics, where at least one has entrepreneurial experience, should more quickly reach a 
hybrid logic than those teams composed of academics and business partners29. Thus,  
 
H1: Academic startups founded by academics with entrepreneurial experience will 
realize shorter time to sales than those startups co-founded by academic and business partners.    
 
Role of Embeddedness 
As experienced academic entrepreneurs are in short supply, one configuration of team 
that may develop a hybrid logic more quickly than the academic and business team is that of an 
academic and a (graduate) student. Graduate student founders30 can help the firm reach a hybrid 
logic for several reasons.  
First, while graduate students may not have the market logic of the business partner, they 
are less embedded in either logic, enabling the firm to adopt a hybrid logic more quickly than an 
                                                 
29 If the firm adopts a hybrid logic, we should expect to see the firm produce sales—even within industries that require 
long incubation periods—as sales represent a shift towards raising funds from the market, as opposed to the 
government. These firms can sell or license elements of their technology to other firms, or sell their processes, as a form 
of bricolage or ‘bootstrapping’ to raise revenues years before a technology is commercialized (Lowe & Ziedonis; 2006).  
30It is worth noting that almost every faculty-founded firm in the sample employs graduate students. The hypothesis 
development refers to these graduate students becoming founders—not simply employees.  
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industry- and academic-led firm. Because founders are “carriers” of logics (Almandoz, 2014), it 
is possible that the degree to which the founder is embedded in the logic is important in 
determining the routines adopted by the fledgling organization, and therefore the commercial 
success of the startup (Pache & Santos, 2013). Almandoz (2014) finds that prior embeddedness 
in a particular logic imprints founders, and influences the decisions they make and affects their 
entrepreneurial success (successful foundings). Indeed, within the same industry, founder’s 
strongly-held worldviews significantly influence the startup’s organizing strategy (Fauchart & 
Gruber, 2011). Graduate students also do not have a tenured position and salary at a university 
(Jain et al., 2009; Rizzo, 2014),31 nor do they have the same level of socialization due to less 
time spent under that logic (Ding & Choi, 2011), reducing their ties to the research logic in 
comparison to other academic founders. 
Second, graduate students also have a different set of preferences and motivations than 
academics, enabling them to help the firm transition more efficiently to a hybrid logic. While it is 
argued that all scientists share a desire for intellectual freedom (Stern, 2004), more recent work 
suggests that scientists self-select into the sector (academia or industry) that best matches their 
preferences and needs32. Indeed, when compared to their faculty, students are twice as likely to 
create a start-up (of equal quality) three years after school (Åstebro, Bazzazian, & Braguinsky, 
2012). Graduating PhD students in the sciences who had chosen to work for a startup after their 
school seem to have different preferences than the academic, caring less about basic research, job 
security and prestige than academia-bound students (Roach & Sauermann, 2010). Their natural 
31 As faculty are simultaneously engaged in both academic and entrepreneurial pursuits, they may be less motivated and 
less able to accept and blend elements from the market logic (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2001).  
32 Interviews suggest that faculty reap the bulk of the reward of technological achievement from their ‘current’ market—




proclivity towards a hybrid logic should help the firm: according to an incubator director in the 
Midwest:  
You really want that person [the technical founder] to be engaged, and to understand, or start 
to understand, commercialization, and what it means to take something from a research 
standpoint into commercial sales. 
Third, during their degree work, graduate students gain a focused expertise in the nature, 
goals, and routines of the research logic. Exposure to the research logic satisfies the need for the 
academic scientist to have a co-founder who understands and values the tacit elements of the 
technology. The shared logics, knowledge and experience of the graduate student founders with 
their research scientist co-founders should also help reduce the inevitable conflicts that emerge 
as the firm transitions towards a hybrid logic (Kor, 2003). In their inductive study on academic 
entrepreneurs, Jain et al. find that academics pick graduate students co-founders because they 
possess the requisite technical capabilities to allow them to delegate control of the firm to these 
individuals (2009). This is a critical point, as one of academic’s primary motivations, otherwise, 
in starting a firm is the desire to maintain control over the technology (Jain et al., 2009). 
According to one serial entrepreneur:  
When faculty commit their technology, they want to control the process. They are a lot smarter 
about the technology than any business guy could ever be. However, when the graduate student 
is there, the faculty isn’t planning on leaving the university; it’s okay for the graduate student 
to get involved and do what he likes. The faculty will take a CTO role, but doesn’t run with it, 
isn’t the driving factor.33 
                                                 





  Coupling the right preferences and motivations with the necessary trust, graduate 
students founders should be well-positioned to partner with an academic to cultivate a hybrid 
logic.   
H2a: Academic startups founded by both academics and graduate students will realize 
shorter time to sales than those startups co-founded by academic and business partners.    
Role of an “Emulsifier” 
 As proposed above, graduate students seem to have a proclivity for creating a hybrid 
logic, as they have different preferences and motivations than an academic and are “in but not 
of” the research logic. However, graduate students do not have experience with a market logic. 
Therefore, a graduate student founder may better serve as an emulsifier, combining the disparate 
logics of the academic (research) and business (market) cofounders into a hybrid logic. Recipes 
requiring the use of oil and water utilize emulsifiers (such as egg or mustard) to combine the two 
discordant elements. Emulsifiers effectively combine oil and water because the molecule’s head 
has a charge, so it can bond with water, but the molecule’s tail is without charge, allowing it to 
bond with oil (See Figure 1). Graduate students, due to their research expertise and the trust they 
have with the academic, allow them to “bond” with the academic, maintaining the research logic 
necessary in the early stages of firm development. However, their penchant for elements of the 
market logic also enable them to interact well with business partners.  
 An important elements the graduate students’ ability to emulsify the divergent logics of 
the academic and business cofounders is their proclivity for elements of both logics. In the 
context of science-driven entrepreneurship, it has been theorized that “bridging the disconnect 




access to individuals who perform both activities, rather than on the ability to generate valuable 
scientific knowledge alone” (Gittelman and Kogut, 2003, p. 380, emphasis added). Graduating 
PhD students who prefer academia are motivated primarily by intellectual freedom and job 
security (research logic traits), while those who prefer industrial employment are very different, 
ranking salary and applied R&D (market logic traits) most highly (Roach & Sauermann, 2010). 
Intriguingly, those graduating students who choose to work for a start-up tend to prefer more 
responsibility and intellectual freedom than those bound for industry, while caring less about 
prestige and job security (while also valuing applied R&D) than those bound for academia. 
These traits suggest that students possess a mixture of research and market logic preferences 
prior to entrepreneurial experience 34. According to two current graduate student entrepreneurs:  
I like the Development part more than others who are going in academia; doing research 
in academia is exciting, but it is not as exciting as the real industry. Probably half of 
academic technology cannot be transferred outside, on an industry scale. But doing 
catalysts can really solve problems, like to solve the energy problem by trying to make use 
of excess gas. That makes me feel more useful, and in that way I can contribute more to 
society and the community rather than play around with new theories, you know? I think, 
basically, I am a practical person. If the technology is useless, then it gives me nothing. 
 
My role is largely technological, as I am pushing the technology forward. But I also do a 
lot of the customer development side, working with collaborators and talking to potential 
customers. I also write most of the grants, together with [the academic founder].   
                                                 
34 One graduate-student founder in our sample wanted to found a firm for “that quest for information, but the thing 
that’s different for me about the commercial setting is that it’s not basic science, it is applied science. I don’t want to 
figure out fundamental gene promoter issues. But, if I can say that you can further activate that in this bacteria…then 
you can use a smaller dose and still get the same effect, and that’s a huge [cost] saving for customers.” 
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Adding to the above reasoning on why founding teams of academics and students may be 
more quickly able to create a hybrid logic than academic and business teams, the former also has 
an element of trust not found in the relationship of the latter. One critical component of the 
liability of newness is that founders often lack mutual trust, esteem, and the routines of a 
working relationship (Stinchcombe, 1965). The student and academic, however, have worked 
together before, breeding trust (Knockaert et al., 2011). Also, their previous (and concurrent) 
research relationship gives both parties not only common knowledge, but also an established 
mode of communication and conflict resolution (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2011). Many academic 
entrepreneurs experience an arduous sense-making process, preferring to delegate to someone 
they trust the responsibility for the business side of the startup (Jain et al., 2009). Because 
graduate students are more motivated to see the technology reach the market in a timely manner, 
there is also better rapport between them and the business founder; the student can provide the 
commercial rational not to postpone product development for another round of vital 
experimentation. According to one graduate student founder:  
[F]aculty and industry partners never see eye to eye, that's a fact. I am the middle-man. When
the faculty doesn’t believe something the CEO says, I can go back to the lab and get the facts. 
We are scientists, so if he can see it in the data then he will be convinced by it. But when there 
are no facts, like in a business decision, then I also help, because we can simply “count heads.” 
So I think that it helps to have both the part-time CEO and me, as we have a better handle on 




 Graduate student founders’ research abilities, combined with the willingness to engage in 
both the technological and commercial aspects of the business, provides their firms a unique 
ability to market35 and develop the technology. Students’ unique openness to elements of both 
logics enables the graduate student founder to understand both the necessity of speaking with 
customers during early technology development as well as how spending more time improving 
the underlying technology can likewise bolter the technology’s market prospects. In addition, 
students’ understanding of commercial needs may enable them to use a market perspective to 
validate early-stage technological development. Thus, while founding teams composed of 
academic, industry and student founders would seem to face more conflict due to an increased 
number of individual viewpoints, we expect that students’ ability to integrate the two logics will 
in fact decrease communication costs improve conflict resolution within the team. The students’ 
ability to serve as an emulsifier of both logics should also help the firm avoid the common 
problem of mission drift to the poles (Pache & Santos, 2013). The increased harmony resulting 
from this composition will speed the firm’s transition into a hybrid logic as compared to a team 
with academic and industry founders: 
H2b: Academic startups founded by academic, business and student founders will realize 
shorter time to sales than those startups co-founded by academic and business partners.    
 
METHODS AND SAMPLE  
                                                 
35 How to market the technology is a key rift between founders with divergent logics. A typical example is Vosaic, a 
firm which had the technological expertise to pursue several market opportunities. The industry partner perceived 
several opportunities as similar, and therefore pre-sold the idea to multiple companies for start-up capital, leading to 




Focusing on the founding teams of academic startups is well suited for analyzing the 
impact of market and research logics on commercialization because both logics are reasonable 
and currently accessible to founders (Almandoz, 2014; pg. 448), and are also likely to have 
contrasting effects on the firm’s sources of funding (via grants or bootstrapping), as sales (from 
either licenses or a product) represent a move towards a hybrid logic. Focusing on university 
spin-offs also helps control for differences between university and non-university spin-offs 
(Wennberg et al., 2011).  In this context, interviews with various research-oriented parties 
emphasized the importance of grant writing and improving the technology, while those of a 
market-orientation spoke of the importance of customer involvement and generating sales. 
To track the founding team’s ties to either logic, or their ability to create a hybrid logic, I 
analyzed yearly sales data on academic startups from 1989-2012. The sample consists of 473 
technology-based firms36 spun off from six large research universities37 spread across the United 
States.  The original sample had 599 firms, 108 of which were dropped because they were either 
founded too early -- prior to the period in which sales data can be captured – or too late, after 
2009 raising issues of spurious right-tailed truncation (sales data are available from 1989-2012). 
Each of the remaining firms were screened by three separate researchers so as to only to capture 
high-technology entrepreneurial ventures and exclude life-style and consulting firms (Shane, 
                                                 
36 The author is indebted to Kenney and Patton (2011) for the initial list of ventures and founding teams. Their sample 
consisted of de novo firms started by university faculty, research scientists, or graduate students. Upon receipt of the 
initial list, the author examined each venture to ensure that it was an entrepreneurial venture formed to commercialize a 
university invention and gathered academic, industry and entrepreneurial experience for each founder, as well as firm-
level data (also sales, VC funding, SBIR grants, acquisitions and IPO). If the founder or founders of a firm could not be 
identified, or if there was insufficient information to determine the employment background of the founder, these firms 
were not included in my database. Consulting firms, firms in retail, accommodation management and commerce-based 
internet website firms were excluded from my initial sample of 599 as well.  
37 The schools are UC Berkley, UC Davis, UC Santa Barbara and the Universities of Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin. 
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2004). The resulting sample is 473 technology-based firms, founded by at least one individual 
affiliated with the university during or immediately prior to establishing the de novo firm.  
The main challenge in studying academic entrepreneurship lies in the paucity of micro-
level data capturing firm performance over time. These data address both of these issues, 
tracking the commercial activities of these academic startups over a 24-year period, as well as 
founder-level data for each venture. To deepen understanding of the context, I also conducted 25 
interviews with the following informants from the University of Illinois, UC Berkley, NCSU and 
Brigham Young University: academic founders, research park directors, venture capitalists, 
serial entrepreneurs, and technology transfer officers. A core set of specific questions was posed 
to the interviewees for purposes of consistency, but questions were purposefully open-ended to 
permit broad discussion. For each venture, I collected demographic data for all individuals listed 
as founders at time of startup, including university affiliation, current and prior employment, 
education, academic department, and gender. Primarily, these data come from biographies, web 
searches of company, university and personal websites, LinkedIn, LexisNexis, and contacting 
technology transfer personnel at the universities. 
Measures 
Dependent Variable: Time to Sales. I examine the academic startup’s transition from a research 
to hybrid logic by observing the time to sales, covering the interval spanning the time between 
when the firm is established and when it first generates sales (e.g., Schoonhoven et al., 1990). 
Because the sales figure captures sales from any source (services, license or product) it does not 
solely represent commercial success, but also the firm’s transition from funding solely through 




bootstrapping). Sales are observed yearly in the National Establishment Time-Series (NETS) 
database (Walls, 2013).  
Independent Variables: In general, demographic characteristics are important indicators of 
sources of cognition—they can reasonably be seen to represent managers’ logics, as a function of 
their knowledge and routine accumulations from prior experiences (Almandoz, 2014; Kaplan & 
Tripsas, 2008). Individual’s routines evolve from their experiences, and while demographic 
attributes do not covary perfectly with cognitive characteristics like logics, studies of top 
management teams suggest that these attributes can serve as useful proxies for the unobservable 
(Taylor & Greve, 2006). Restricting the sample to founders helps achieve consistency across the 
sample, as firm leadership often changes with the successful completion of milestones.  Firms 
with the following “types” of founding teams are coded as (1=Yes, 0=No): 
Academic-Only: Ventures are classified as ‘academic-only’ if, at the time of founding, the 
founding team consisted exclusively of faculty and/or university-employed research scientists 
without entrepreneurial experience38.  
Serial Academic-Only: Building on extant research (Beckman et al., 2007), this type of firm 
refers to those founded exclusively by academics, where one or more have entrepreneurial 
experience. (H1)  
                                                 
38 Research Scientists are co-classified with faculty as academic scientists because they represent full-time, specialist 
researchers. Similar to faculty scientists, they write and receive government grants, publish papers and chose academic 
(vs. industry) research as their career due to an alignment with their preferences and motivations. They differ from 
faculty in that they do not have a teaching requirement, a tenure arrangement or graduate students. But these differences 




Academic & Student: Graduate students39 are employed in every startup founded by academics 
in the sample, much fewer have student co-founders. Due to many interviews40 suggesting a 
material difference between the role and function of student founders vs. employees, this type of 
firm refers exclusively to firms founded by academics and graduate students (H2A).   
Academic, Student & Business: Firms founded by academics, students and business partners; 
this is a key type in this study to test the emulsifying role of the graduate student (H2B).  
Academic & Business: Firms founded by solely academics and business partners (any individual 
unaffiliated with a university, but joined from another firm as a founder). As this is the solution 
most commonly recommended, I include this type of firm as the reference case for the 
hypotheses.  
 
Control Variables  
A number of controls are included to reflect the firm’s underlying ability to commercialize their 
technology, as well as the (perceived and realized) quality of the firm. Venture Capital. The 
                                                 
39 Founders qualify as graduate student if they are concurrently listed as founder and graduate student, or if the firm 
started 1 year or less after graduation and there was no indication that the student was employed in the interim. 
40 For instance, here’s an extended excerpt from an interview with a local venture capitalist (August, 2012): “Tim and I 
are working with a couple of other teams that are just that way--the professor, the doctoral student (or the post-doc 
who's working for the professor,)--they are bringing this thing together. Usually the junior one will be the CEO or the 
lead person…..  The post-doc is usually more flexible as to what their life commitments are--and they're probably not 
teaching. And they might need a job, and they're trying to make the decision of do I go start this company or do I go get 
a job, or what should I do? Whereas the professor often wants to keep his job; keep being a professor--that's often a big 
thing. But there's sort of this culture--I'm not sure about this, but this is what I've seen. So, this is anecdotally true from 
time to time that the professor kind of gets a kick out of watching his protégés spin these things off into ideas; so they 
are very supportive. And of course, the PhD students or the Post-Docs are sitting there thinking, "what's the next phase 
of my career going to be? Wow, I could take this technology and turn it into something that could be a lot of fun--
maybe I'll take a run at it." It doesn't always work out real well, there are all kinds of reasons businesses fail, but that is 
happening….In fact,  I would say that it's often not even that professor that's the keeper of the flame; it's really the post-
doc or the doctoral student who's really charged up about it, and through lots of conversations with their advisor, 
they've come to realize that "hey, this might be a nice thing for you." "You ought to run with this." "Really, you think I 
can do it?" "Yeah, you should run with this." And BANG off they go. So, it's almost as if it's the student's idea, not the 
professor's; the professor is in a supportive role, but they've got this little environment that nurtures that.” 
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receipt of these funds over time captures an element of the technology’s market attractiveness, 
but also proxies for mentorship, resources and a larger network received from these groups, 
which should be related to a firm’s ability to generate sales (Pahnke et al., 2015).  SBIR Grants. 
The Small Business Innovation and Research (SBIR) program, enacted in 1982, is a public 
program that provides grants to fund private sector R&D projects. It aims to help fulfill the 
government’s mission to enhance private sector R&D and by advancing innovation in the basic 
sciences for ventures in very early stages of product development. Phase 1 grants are peer-
reviewed by academics to verify whether the specific technology application has the potential for 
commercialization. Phase 1 SBIR grants are observed as a longitudinal count of grants over time. 
Similar to VC funding, these grants provide resources and serve as a signal of the perceived 
quality from a scientific perspective.  
Technology License. Many academic startups license technology from the university via the 
school’s Technology Transfer Office (TTOs). As the TTO attempts to serve as a boundary 
spanner for the academic and commercial worlds, a license proxies TTO resources and the 
technology’s perceived value41 to the university. Many interviews with university personnel 
suggest that ventures who license the technology from the university benefit, as TTOs help 
facilitate commercialization via providing direction about potential market applications, general 
market conditions, and patent protection feasibility . This is coded as a dummy variable, 1 if the 
venture licensed the technology. Industry. To control for differences in resource requirements, 
time to commercialization and appropriability regime, we created dummy variables for the 
41TTOs have the option to pass or to license the technology to the firm. Licensing the technology is not without its 
costs to the university, as a license expends exiguous man-hours to investigate, track and support the license. A license 
also proxies for quality, as **TTOS are increasingly functioning as “technology intermediaries” that help facilitate the 
transfer of technological innovations from the lab bench to industry Markman, G. D., Phan, P. H., Balkin, D. B., & 





following industry sectors: information technology—software ; information technology—
hardware ; life sciences; medical instruments; and a final category including engineering, 
nanotechnology, semiconductors, materials, etc. (12% of sample). We obtained this data from 
the NETS (Wells, 2010), PrivCo, CorpTech and Hoover databases, as well as university 
directories, where the categories were defined using the description of the company given by the 
university or by the company’s website. As the industry affects both strategy and performance, it 
is important to control for the technological focus of the venture (Eesley et al., 2014a). Team 
Size. Because team size is an important indicator of the human capital available in a new venture, 
as well as potentially a signal for the perceived attractiveness of the technology, this study also 
controls for founding team size. University. While scientists’ proclivity to participate in 
university technology transfer is highly dependent upon individual attributes, those personal 
traits are conditioned by the local work environment (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008). Universities 
vary in their attitude and in the resources provides to faculty and/or students participating in 
entrepreneurial behaviors. I therefore include a dummy variable for each university. Recession 
Year. I also included a dummy if the firm was founded in 1990-91, 2001, or 2008. 
 
Analysis 
In this paper, I aimed to identify the predictors of the cumulative incidence of sales with the Fine 
and Gray model (1999), which extends the Cox proportional hazards model to competing-risks 
data by considering the subdistribution hazards. The strength of the association between each 
predictor variable and the outcome is assessed using the subhazard ratio; the ratio of hazards 
associated with the cumulative incidence function in the presence (or absence) of the 




technology-based firms. Once established, each firm is at risk of generating sales, but not all 
firms reach sales at the end of the sample. Instead, many firms fail to achieve sales at all, due to 
dissolution or acquisition. Firm deaths or acquisitions occurring before sales are not considered 
in this analysis, but it is not appropriate to sample on the dependent variable. This is where the 
advantage Fine-Gray approach (vs. Cox Proportional hazard model) comes in: while the 
cumulative incidence function is an involved function of all cause-specific hazards, the 
subdistribution hazard reestablishes a one-to-one relationship and consequently offers a 
summarizing analysis of separate cause specific hazards analyses. In this paper, the purpose of 
the analysis is to assess how founding team composition speeds up or slows down the occurrence 
of the first sales event, which is a nonlinear function of all three cause-specific hazards and the 
baseline hazard: h1(t)=sales, h2(t)=death, and h3(t)=acquisition. I want to allow the covariates to 
affect h1, h2, and h3 differently.  As opposed to a cause-specific analysis (such as a Cox model), 
which would censor the competing event(s), the Fine-Gray approach “carries forward” the 
competing event(s) in the risk set, with appropriate weighting, and does not censor them. The 
standard errors are robust (Huber-White) and clustered for each firm.  
 The Fine-Gray model is a nonlinear bivariate regression model, estimated in STATA by 
“stcrreg”. In general, this makes it difficult to interpret the range of covariate values, though it is 
less of an issue with binary variables (Norton, Wang, & Ai, 2004). However, it is important to 
verify the assumption of proportionality—that the baseline hazard varies across subjects only as 
accounted for by the covariates—in hazard models, to do so we performed a Grambsch & 
Therneau analysis on the residuals (“estat phtest”) and found that the model does not violate 
proportionality (p>0.1). The interpretation of the coefficients is based on whether they are 
greater or less than 1. A coefficient less than 1 suggests that when the variable of interest 
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increases, the hazard rate of experiencing the outcome represented in the column decreases 
compared to the base rate (or average), or, in this case, it takes more time to generate sales. A 
coefficient higher than 1 suggests that the hazard of experiencing the outcome increases 
compared to the base rate, or less time is required before sales (See Tables 3.2-3.3 & Figure 3.3). 
RESULTS 
The correlation matrix and summary statistics are shown in Table 3.2. Correlations are 
|0.4| or less, indicating that collinearity of covariates should not be a concern. Variance inflation 
measures for each variables are insignificant, with variance inflation factor values (chi^2 <2.0). 
Table 3.2 reports the empirical analysis, where Model 2 details time to Sales and Model 3 time to 
acquisition; all models include all controls. Supporting the idea that universities do not license 
the “most” basic technologies, firms that license their technology from the university generate 
sales more quickly than those without a license. Contrary to some prior findings (Shane, 2000), 
there is no increase in innovation for larger teams.  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that firms founded by academics with prior entrepreneurial 
experience will more quickly generate sales than the academic and business firms, but results do 
not support this hypothesis. Although the effect of a serial academic founder is in the expected 
positive direction, the coefficient for time-to-sales is not significant, suggesting that more than 
experience is needed for academic founders to adopt a hybrid logic. This finding is consistent 
with that of recent work suggesting that, in the context of technology-based entrepreneurship, 
prior entrepreneurial experience is not sufficient to change the minds and routines of scientists 
(Eesley & Roberts, 2012; Knockaert et al., 2011). In an attempt to understand this finding, I 
interviewed a serial entrepreneur to ask about why the serial academic entrepreneur appeared to 





Even the serial faculty entrepreneur doesn’t get it. It’s an embedded worldview, and it 
colors the whole process. They are in a logic that will never apply in a commercial 
world. They always reapply it. It is very difficult to ascend that. When it works, it is 
due to a graduate student leading the team, or a very tech- and person-savvy industry 
partner. But I consider myself a very savvy partner, and I have a very hard time doing 
it. And this is my 6th startup. 
 Models 2 & 3 confirm this belief, suggesting that experienced academic entrepreneurs, 
due to their embeddedness in the research logic, may not be able to quickly apply the new, 
market-related knowledge gained from their entrepreneurial experience to the venture. The 
coefficient (2.75) for the firm founded by both a student and a serial entrepreneur suggest that 
these firms, while rare, operate under a hybrid logic, quickly generating sales to support ongoing 
research efforts. Adding to the hypothesized findings, these results suggest that founders 
embedded in the research logic may have the know-why, but have difficulty with the know-how, 
or struggle to leave their past worldview and routines behind. However, when coupled with a 
trusted, less-embedded founder, the embedded, experienced academic founder can point the firm 
in the right direction to achieve a hybrid logic. 
 Hypotheses 2A & 2B focus on the role of the graduate student founder, whether as a less 
embedded enabler for the entrenched academic, or as an emulsifier between the research and 
market logics.  I fail to find support for Hypothesis 2A; academic and student co-founded firms 
do not move quicker to sales than those led by business and academic partners. It is worth noting 
that while these teams are not statistically quicker than academic-industry partnered teams, they 
are not slower either. This appears to confirm findings of patenting behaviors in university 
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laboratories, where faculty and graduate student teams are much more likely to patent than either 
group alone, suggesting a shift towards innovation and a hybrid logic (Carayol & Matt, 2004).  
Digging into the roles of the graduate student as an emulsifier, it appears that the firm 
founded by both an academic and a business partner would appear to have, without the graduate 
student, the right set of knowledge, skills, and experience to move the technology forward. Yet, 
founding teams with graduate student founders are much quicker, on average, to move towards 
commercialization. Expressed as hazard ratios, the coefficient of 1.71 (in Model 2) suggests that 
if we compare two firms, one who is led by academic and business partners, the other led by a 
student with academic and business partners, in just one year the latter firm is almost twice as 
likely to generate sales (172%). However, the same effect is not seen for either the student and 
faculty teams, or the student and business partner teams; this suggests that motivation and effort, 
proxied by the graduate student founder, are not sufficient to move the firm to 
commercialization. Rather, the largest gain comes from graduate student’s ability to integrate the 
right mixture of goals, skills and routines from both research and market logics into a coherent 
hybrid logic.   
Robustness 
DV-Acquisition For some industries, the nature of the appropriability regime (Gans & Stern,
2003) necessitates that many technology-based startups seek out an acquirer rather than sell their 
technology (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006). Acquisitions often represent a successful exit for 
academic entrepreneurs (Lowe & Ziedonis, 2006). Model 3 captures this by analyzing time to 
acquisition. Acquisitions and failure data were compiled by the author’s searches of SDC 




remain unchanged for acquisition when compared to sales, firms founded by students and 
business partners experience less time until acquisition. This suggests that, when compared to 
academic and business co-founders, these firms are able to more quickly develop their 
technology such that established firms are willing to acquire the startup (see Table 3.4). 
Industry Analyses  To provide additional insight into potential mechanisms operating across the 
firms, I also run sub-group models for each industry cluster (Kenney & Patton, 2011). This 
approach relaxes the assumption that all other covariate effects are equal across sub-groups, and 
may be especially important in this context. For instance, in the life sciences industry, ventures 
frequently develop a new technology and then partner with incumbents for subsequent regulatory 
approval, marketing, sales and distribution, suggesting that time to acquisition rather than time to 
commercialization may serve as a better measure for firms within that industry. Looking at the 
four largest industry segments—IT-Software, IT-Hardware, Life Sciences, Medical 
Instruments—and the final category, consisting of Engineering & Physical Sciences, Table 3.4 
gives the hazard rations for each industry group. Only the IT-Hardware industry group shows 
nuanced support for H1, that academic scientists with prior entrepreneurial experience will move 
more quickly to sales. The prediction of H2B, that firms co-led by students, academics and 
business partners will move more quickly to sales is also supported except for the software and 
life sciences industry groups. This is not unexpected; software is the least “basic” of the 
technology groups, meaning that the routines and outlook of the research logic in software are 
much more tightly aligned with the routines of the market logic. Similarly, lack of results for 
only the life sciences industry group is not unexpected, as startups rarely, if ever, commercialize 
their technology, but rather are acquired before that time (Lowe & Ziedonis, 2006). Again, firms 
founded by an experienced academic and a graduate student quickly generate to sales.  
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DISCUSSION 
Research universities have long been recognized as providing critical inputs for economic 
development, including academic knowledge, technological innovation and skilled workers. 
Increasingly, academic entrepreneurship has been hailed as an important mechanism in 
university’s role as a creator and dealer in the market for intellectual property (Fuller & 
Rothaermel, 2012; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2001b). However, given the high level of human and 
intellectual capital in these ventures, as well as the strong intellectual property system in the 
U.S., the low rate of commercialization success for these startups is puzzling. This research
builds on our prior understanding of the difficulty of academic entrepreneurship, by taking a 
deep-dive into the phenomenon via a mixed methods approach, with the goal to better 
understand early founder behaviors in academic entrepreneurship and the role of founders’ 
institutional logics, and to test the relative firm-level effects of founders with diverging logics. 
Consistent with literature in technology-based entrepreneurship that adding in the right 
knowledge ingredients is insufficient to create the right ‘entrepreneurial sauce’ (Delmar & 
Shane, 2006; Dencker et al., 2009; Gittelman & Kogut, 2003), I find weak support for the idea 
that a firm led by academic and business founders will reduce the time to sales (e.g., Model 1, 
the coefficient for academic and business-led firms (Academic-Business), suggesting that these 
firms are faster than academic-only led firms, with limited support). Indeed, these mixed 
research and market logic firms do not perform any better than firms led by academics with 
entrepreneurship experience or by those led by academic and student teams. This finding 
suggests that combining two parties with the complementary knowledge is not necessarily 




 In this context, having an individual who understands, or is amenable to accepting, both 
logics, appears to be a key factor. As theorized by Gittelman and Kogut (2003), the ability to 
overcome the disconnect between scientific knowledge and routines (research logic) and market 
knowledge and routines to innovate, or create a hybrid logic, may depend on access to 
individuals who perform both activities. This study contributes to academic entrepreneurship by 
explicitly measuring firm commercialization and performance. While I find little difference for 
firms with both research and market logics, led by a serial academic entrepreneur or an 
academic-business team, those startups commercialize much faster when co-founded by a 
graduate student emulsifier. Having the knowledge, mindset and routines of the research logic, 
without being tied to that logic, the graduate student is able to take elements from both logics to 
help create a hybrid logic firm. The results are both economically and statistically significant; 
time to commercialization has long been theorized as critical for technology-based startups 
(Schoonhoven et al., 1990), and the time drops in half with a graduate student co-founder.  
 Thus, adding to recent phenomenological research on academic entrepreneurship (George 
& Bock, 2009), in our setting we believe that student co-founders enable academic founders to 
relinquish control over the technology, accept elements of the market logic, and work together 
with business partners to more quickly commercialize their technology. Academic scientists who 
become entrepreneurs often “protect” themselves by reconfiguring the practices and routines of a 
startup in such a way so as to retain their academic identity (aka buffering) (Jain et al., 2009); 
delegating those routines to trusted students avoids that behavior, allowing them to develop a 
healthy hybrid logic while working in the startup. Students, as emulsifiers, allow both parties to 
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commit the relevant portions of their knowledge and experience to the firm. A public interview 
with a technology-focused venture capitalist adds texture to these findings42:  
The NSF is funding the world’s best science, but that doesn’t necessarily make the 
world’s best companies. The teams that are coming together to pursue their commercial 
opportunity need to look way beyond their technical boundaries—their discipline—to see 
if there’s a real business there. …. We’re trying to take teams on a journey together, and 
some people are not amenable to change, not amenable to coaching, and not amenable to 
advice, and that’s true for all types of commercialization.  
In highlighting the above mechanisms, this study also responds to the call to integrate 
insights from strategic management and entrepreneurship regarding micro-level knowledge, 
experience and routines with institutional reasoning (Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2012), 
providing initial building blocks for integration of the two bodies of research moving forward. 
Future research examining the role of diverse past experience and knowledge on firm behavior 
(e.g., Phillips, 2002; Taylor & Greve; 2006; Feldman et al., 2015) may benefit by bringing the 
logics mechanism to bear. 
This work also contributes to recent work surrounding upper echelons in high-technology 
entrepreneurship. Prior work has examined factors such as the career history of founders and top 
management team, strategy and market growth (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990); generally 
arguing that a functionally diverse founding team is optimal (Beckman, et al., 2007). I add to this 
literature by suggesting commercial experience on paper does not necessarily mean that the team 
member has a commercial mindset, as recent inductive research suggests (Knockaert et al., 
42 Taped Interview with Errol Arkilic: http://steveblank.com/2015/07/20/how-we-changed-the-way-the-u-s-
government-commercializes-science-part-1-of-episode-6-on-sirius-xm-channel-111-errol-arkilic/ 
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2011). The effect of experience is even mixed in the case of entrepreneurial experience, and the 
effect of a founder’s logic seems to explain why past entrepreneurial experience alone is not 
always found to improve performance outcomes (i.e., Eesley et al., 2014).   
Through an empirical analysis building upon recent inductive studies on the difficulties 
of divergent logics (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Kraatz & Block, 2008), this research confirms 
that founders’ logics are indeed sticky (Almandoz, 2014) and adds a potential mechanism for 
startups in industries requiring hybrid logics (i.e., microfinance, biotechnology, and healthcare). 
Firms struggle to manage the conflict between the conflicting, yet valid, routines and goals of 
multiple logics (Ding & Choi, 2011; Pache & Santos, 2013; Sauermann & Stephan, 2013), as 
logics affect the firm’s goals, the means used to achieve those goals, and even the vocabularies 
and rationales for action, leaving founders imprinted with different logics without a common 
language with which to solve conflicts (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Thornton et al., 2012). This 
research adds to this discussion by suggesting that founders’ embeddedness to an institutional 
logics can affect their ability to blend elements from competing logics. More specifically, 
however, a founder who can serve the role of an emulsifier, being experienced, but not tied to, 
either logic, may be a key to helping a firm create a hybrid logic. This finding, however, raises 
the question of how well these teams manage the difficult ‘professionalization’ process 
undergone by startups as they grow past the initial startup phase.  
This research study has some limitations, which also open up avenues for future inquiry. 
First, although the use of ideal types of logics is well founded in the literature, it should be kept 
in mind that objective and more fine-grained measures could provide additional insights. Second, 
even though we rely on qualitative interviews with venture capitalists, entrepreneurs and 




cognition-related data on the thought processes of founders to understand the effect of logics on 
their perceptions, values and actions. This is especially relevant with respect to how individuals 
with entrepreneurial intentions go about creating a founding team. This paper sets the stage for 
future research in this area, especially for research of a qualitative nature.  Most importantly, our 
ability to make causal inferences is very limited, and more work is needed to more cleanly map 
the relationship between founders’ past logics and the actions taken by the young firm. For 
instance, do individuals and firms with different logics learn differently from the same ongoing 
experience? How does embeddedness factor into this learning?  
 One might argue that there is a selection effect of participation in entrepreneurship in the 
cases where the technology is clearly a ‘big hit.’ Thus, I attempted to control for various ‘signal’ 
aspects of the technology in question. In addition to controlling for the type of industry for 
various fixed inter-industry differences, including popularity, I controlled for funding over time. 
The SBA, which awards SBIR grants, has a Congressional mandate to encourage the commercial 
innovation of ventures based on their technical innovations. Consistent with this mandate, each 
application is sent to a Scientific Review Officer, an extramural staff scientist who serves in a 
similar position to an associate editor of an academic journal. This Officer recruits qualified 
reviewers based on scientific and technical qualifications. Thus, SBIR awards may serve to 
reasonably proxy for the perceived scientific quality of the technology, in terms of its ability to 
be commercialized. In controlling for venture capital funding over time, we also hope to capture 
an element of the technology’s market attractiveness. However, it should be noted that VCs 
insight into the future is not exceptional, either in general or when compared to other investors 
(corporate or government) (Pahnke et al., 2015).  We also control for whether the technology 
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was licensed from the university, to control for the perceived value of the intellectual property to 
the university’s TTO (Markman et al., 2005).   
A related argument is that the results can be explained by the “ripeness” of the 
technology. As this is almost impossible to accurately measure, several elements of the research 
design attempt to alleviate this concern, such as SBIR and venture capital funding. It is also 
reasonable to believe that those teams which include a business partner would be furthest along 
in terms of technology development, as business partners have little to no incentive to delay 
commercialization.43 Addressing this issue head-on, the “reference” case for the hypotheses was 
composed of academic and business co-founders. This concern brings up several interesting 
research questions, such as how accurately are inventors able to judge the development level of 
their technology? In technology-based entrepreneurship, the inventor may have introduced an 
‘objectively identifiable change to the environment’, but he or she does not yet have an 
opportunity. It is this translation process which is so difficult for science-based entrepreneurs, 
which is what this research hopes to begin to address.  
In conclusion, this research undertakes the linkage and testing of institutional logics on 
upper echelons and technology-based entrepreneurship literatures. Specifically, we find that 
more than just the resources and experience of the founding team, the level of embeddedness of a 
founder, who can serve as an emulsifier to integrate the necessary elements of divergent logics 
may help overcome the prevalent technology-market linking problem in technology-based 
entrepreneurship. In this sense, institutional logics form the lens through which an individual and 
an organization notices and interprets its experience and develops and deploys knowledge. As 
such, a focus on institutional logics offers important insights that can be incorporated into 
43 In contrast, it could be argued that graduate students and academics have mixed incentives, as the desire for 
publications—the currency of academic life—may delay quickly commercializing the technology.  
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literature focused on commercialization and innovation, such as technology-based 
entrepreneurship and organizational learning, as well as literature on the firm-level effects of top 
management teams. The potential gains from improving the commercialization rates among 
these firms have significant economic and policy ramifications, especially in light of the recent 
financial crisis and an increasingly competitive global marketplace (Rothaermel et al., 2007).  
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CHAPTER 4: FOOL’S PARADISE: WEIGHING MULTIPLE UNCERTAINTY 
FACTORS IN ENTREPRENEURIAL JUDGMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Uncertainty is one of the core problems faced by entrepreneurs (Knight, 1921). Much 
emphasis has been placed on the reduction of uncertainty that occurs when entrepreneurs have 
knowledge or experience relevant to their business venture (McKelvie et al., 2011; Mitchell & 
Shepherd, 2010). A primary factor in an entrepreneur’s ability to perceive and judge the nature 
of uncertainty in a potential opportunity is an entrepreneur’s prior experience (Foss & Klein, 
2012; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Past experience and knowledge enable the entrepreneur to 
create a mental model of the word, which allow the recognition of exploitable inefficiencies that 
can lead to new business ideas (Grégoire et al., 2010; Maitland & Sammartino, 2015; Wood et 
al., 2014). There is broad agreement that prior experience provides entrepreneurs a way to 
mitigate the uncertainty surrounding a new opportunity, and that this can be valuable, even 
necessary, when embarking on the subjective process of understanding and evaluating a business 
idea (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Shepherd et al., 2015; Wood & Williams, 2014). The 
manner in which an entrepreneur evaluates perceived opportunities is of great significance to the 
entrepreneurial process, as the initial evaluation can shape the entrepreneur’s future decisions 
with respect to the firm (Boeker, 1988; Fauchart & Gruber, 2011; Fern et al., 2012; McMullen & 
Shepherd, 2006).  
While, intuitively, it seems that an entrepreneur’s experience should reduce uncertainty 
and facilitate judgment, it is possible that the type or level of experience can in fact create 
knowledge corridors that confine the perception of uncertainty to those loci of uncertainty made 
familiar to an entrepreneur through her functional experience (Dane, 2010; Denrell & March, 
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2001; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). These knowledge corridors may blind entrepreneurs to 
potential business ideas, such as possible market applications for an invention, in markets outside 
of their expertise (Ronstadt, 1989; Shane, 2000). Consider, for example, that the ability to 
explore new opportunities has been observed to be cognitively constrained by prior experience 
(Baron & Ensley, 2006; Groysberg & Lee, 2009; Groysberg, Lee, & Nanda, 2008; Wiley, 
1998)44. Rather than always enhancing an individual’s ability to evaluate the world around her, 
experience may reduce the loci of uncertainty perceived by an entrepreneur in judging an 
opportunity, due to the tendency to focus attention on familiar criteria over other potentially 
relevant factors (Gruber et al., 2015; McKelvie et al., 2011; Simon, 1947).  
This study serves as a first-look at examining how prior experience influences the 
attention entrepreneurs give to different loci of uncertainty in the evaluation of a potential 
opportunity. For instance, technically-experienced individuals may see greater challenges, or 
greater potential, in the product-related aspect of a new business idea. However, does this 
tendency increase or decrease in the face of high or low levels of technical uncertainty for these 
technically-trained entrepreneurs? What about for non-technical individuals: will their focus shift 
with changing levels of uncertainty outside of their expertise? These are the driving questions 
behind this study.  To answer these, this pilot study first provides an overview of the role of 
experience in evaluating new business ideas. The discussion moves to developing propositions 
surrounding the relationship between an individual’s prior functional, entrepreneurial, and 
managerial experience and the perception of uncertainty. These theoretical mechanisms are then 
tested through an experimental study where the level of technical uncertainty is manipulated and 
participants are asked to make judgments as to the nature of uncertainty in a realistic case study 




of a new venture proposal. Thus, the purpose of this essay is to extend our understanding of the 
nature of uncertainty and to explore the link between functional experience and the evaluation of 
uncertainty. Building upon research linking entrepreneurial opportunities and uncertainty (e.g., 
Raffiee and Feng, 2014, Brinckmann et al, 2010), this study provides direction for further 
research to discover how changing levels of uncertainty affect entrepreneurial judgment. Early-
stage findings, such as that individuals are concerned with many different uncertainties but the 
attention they pay to these various uncertainties differs based on functional experience, look 
promising. In addition, there is early evidence to support the idea that lumping together various 
loci of uncertainty into a single uncertainty construct may produce misleading conclusions. After 




 It is well understood and acknowledged that entrepreneurs’ abilities to perceive and 
evaluate uncertainty have significant performance effects (e.g. Alvarez & Barney, 2005; Dew et 
al., 2009; Foss & Klein, 2012). New ventures generally operate under conditions of high 
uncertainty, as they tend to experience more volatile competitive landscapes (Hmieleski & 
Baron, 2008), hostility and changing consumer preferences (Miller, 1992), and weaker ties than 
their more established suppliers, customers, and competitors (Anderson & Tushman, 2001; 
Castrogiovanni, 1991).  
Entrepreneurs evaluating technologically-based opportunities face a difficult task in 
assessing uncertainty, as they lack the well-developed norms, resources, capabilities, 
complementary assets, or a clear technological trajectory (Qian, Agarwal, & Hoetker, 2012; 
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Teece, 1986). In general, prospective entrepreneurs must either bear or resolve high levels of 
uncertainty at the time of judgment, or else forgo the opportunity. 
Addressing uncertainty has been the source of much examination in the literature, 
coalescing around considerations of perceived risk (i.e., potential loss, not Knightian risk) and 
expected returns (e.g. Hsu, 2007). While uncertainty resolution can occur through various 
mechanisms, the discussion in this essay centers on how uncertainty is addressed in the 
evaluation stage of an opportunity. Therefore, rather than discuss experiential ways of resolving 
uncertainty, this discussion is limited to cognitive perception mechanisms available to an 
entrepreneur45 (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000)(Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000)(Gavetti & Levinthal, 
2000). Where entrepreneurs can gain a substantive understanding of the environment, its inputs, 
causal mechanisms, and outputs, they are better able to foresee the results of certain actions. 
Information gathering from search, signals, market research, and so forth are oriented toward 
uncertainty reduction through maximized environmental perception (e.g. Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990; Spence, 1973). Entrepreneurs contemplating a new venture idea, therefore, can first 
attempt to resolve uncertainty through superior perception mechanisms. These perception 
mechanisms are developed through prior knowledge and experience, which brings the 
entrepreneur in familiarity with the loci of uncertainty (Dane, 2010; Denrell & March, 2001; 
Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). 
The evaluation of new venture ideas (Davidsson, 2015) involves assessment of the 
various uncertain aspects of the idea, their expected outcomes, and the risks involved. Such 
entrepreneurial judgment is defined as “residual, controlling decision-making about resources 
45 Uncertainty can also be mitigated where either the environment, or information regarding the environment, can be 
controlled and therefore managed. If the environment and/or its information can be controlled, the uncertainty faced 
by the firm can be reduced while simultaneously increasing the uncertainty faced by competitors (Jauch & Kraft, 




deployed to achieve some objectives” (Foss & Klein, 2012: 78). Knight (1921) emphasized the 
extremely uncertain nature of entrepreneurial judgment, describing it as “an estimate of an 
estimate.” Yet the specific nature and effects of uncertainty on entrepreneurial judgment have 
remained elusive. The lack of clarity is partially due to the focus of empirical research in the 
entrepreneurship literature on environmental uncertainty, a general type of uncertainty gauging 
the predictability of conditions in firm’s environment (McKelvie et al., 2011), although noting it 
can have differential effects based on its perceived level or intensity.  Specifically, research tends 
to treat the uncertainty found in perceived opportunities as homogeneous (Brinckmann, 
Grichnik, and Kapsa, 2010) or as varied only at the industry level (Hmieleski, Carr, and Baron, 
2015), thereby assuming away industry-specific risk and uncertainty (Raffiee and Feng, 2014). I 
challenge this approach, observing that entrepreneurs generally face heterogeneous uncertainties 
in their assessment of new venture ideas. 
For example, little is known about what types of information should be understood for the 
reduction of uncertainty. Relevant uncertainty can only be reduced by filling in the information 
defects with relevant information (Milliken, 1987; Spender, 1989).  Uncertainty may include (but 
is not limited to) financial uncertainty (Dardanoni, 1991), market or demand uncertainty 
(Eckhardt & Shane, 2003), competitive uncertainty (Ferrier, 2001; Schumpeter, 1934), 
technological uncertainty (Montoya-Weiss, Massey, & Song, 2001; Teece, 1986), institutional 
uncertainty (North, 2005) and environmental (ecological) uncertainty (Deschenes & Greenstone, 
2007; Sachs & Malaney, 2002). Thus we first must lay out the loci of uncertainty associated with 
new venture ideas before we can turn our attention to the link between the types of uncertainty 
perceived by an entrepreneur and his or her experience and expertise.   
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Loci of uncertainty 
Scholars note that uncertainty is commonly employed in research as a holistic term, 
embodying all types of unpredictability, when there may in fact be important differences 
between types of uncertainty (Milliken, 1987). McKelvie et al., (2011) conclude that this 
conflation between types of uncertainty has obfuscated research on the effects of uncertainty in 
the entrepreneurship process. 
While there have been several classification schemes of the different types of 
environmental uncertainty (e.g. Milliken, 1987; Spender, 1989), these offer little with regard to 
the specific nature of uncertainty, and therefore do not qualify as true types46 (Packard, Clark, & 
Klein, in press). Instead, my attention is to the locus of such uncertainty, i.e., where uncertainty 
originates. Milliken (1987), for example, observes environmental uncertainty at three key loci: in 
the complexity of the state of the environment (state uncertainty), in the unpredictable effects of 
certain actions or events (effect uncertainty), and in the possible actions available to the 
organization or to its competitors in response to observed changes (response uncertainty). 
However, I contend that such loci are not comprehensive in describing the various uncertain 
aspects of the external environment. As Table 4.1 indicates, I proffer six distinct loci of 
uncertainty within the external environment that are relevant to the judgment and resultant action 
of the entrepreneur: in the technology, the availability of resources, the industry and competition, 
institutions, demand, and the environment.  I do not claim that this typology is all-encompassing. 
However, because each of these specific loci of uncertainty plays an important role in facilitating 
or impeding the entrepreneur’s assessment of the new venture’s technical and economic 
46This paper preserves Knight’s (1921) seminal distinction of types of uncertainty, i.e. probabilistic risk and 
non-probabilistic uncertainty.  
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viability, I argue that this framework of uncertainty loci has an important role in the perception 
of uncertainty in an opportunity.  
Functional Experience and Knowledge Corridors 
Having briefly introduced the relevant loci of uncertainty confronting an entrepreneur in 
the evaluation of an opportunity, I next attempt to uncover how technically-trained entrepreneurs 
allocate their attention and focus—either towards what they know or the unfamiliar—depending 
on whether the technical locus of uncertainty is at a high or low level. Although often over-
played, it is nevertheless true that technically-trained individuals tend to have a lower inclination 
to deal with non-technical issues and believe that products are best thought of in terms of 
characteristics or functionality (Gruber et al., 2015; Jolly, 1997).  Dougherty (1992) performed a 
qualitative study on innovative projects, finding that technically-minded individuals tend to 
define market opportunities by the product dimensions. As a consequence, technologically-
experienced individuals may see greater challenges, or greater potential, in the product-related 
aspect of the new business idea.  
Increasing the level of uncertainty should affect which locus of uncertainty individuals 
choose to focus on. While there is evidence suggesting that individuals gravitate toward 
interpretations of organizational problems that mirror their functional backgrounds (Dearborn 
and Simon, 1958; Finkelstein et al., 2009), individuals greatly differ on how they act under 
uncertainty depending on prior experience (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). While individuals in 
uncertain conditions allocate attention according to their strengths (Cyert & March, 1963a; 
Greve, 2008; March & Shapira, 1987), what happens when the level of uncertainty increases?  
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While much has been said regarding the effects of uncertainty on entrepreneurship (e.g. 
Alvarez and Barney, 2005; Foss and Klein, 2012; McMullen and Shepherd, 2006; Schoonhoven 
& Eisenhardt, 1990), there has been comparatively less said regarding the entrepreneurial 
judgment process itself (some examples include McMullen and Dimov, 2013; Miller, 2007; 
Sarasvathy, 2001; Shepherd , Williams, and Patzelt, 2015), and even less has been said with 
respect to changing levels of uncertainty. Typically, individuals use more heuristics in their 
decision-making under conditions of uncertainty (Busenitz and Barney, 1997), suggesting that 
individuals will rely on their prior experience more as uncertainty increases. As entrepreneurial 
judgment is inherently subjective (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999), individuals’ perceptions under 
higher levels of uncertainty should be subject to increased bias towards the locus of uncertainty 
matching their own functional experience. Taking the argument that individuals under higher 
levels of uncertainty will concomitantly rely more heavily on their experience, and combining 
that with the insight that technically-minded individuals in entrepreneurial settings tend to stick 
to the technical or product-related aspects of the opportunity I propose that: 
Proposition 1: In a condition of high technical uncertainty, technically-minded 
individuals will focus their attention on technical loci of uncertainty relative to a 
condition of low technical uncertainty. 
Awash in a flood of information and uncertainty, entrepreneurs evaluating an opportunity 
must be selective with respect to which uncertain aspects of the opportunity they focus on and 
attempt to resolve through perception mechanisms (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Haynie et al., 
2009; Ocasio, 1997). Individuals in uncertain situations tend to allocate attention according to 
their strengths (Cyert & March, 1963a; March & Shapira, 1987), which not only influences the 
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identification and evaluation of problems, but also guides the search for solutions to these 
problems (Greve, 2008). Whether viewed as individuals or problem-solving entities (Hsieh, 
Nickerson, & Zenger, 2007), entrepreneurs have limited attention capacity which leads them to 
attempt to resolve uncertainty primarily based on what they know and have experienced (Ocasio, 
2011; Simon, 1947).  
Among the most salient experiences a potential entrepreneur might rely on are those 
gained within and characterized by a particular function within which she has worked. I term this 
experience in general areas, such as technical, sales/marketing, etc., as functional experience. 
Functional experience includes experience with the structure and processes of that field, 
familiarity with relevant institutions, standards, and norms, established relationships with 
suppliers, buyers, and competitors, an understanding of and familiarity with various technologies 
often used, and so on. 
Findings from the literature of the identification stage of opportunity evaluation suggests 
that entrepreneurs are likely to view potential opportunities through their past experience. For 
instance, Shane (2000) studied eight entrepreneurs who derived their ideas from the same 
technology and found that each one was easily able to apply the technology to their area of 
experience. However, these entrepreneurs did not consider markets outside their function, gave 
little attention to the size or competitive nature of their target market, and many of them failed 
without attempting to apply the technology in a market outside of their expertise47. Gruber and 
coauthors (2013) similarly find that expertise can constrain idea generation to known types of 
problems. There is also some evidence to suggest that not only is the idea generation stage of 
47 The entrepreneurs in Shane’s sample were technical: architectural engineers evaluated the opportunity in 
3D-printing as to how the technology could be used in their trade, medical lab technicians did likewise. However, 
these individuals did not consider areas of the opportunity outside their technical sphere, such as market size, 
customer base, etc. 
95 
opportunity evaluation tied to an entrepreneur’s prior knowledge and experience (Shane, 2000; 
Shepherd & DeTienne, 2005), but those same factors also influence an entrepreneur’s evaluation 
of an opportunity’s ex-post characteristics (Dimov, 2007b; Shepherd, McMullen, & Jennings, 
2007). For instance, an entrepreneur’s data-gathering efforts to reduce uncertainty in the 
discovery and evaluation of an opportunity are often ineffective, and sometimes have a negative 
effect, in part because that data-gathering process tends to be limited to first-person, experience-
based considerations48 (Shepherd et al., 2007).  
In evaluating the uncertainties surrounding a new business opportunity, an entrepreneur 
will likely focus on the set of uncertainties matching her experience. In general, an entrepreneur 
has increased insight into innovations more closely related to his functional expertise (Haynie et 
al., 2009; Wood et al., 2014). Because success hinges on the ability to accurately assess multiple 
aspects of an opportunity, relevant functional experience is necessary for thorough evaluation 
(Baron & Ensley, 2006; Dimov, 2007b; Milliken, 1987). However, cognitive studies suggest 
that, as individuals acquire experience in a single function, their mental models place increased 
emphasis on elements that are related to that function (Matlin, 2005). Attention spent on each 
additional functional-specific issue, however, may leave less attention for other more critical 
aspects of the new venture idea and thus have decreasing marginal benefits (Baron & Ensley, 
2006). Therefore, in evaluating the uncertainties surrounding an opportunity, an entrepreneur’s 
functional experience may lead to knowledge corridors, or a focused attention on the uncertain 
issues related to his or her expertise (Ronstadt, 1989; Venkataraman, 1997). Indeed, 
entrepreneurs understand and give meaning to aspects of a new business idea by imposing their 
48 While it is not clear from the literature what exactly prevents the efficacy of evaluation and data-gathering 
processes (i.e., business plans or environmental scanning), that something is reducing their efficacy is clear from the 
weak, and sometimes negative, effect of these activities on entrepreneurial performance (i.e., Bhidé, 2000; Delmar 
& Shane, 2003; Dencker, Gruber, & Shah, 2009). 
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experience-derived templates to interpret idea-related information (Barreto, 2012).  Individuals 
employ widely varying weights derived from their distinct functional experience profiles to 
assess different aspects of situations, leading to very different interpretations of the same 
scenario (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Fauchart & Gruber, 2011). In short, although entrepreneurs 
simultaneously face many distinct loci of uncertainty, they may apply their experience-based 
templates towards those areas where they have the most relevant experience. 
Proposition 2: Individuals will focus their attention on the loci of uncertainty most 
related to their functional experience. 
The proposed link above between an entrepreneur’s functional expertise and the 
uncertainties they perceive may also be impacted by the depth of their experience. Naïve or 
inexperienced cognitive maps tend to be overconfident in judgment because they are yet unaware 
of the possibilities of various unanticipated outcomes (Hayward, Shepherd, & Griffin, 2006). As 
experience is garnered, awareness and recognition of uncertainties should rise, generally 
facilitating better judgment (Dew et al., 2009; Eisenhardt et al., 2010).  
Individuals can mentally construe future states of reality in accordance with the 
psychological distance (e.g. time, space) of that construal to their psychological reality (Trope & 
Liberman, 2011). Their assessment of future events, such as new business outcomes, is 
influenced by their considerations of subjective desirability and perceived feasibility (Liberman 
& Trope, 1998) 49.  Individuals with direct functional experience tend to have more concrete 
construals, based in reality, which may allow them to focus on the implementation challenges 
(feasibility), while those without direct experience tend to have higher-level (abstract) construals 
49 Desirability refers to the tendency for some individuals, depending on experience, to weigh an anticipated end 





which prompt them to focus more on the big picture (desirability) (Hamilton & Thompson, 
2007). Increased levels of functional experience may assist entrepreneurs in illuminating relevant 
loci of uncertainty for that function. For example, technical experience can facilitate a more 
accurate ‘feasibility check’ with respect to the technological uncertainties surrounding the 
opportunity, as such experience provides familiarity with relevant problems or unknowns (Kor et 
al., 2007). Those with less functional experience may have less concrete ideas about the 
opportunity under evaluation (Baron & Ensley, 2006), including the various loci of uncertainty. 
Additionally, when confronted with problems, our brains tend to search our dominant and 
recent knowledge schemata (i.e., functional expertise) first and foremost for guidance. Experts 
can become entrenched in the assumptions and routines through which they interpret and act 
upon problems (Bilalić, McLeod, & Gobet, 2008; Dane, 2010; Fiske & Taylor, 2013). Especially 
in uncertain and demanding situations (Hambrick et al., 2005), expertise can discourage further 
search (Gustafsson, 2006; McKelvie et al., 2011; Taylor & Greve, 2006), or result in knowledge 
corridors (Ronstadt, 1989; Shepherd & DeTienne, 2005). As expertise may breed over-reliance 
on one’s past experience and routines (Teece, 2007), it is likely that while functional experts may 
better perceive loci of uncertainty relative to their expertise, the same might not hold true to 
other loci of uncertainty (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Kor et al., 2007). It is possible that 
expertise breeds over-reliance on one’s own experience and routines.  
In short, potential entrepreneurs may be able to more precisely assess a new venture’s 
feasibility within the particular functional lens with which they are experienced, whereas those 
uncertain elements falling outside of their expertise may be overlooked (Dew et al., 2009; 




Proposition 3: The positive relationship between functional experience and perceived 
related loci of uncertainty will increase linearly for individuals with greater experience.  
 
Entrepreneurial and Managerial Experience 
Entrepreneurial experience refers to past experience in founding new ventures. Such 
experience comprises the entirety of the entrepreneurial process, and may include experience in 
idea generation, development, and refining, prototyping, pursuing and securing entrepreneurial 
financing, entrepreneurial pitching and marketing, and in managing a venture, its successes and 
failures. 
Entrepreneurial experience may facilitate entrepreneurs’ perception of a greater number 
of loci of uncertainty in opportunity evaluation for several reasons. Experience in founding new 
ventures is likely to expose individuals to the myriad of problems experienced by new firms in a 
variety of areas such as competition, intellectual property, hiring new employees, finding 
financial capital, developing a new product, and establishing contacts with potential customers 
(Delmar & Shane, 2006). Compared to novices, experienced entrepreneurs diverge in their views 
as to what constitutes an attractive business idea because they tend to be concerned with more 
discrete elements and have a more detailed mental framework (Baron & Ensley, 2006; Matlin, 
2005). Having observed and experienced several, if not all, loci of uncertainty in prior ventures 
(Shane & Stuart, 2002), entrepreneurially experienced founders are more likely to recognize 
more of the different loci of uncertainty and their potential impact on venture performance. The 
past experience of unpredictable events and outcomes should open the eyes of the founder to 




tend to spend larger amounts of time searching for the “right” new business idea (Gruber et al., 
2008).  
Past experiences of unpredicted outcomes in entrepreneurship, including and especially 
venture failure, can reshape one’s cognitive template to account for unforeseen possibilities 
(Dew et al., 2009; Maitland & Sammartino, 2015). Entrepreneurs with prior startup experience 
almost always have learned the importance of adaptability, so they may be more prepared than 
those without such experience for the inevitable changes (Bhidé, 2000; McDonald & Cheng, 
2016). Prior experience with failure appears to strongly shape subsequent mental models, thus 
influencing cognition regarding future opportunities (Hayward, Forster, Sarasvathy, & 
Fredrickson, 2010). This should, but does not always, nudge entrepreneurs to pay closer attention 
to details across different loci of uncertainty in the evaluation process (Ucbasaran et al., 2010). 
Conversely, research also suggests that success may obfuscate uncertainty recognition, as 
successful entrepreneurs fail to recognize the elements of uncertainty and luck in their own 
success, leading them toward subsequent failure (Eggers & Song, 2015). 
I expect the effect of prior entrepreneurial experience on an entrepreneur’s ability to 
notice and attend to a greater loci of uncertainty will depend on the success of that experience.  
Proposition 4A: Individuals with prior entrepreneurial experience will, ceteris paribus, 
recognize more loci of uncertainty. 
Proposition 4B: Individuals with successful prior entrepreneurial experience will, ceteris 
paribus, recognize fewer loci of uncertainty. 
 Managerial experience, or past experience in managing a firm, is also expected to 
produce a familiarity with various loci of uncertainty. The extent to which this is true may 




lower-level management may be shielded from many of the uncertainties that upper-level 
managers must face. Functional managers typically focus on operations and employee 
management and relations, rather than corporate level issues. Therefore, while they will be 
exposed to a greater number of uncertainties in their day-to-day, these uncertainties may well be 
confined mostly, or solely, to those uncertainties falling within their functional experience. Thus, 
functional management expertise may lead to stronger knowledge corridors than those without 
managerial expertise (Barreto & Patient, 2013; Boeker, 1988; Walsh, 1995). In addition, 
functional managers are buffered from certain uncertainties facing small and nascent ventures, 
such as loci of uncertainty regarding acquisition of resources, industry, or changing technologies. 
The same types of uncertainties do not always have the same effect on large versus small firms 
due to differences in resource bases (Elfenbein, Hamilton, & Zenger, 2010; Stinchcombe, 1965). 
A new venture founder with upper-level managerial experience may have been exposed 
to all aspects of the firm’s uncertain environment (Lazear, 2005). Upper-level managers often 
deal with the various elements of running a business, such as competitive strategy, novel 
technologies, the purchase of equipment, resource constraints, or governmental regulations. This 
experience generally necessitates the managing of each of the respective loci of uncertainty. 
Upper-level managers are also more likely to have experience with multi-functional teams, 
exposing them to different concerns and perspectives outside of their functional experience (Kor, 
2003). In short, I propose that managerial experience may also serve to facilitate greater 
uncertainty recognition:  
Proposition 5A: Individuals with upper-level managerial experience will, ceteris paribus, 
recognize more loci of uncertainty. 
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Proposition 5B: Individuals with functional managerial experience will, ceteris paribus, 
recognize fewer loci of uncertainty. 
METHODS 
To test these propositions, I devised an experimental instrument intended to capture 
cognitive variation between individuals with differing experience and their attention to and focus 
on various loci of uncertainty. To achieve response validity (e.g., Shepherd, 1999), to anchor my 
theorizing, and to augment the validity of these findings (cf. Shane, 2001), the new venture idea 
scenario was developed from an actual and ongoing venture in a technology-driven industry, 
based on interviews with the current CEO of that venture (c.f. Grégoire and Shepherd, 2012). 
The firm in the scenario was developing a nanoparticle production process into the “supports” 
used in constructing catalysts in the petroleum industry. The modus operandi of this experiment 
is consistent with my theoretical development. Uncertainties in the given scenario consist of real 
external uncertainties to be faced by all, but especially technology-based ventures, as 
technology-created opportunities face a broad range of uncertainties (Jensen & Thursby, 2001). 
This scenario is provided in full, with phrases denoting each of the six loci of uncertainty, in 
Exhibit 4.1 and Table 4.1. 
The scenario was piloted by 14 graduate students and professionals to see whether the six 
loci of uncertainty were noted among the participants. Based on feedback from this manipulation 
test, the design was improved through discussions with 12 faculty members of the University of 
Illinois. The experiment was then piloted to 20 graduate students, professionals and faculty, in 
two rounds of 10 participants, and improvements were made to the design after each round, prior 
to the release of the study.   
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Participants were asked to assess a new venture idea and describe the uncertainties they 
would like to resolve prior to investing in the proposed venture. Each participant was given the 
same set of questions, but the venture proposal differed in that the level of technological 
uncertainty was manipulated according to the subjects’ self-reported expertise. Of the six loci of 
uncertainty, the one most clearly tied to a type of functional experience, and which was of most 
interest to the findings of this dissertation, was technological uncertainty50. Therefore, each 
respondent was presented with one of two versions of the scenario, one with high technological 
uncertainty and one with low technological uncertainty51, while the remaining loci of uncertainty 
(resource, industry, institutional, demand, and environmental uncertainty) were held low. Pretest 
checks with two executives in the focal industry confirm these manipulations. Participants were 
also asked to consider the scenario and report the perceived viability of the venture, the relevant 
uncertainties, and other factors according to their assessment of the idea.  
By manipulating a critical locus of uncertainty for a technology-based opportunity 
scenario, I was able to test the propositions regarding how one’s experience influences their 
recognition of, and attention to, loci of uncertainty. The treatment was confined to changing the 
level of uncertainty for the technological locus of uncertainty. In the high technological 
50 Technological uncertainty refers to the unpredictability of knowledge and technology (Song & Montoya-Weiss, 
2001. Technologies are ever-changing as scientific discovery produces new insights, which diffuse over time into 
various industries (Schumpeter, 1942). New technologies are necessarily uncertain in their overall quality and 
performance over time (Agarwal et al., 2004). Thus, technological uncertainty exists in several areas/dimensions: 
about the characteristics of new technologies (such as costs or performance), about the relation between the new 
technology and the technical infrastructure in which the technology is embedded (to what extent will adaptations to 
the infrastructure be needed), and about the possibility of choosing alternative (future) technological options 
(Krishnan & Bhattacharya, 2002). These forms of technological uncertainty represent the various gaps of 
information facing entrepreneurs as they attempt to evaluate the likelihood of success in a given opportunity. Hence, 
these forms present substantive hurdles for entrepreneurs who may be both seeking to use new technologies as well 
as competing against them.  
51 For the manipulations, we point out that low does not mean that the level of uncertainty is zero; rather, it is a low 
positive. This manipulation is therefore known as a “weak manipulation, strong test,” as the presence of statistically 
significant results is much harder to achieve (see Viswanathan, 2005).  
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uncertainty scenario, the founder has not yet manufactured the product at a commercial scale. In 
the low technological uncertainty scenario, the firm has just manufactured their first successful 
batch of products at a commercial scale. While this does not eliminate the technological 
uncertainty, taking the product from prototype stage to a successful round of commercial 
production represents a very significant advancement in the technology (Beckman & Barry, 
2007; Gerber & Carroll, 2012)52. Because roughly 30% of the participants had technical 
backgrounds, the manipulation should be able to ascertain the differences in responses for the 
respondents with technological backgrounds versus those with non-technical backgrounds. The 
manipulation also would identify the ‘within and without’ effect of the respondents’ experience, 
to isolate the mechanisms underlying participants’ perception of uncertainty. For instance, if the 
respondent listed functional expertise as engineering, they would be randomly assigned to the 
first or second scenario,53 thus creating the two-by-two matrix below (see Table 4.2).   
Sample 
Given the study’s focus on the role of experience on the perception of uncertainty in new 
venture idea evaluation, I sought a sample of individuals with a variety of experience. 
Specifically, as the study was designed to speak to the way in which prospective and current 
entrepreneurs evaluate changes in technological uncertainty, I sought a sample with diverse 
levels of technical, managerial, and entrepreneurial experience. Originally, the sample was to be 
recruited from an executive MBA program at the University of Illinois. However, low response 
rates (and poor throughput percentages) prompted a search for additional participants, who were 
52 This assertion was confirmed by two industry experts as well as a serial entrepreneur (with no expertise in that 
particular field). 
53 The respondents also provided a more detailed list work experience, including industry, job title, and years spent 
on the job. Although demographic attributes do not covary perfectly with cognitive characteristics, they often serve 
as useful indicators of these aspects because individuals’ cognition evolve from their experiences (Haynie et al., 




recruited in May-June 2015 using the Qualtrics online survey panel and Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk). Both Qualtrics and MTurk are increasingly being used in research in the social 
sciences, as they demonstrate a more robust sample than students or volunteers, can be relied 
upon to more accurately fill out the survey due to their expertise, and are vetted by prior 
researchers54. (Bohannon, 2011; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Casler, Bickel, & 
Hackett, 2013; Hagtvedt, 2011; Rosoff, Siko, John, & Burns, 2013).   
 Participants were randomly assigned to either the “high” or “low” technical uncertainty, 
depending on their expertise, and the experimental design included “attentional” questions to 
determine whether respondents were actively engaged. In total, 157 participants (56% male, 
average age of 41) completed the instrument, and after review, partial responses were dropped 
(Qualtrics, 2, MTurk, 18, Executive MBA, 16), leaving 123 participants who successfully 
completed the experiment (Qualtrics, 45; MTurk, 62, Executive MBA, 16). Comparison tests for 
these three groups reveal little difference in age or gender, but MTurk users had 3-4 less years of 
work experience than the Executive MBAs and Qualtrics participants, and the Executive MBAs 
were comparatively higher-educated. These differences are important, though the effect on the 
study is uncertain. It could be that education provides individuals with the meta-learning ability 
to scan an environment and pick out more uncertainties that do not pertain to their functional 
experience. However, studies show that this effect fades with time, making education an 
imperfect measure (Gambardella, 1995). 
This study takes advantage of the varying levels of managerial, entrepreneurial, and 
functional experience across subjects. The executive MBA students were contacted by email to 
                                                 
54 In the case of Qualtrics, the respondents are vetted in two waves: one is by Qualtrics; the second is by 
researchers, who have a respondent ID that they can flag as particularly poor; those with poor scores are dropped 
from Qualtrics’ sample pool.  A similar situation exists for MTURK contractors; I was given the option to rank each 
of the respondents based upon the accuracy with which they filled out the instrument.  
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request their participation in the research. Those who had not yet participated in the study were 
sent a reminder email one week after the first email, resulting in a response rate of 30% (32 out 
of 105 contacted). Student participation was voluntary, and there were no inducements given to 
respondents for their participation. MTurk respondents were paid $1.25 for their participation 
and assigned randomly to a scenario type, stratified by their functional experience. Qualtrics 
utilizes by-invitation-only online panel recruitment, and administers payment according to the 
type of participant desired, and was responsible for filling a quota for each of the 
entrepreneurship, management and technical experience categories (see Table 4.5; 15 for each 
experience type). If participants listed one of the three, they were assigned to that quota group. If 
participants could answer yes to more than one category, they were randomly assigned to a quota 
group by Qualtrics. (The question to elicit functional expertise was: “How would you classify 
your work expertise? 1= Sales or Marketing, 2=Engineering or Technical, 3=Strategy, 4=Other.) 
Of the four areas of expertise, based on self-assessment of participants, 39 have technical 
expertise, 45 have sales/marketing expertise, 24 have expertise in strategy and 15 self-identified 
as other. Roughly one-half of the participants had entrepreneurial experience (61/123), and 55 of 
those individuals founded at least one successful firm; 42 (34% of sample) founded only 
successful firms. This is an incredibly-high number for a random sample, suggesting that this 
variable may not have a high level of external validity. 77 of the participants had some 





The primary construct of interest is perceived uncertainty. There are important theoretical 
reasons why the construct of uncertainty should be broken out into distinct loci of uncertainty. 
While the decision to pursue a perceived opportunity can be seen as binary, it does not make 
sense to reduce the decision of an experimental study merely to a binary decision, as we are 
trying to understand (or, at the least, to proxy for) the true effects of uncertainty on decision-
making (McKelvie et al., 2011). I therefore operationalize the dependent variable in several ways 
in accordance with my hypotheses. First and principally, I attempt to ascertain a count of 
uncertainties perceived by each participant from within the various loci. After participants had 
read the scenario, they were asked to “Please list an uncertainty you would like to resolve prior 
to investing in, or moving forward with, this company?” This option, along with the scenario, 
was listed on a loop as many times as the participant decided to list additional uncertainties. In 
total, 401 uncertainties were listed by the 123 participants, with 22% technological, 32% 
resource, 16% demand, 16% industry, 6% institution and 8% environmental uncertainty, 
classified by the author. The average number of loci identified across all respondents was 3.26; 
by group, MTurk=3.51, Qualtrics=3.2 and Exec MBA=4.2. I also collected the perceived 
importance of each uncertainty they listed, with respect to the expected ability of the venture to 
succeed. I selected a five-point metric rating scale, as it captures gradation in the importance of 
the uncertainty and allows for the possible investigation of interactive relationships (Hitt & Barr, 
1989).  
As a secondary measure, I provided participants a list of the six loci of uncertainty 
outlined above, with brief explanations, and asked respondents to list which they considered to 
be of most concern for the new venture. Respondents were also asked to assess the relative 




mitigated. This procedure produced several dependent variables, which are briefly detailed with 
their accompanying hypotheses for convenience, in Table 4.3 below. As follows, they are:  
Focus-This variable is a ratio of the number of uncertainties corresponding to 
participant’s expertise over the total number of uncertainties identified by the respondent. This 
dependent variable sought to capture the attention given to the locus(i) of uncertainty 
corresponding to an entrepreneur’s experience.  
Count- The total number of uncertainties identified by the participant.  
Comparison- Dummy; a “1” signifies that the participant listed at least as many 
uncertainties corresponding to his or her area of expertise as the total number of uncertainties 
they listed that are classified with the remaining uncertainty loci.  
Concern- This dummy variable uses the secondary measure described above, where the 
six loci of uncertainty are listed and explained, and respondents are provided a multiple choice 
question asking which of the six is most relevant to the scenario. A “1” signifies that the loci of 
uncertainty the respondent lists as “of most concern” corresponds to their functional experience 
(see Table 4.3).  
In addition, I also capture respondents’ evaluations of the attractiveness of the business 
idea (Wood et al., 2014), or its perceived likelihood of success using a seven-point scale (Haynie 
et al., 2009; Mitchell and Shepherd, 2010). I also captured respondents’ willingness to invest in 
or join with the new venture (seven-point scale) (McKelvie et al., 2011).   
Independent variables  
I study the effect of experience on individuals’ attention and evaluation of different loci 
of uncertainty. Specifically, I am concerned with three aspects of expertise: functional 
experience (self-classified as Technical/Engineering, Sales/Marketing, Strategic, or Other), 
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managerial experience (type of experience and years involved), and prior entrepreneurial 
experience (binary; 1 if individual had founded a successful firm). Managerial experience is 
captured by asking respondents how much managerial experience they had (in years), as well as 
what level of experience that experience was at (upper-level or functional-level). To ensure that 
entrepreneurial experience was not co-determined with managerial experience, respondents were 
asked to list managerial experience, excluding entrepreneurial experience. In addition, due to the 
interest in whether successful prior new venturing (where success is defined as being profitable 
at the time of leaving or sold for a profit) results in a different outcome with respect to 
respondent behaviors, I captured Successful Prior Entrepreneurial Experience as the percentage 
of successful to total firms founded. Please see Table 4.5 for a quick cross tab analysis of these 
types of experience.  
Years of Experience captures the length of experience measured in years. Each of these 
was self-reported. Finally, the dummy variable High Technical Uncertainty captures the 
manipulation in the experiment (whether the scenario’s technical uncertainty was “high” or 
“low”; See Table 4.8). I also requested detailed information regarding participants’ work 
experience (job titles, number of years worked) and education (field and level).  Because 
individuals’ cognitive tendencies, biases, and landscapes evolve from experiences and can be 
assessed fairly objectively (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), demographic attributes can serve as 
adequate indicators of these qualities (Haynie & Shepherd, 2009). Although demographic 
attributes do not covary perfectly with cognitive characteristics, studies of top management 





 In parallel with the focus on the role of managerial, work, and entrepreneurial experience, 
I readily acknowledge that individual differences in cognition, preference, or disposition could 
affect participants’ ability or willingness to perceive uncertainties in this scenario. To control for 
such possibilities, I employed validated instruments to collect data on participants’ risk 
propensity (Meertens & Lion, 2008), comfort with ambiguity (Budner, 1962), locus of control 
(i.e. to what extent outcomes are perceived to be within their control) (Schjoedt & Shaver, 2012), 
and creative self-efficacy (i.e. self-confidence in one’s creative abilities) (Tierney & Farmer, 
2002). I also collected potentially relevant demographic information, including cultural identity 
(Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001), age bracket, and gender. Because experience with 
cross-functional teams might influence one’s ability to perceive loci of uncertainty outside of 
their experience, participants were asked to report their experience with such teams. Finally, 
participants reported their level of engagement during the experiment to account for participation 
factors (Berg, 2004).  
 
RESULTS 
Table 4.4 provides the summary statistics of variables of interest. While most variables 
are not significantly correlated, two of my control variables—Locus of Control and Creative 
Self-Efficacy—share a .55 correlation. Results are robust to removing Locus of Control from the 
model. My statistical analysis draws on only 123 observations, despite the high number of 
variables employed. The dependent variables are truncated Models 1-3, and there is a count 
variable employed in Models 4 and 5, suggesting a negative binomial (or quasi maximum 
likelihood specification) may be best. However, as negative binomial analyses are not 




a Tobit analysis; (unpublished) results are consistent with OLS regressions (Table 4.9). Findings 
from a Tobit analysis of participants’ response to the scenario in regards to uncertainty are 
presented in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7. 
Proposition 1 is analyzed in Table 4.6. Here, the analysis is contingent upon the level of 
technological uncertainty being “high,” though the analysis is broken out into two sections, high 
and low, so as to compare the treatment effect proposed. As proposed, individuals with technical 
backgrounds were more likely to focus on the locus of uncertainty matching their background 
when that condition was set as high, but this did not occur for the low treatment group. This is 
true with both the significance of the effect, as well as the sizes (Model 1-2). For instance, For 
Model 2, the coefficient under the high condition (.731) is about twice the size as that in the low 
technical condition (.366). Several other interesting effects emerge. For instance, while 
technically-trained individuals were more likely to focus on the technical locus of uncertainty in 
the high condition (Models 1-2), they were not as concerned about that locus of uncertainty 
(Model 3-4). In addition, individuals with non-technical functional experience were relatively 
unaffected by changing the technical locus of uncertainty from a high to a low condition.   
With respect to the subsequent propositions, Model 1 (see Table 4.7) shows that, 
consistent with Proposition 2, individuals tend to focus more on the locus of uncertainty 
corresponding to their functional experience than uncertainties outside of that expertise. This 
seems to hold for all types of functional expertise, though the differences in coefficients may 
suggest that this effect can be unpacked further. Models 2 and 3 both analyze how much 
attention is given to the areas of uncertainty corresponding to an individual’s experience. This 
effect is captured in two ways; first, I compare the number of uncertainties identified within 




uncertainty they deemed the greatest threat to the venture’s success. Results from both models 
are also consistent with Proposition 2, that participants perceived greater uncertainty within the 
loci related to their functional expertise. Proposition 3 suggests that greater functional experience 
would increase the link between expertise and the attention given to the corresponding locus of 
uncertainty. Years of Experience was not statistically significant across the models, so 
Proposition 3 was not supported.  
Propositions 4A and 4B look at the effect of entrepreneurial experience and successful 
entrepreneurial experience, respectively, on the entrepreneur’s propensity to identify more loci of 
uncertainty. Surprisingly, both general and successful entrepreneurial experience lead to 
individuals identifying fewer loci of uncertainty. This could be a function of the high amount of 
successful entrepreneurial experiences in the example; when split into successful and 
unsuccessful, the successful exhibits a much larger, more significant negative effect than the 
general (Table 4.7), and as would be expected, but the unsuccessful exhibits a positive significant 
effect (unreported). Additional light on this topic can be gleaned through an analysis of the effect 
of successful entrepreneurship experience (Table 4.6), as measured under the high and low 
uncertainty conditions. Specifically, when compared to Table 4.7 or the low technical 
uncertainty condition, under the treatment of high technical uncertainty we see that the size of 
the coefficient is reduced by half and the significance level drops. This suggests that those with 
successful entrepreneurial experience both notice and respond to changes in levels of 
uncertainty, whether that is in their functional area or not. Separate, unreported results looking at 
how heavily individuals weighed the uncertainties across the scenario suggests that those with 
prior entrepreneurial experience rate loci of uncertainty as comparatively less important. It is also 




that participants noticed (Models 4 and 5), strengthening the suggestion that functional 
experience has a focusing effect on uncertainty perception.   
Proposition 5A asks whether those with upper-level managerial experience would 
identify more loci of uncertainty, and 5B asks whether functional managerial experience would 
identify less loci of uncertainty; neither were supported by the data. Finally, the manipulation 
variable (High Technical Uncertainty) was not significant for all types of experience in Models 
1-3, but it has a strong negative effect on the total count of the number of loci of uncertainty 
identified (Models 4-5). This was unexpected, as it suggests that individuals identify fewer 
uncertainties overall when technical uncertainty is high, a possible interpretation being that the 
manipulation drew individual’s attention to technical uncertainties at the expense of other 
uncertainties (see Table 4.7).       
DISCUSSION 
 In this pilot study, I investigated how changing the level of technical uncertainty affects 
individuals’ evaluation of the opportunity. The main treatment effect—measuring the change in 
behavior due to a change in level of uncertainty—has some merit (Table 4.6). It appears that, for 
technically minded individuals, changing the level of uncertainty from low to high influences the 
focus that they give to the technical loci of uncertainty. This effect does not carry through to the 
count models (Models 3-4), perhaps in part because there was a substitution effect taking place. 
As the average number of uncertainties per individual was low (~3.26), it appears that 
respondents were only willing to expend a certain amount of energy on the assignment, and that 
changing the loci of uncertainty that matches their expertise influences where they put that 
energy. To make an impact on society, this study relies on the assumption that the behavior of 




on this effort by following up on this experiment with individuals with an effort to walk them 
through a real-life scenario, maybe in the form of a free-flow interview, to establish whether this 
baseline behavior matches the actual behavior of entrepreneurs in the field.    
In addition, I study the effect of different types and levels of experience on the attention 
to and evaluation of different loci of uncertainty in a new business venture opportunity. In 
particular, I assessed the effect of individual’s functional expertise, entrepreneurial (successful 
and general) experience, and managerial (upper-level or functional) experience, on their 
perception and evaluation of uncertainty. The goal was to understand how experience relates to 
uncertainty evaluation, and whether it narrows or expands the loci of uncertainty perceived by 
the individual. In short, I find evidence that when evaluating uncertainty, individuals tend to 
focus their attention on the loci of uncertainty related to their functional experience.  
While much has been written regarding the effects of uncertainty on entrepreneurship 
(e.g. Alvarez and Barney, 2005; Foss and Klein, 2012; McMullen and Shepherd, 2006), there has 
been comparatively less written regarding the entrepreneurial judgment process itself (some 
examples include McMullen and Dimov, 2013; Miller, 2007; Packard et al., in press; Shepherd et 
al., 2015). We know comparatively little with regard to how entrepreneurs manage multiple 
uncertainties factors in entrepreneurial judgment. This research builds on past work, where most 
of the theorizing assumes that the attributes of people who discover opportunities are 
uncorrelated with the attributes of the opportunities that they discover (Evans & Jovanovic, 
1989), and attempts to shed light on previous observations of a potential mechanism underlying 
why entrepreneurs are often observed focusing almost exclusively on the aspects of the 
opportunity that correspond to their area of expertise, ignoring the other uncertain elements 
(Gruber et al., 2015; Shane, 2000). By shedding light on this mechanism of how prior experience 
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interacts with levels of uncertainty, this study also helps clear the path to resolving past 
discrepancies in the relationship between experience (functional, managerial and entrepreneurial) 
and performance.  
One main finding from this study is a better understanding of a potential limitation to 
experience. Although there is broad agreement that relevant past knowledge is valuable, even 
necessary, to the proper evaluation of an opportunity (Dew et al., 2009; Shepherd et al., 2015; 
Wood & Williams, 2014) there is also evidence that functional expertise can constrain evaluation 
(Groysberg & Lee, 2009; Wiley, 1998). In general, the results support the latter view that 
expertise narrows the perceived loci of uncertainty to those areas that match one’s experience. 
This aligns with the idea that functional expertise reduces cognitive flexibility and the 
willingness to adapt to change (Denrell & March, 2001). Likewise, it supports the insight that 
individuals in uncertain conditions allocate attention according to their strengths (Cyert & 
March, 1963a; Greve, 2008; March & Shapira, 1987). Similar mixed findings on the benefits of 
expertise exist in the management and entrepreneurship literatures (Eesley et al., 2014a). Shane 
(2000), for example, found that entrepreneurs focused solely on how a new technology could be 
applied to markets within their expertise, abandoning their venture in the face of difficulties 
(insufficient market demand, lack of funds, technological issues, etc.) rather than examining 
opportunities to use the technology outside of their area of expertise.  
The results provide additional insight into of an entrepreneur’s “knowledge corridor” 
created by their idiosyncratic prior experience. The results of this study suggest that expertise 
may in fact constrict the variety of uncertainty loci perceived by an individual, as they focus their 
attention on those criteria relevant to their expertise, thereby overlooking other potentially 




applied solely to where entrepreneurs viewed opportunities, suggesting that functional expertise 
causes entrepreneurs to both view distinct loci of uncertainty and evaluate those loci of 
uncertainty according to their prior experience. Individuals feel more comfortable solving 
problems closer to their expertise. In doing so, they will naturally discount uncertainties, as they 
do market opportunities, that lie outside their expertise.  This finding is in line with the “jack-of-
all-trades” argument made by Lazear (2004, 2005), as the cross-sectional evidence given therein 
shows that individual’s with broad experience are more likely to become an entrepreneur. 
Because individuals with expertise may be fixated on both the positive and negative elements of 
their expertise, those individuals with broad experience bases should be more likely to perceive 
both the positive and negative aspects of an opportunity.  
 It follows that perhaps extensive experience can lead to entrepreneurial overconfidence. 
Experts are not always adept at evaluating ideas (Baron & Ensley, 2006; McKelvie et al., 2011), 
suggesting that perhaps experience has an inverted-U relationship with uncertainty perception 
(Hayward et al., 2006). Gruber et al. (2015), for instance, find that individuals with narrow 
industry expertise give credence to fewer aspects of new business ideas than those with more 
general experience. The results described in this essay, especially with regards to entrepreneurial 
experience and functional expertise, suggest that this is the case, as experienced participants 
perceived a more focused set of loci of uncertainty. While an overconfidence effect has been 
captured for venture capitalists (Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001), the finding that founders with 
prior entrepreneurial experience, successful or unsuccessful, perceive fewer uncertainties sheds 
light on the lesser-developed link between expertise, overconfidence, and uncertainty perception 
(Read & Sarasvathy, 2005). One unexpected result of the experiment is the finding that the 
negative effect of successful entrepreneurial experience (Table 4.6, Model 4) does not appear to 
116 
hold in the case of high technological uncertainty, suggesting that entrepreneurial experience 
may enable individuals to successfully evaluate different levels of uncertainty. These results add 
nuance to prior studies measuring the difference between how individuals evaluate opportunities 
depending on whether they have past management or entrepreneurial experience (Busenitz & 
Barney, 1997). It also hints at an underlying reason for mixed findings on the effect of 
entrepreneurial experience on a venture’s success (Eesley et al., 2014a; Stuart & Abetti, 1990).   
This paper also opens up the dialogue for discussing different loci of uncertainty in 
entrepreneurship. New business ideas are clouded by uncertainty (Knight, 1921; Wood et al., 
2014). Yet most of the literature primarily focuses on uncertainty as a general construct 
(Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco, & Sarkar, 2004; Gaglio & Katz, 2001; McKelvie et al., 2011; 
Song & Montoya-Weiss, 2001). The results suggest that individual backgrounds interact with the 
various uncertain aspects of an environment. This paper finds that, rather than general 
uncertainty, the loci of uncertainty under investigation in this paper plays an important role in 
facilitating or impeding entrepreneur’s assessment of the new venture’s value and viability.  
This study has the potential to extend entrepreneurship research by building up the link 
between entrepreneurs’ human capital and the importance of knowledge in the evaluation of 
opportunities (Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Haynie et al., 2009; Shane, 2000), and provides 
support for a number of subjectivist theories of entrepreneurship (Foss, Foss, Klein, & Klein, 
2007; Kor et al., 2007; Mahoney & Michael, 2005). The link between an individual’s experience 
and his evaluation of uncertainty supports Kor et al.’s (2007) and Penrose’s (1959) assertion that 
firm-level heterogeneity in entrepreneurial activity stems from the relationship between existing 
resources and perceived opportunities. This paper contributes to the entrepreneurial judgement 
literature by suggesting that it is helpful to know the link between experience and knowledge 
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corridors, as the ability to foresee uncertainties in all aspects of the new venture will enable 
entrepreneurs to: a) spot missing information and conduct thought experiments without first 
expending resources, b) match the supply and demand of resources to avoid time consuming 
bottlenecks, and c) pursue goals in a systematic way through the development of concrete action 
steps (Delmar and Shane, 2003; Gruber, 2007).  
This pilot study stands to make contributions in several literature streams besides 
entrepreneurship. Given the overwhelming amount of (often conflicting) information that 
assaults managers, it has been suggested that the information managers choose to heed affects 
the strategic direction of even large firms (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; 
Ocasio, 2011; Simon, 1947). In addition, this paper adds to the recent counterintuitive finding 
that “technologists” pay more attention to product-oriented opportunity attributes (Dencker & 
Gruber, 2015), a finding worth careful attention in the technology-based entrepreneurship and 
innovation literatures. A follow-up study, written for a more general audience (rather than 
entrepreneurship-based), would be very beneficial, as all individuals face various loci of 
uncertainty in their business dealings.  
Finally, I add to the complex findings regarding the effectiveness of learning behaviors 
such as environmental scanning (Shepherd & DeTienne, 2005) and writing business plans 
(Bhidé, 2000; Delmar & Shane, 2003; Dencker et al., 2009), and provide a mechanism for why 
these actions are ineffective for the firm, as these planning efforts may be confined to preparing 
for the loci of uncertainty with which the entrepreneur already has the most experience.  
Limitations: 
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This experiment was conducted as a pilot to attempt to first demonstrate the viability of 
the theoretical rationale described in the paper. A pilot design addresses the difficulty of 
controlling for the broad array of factors which likely influence new venture decisions in an 
uncertain environment, by solely treating technical uncertainty.  Experimental approaches have 
advantages in internal validity for theory testing purposes, but may be criticized on grounds that 
the experimental task is not a real one with real payoffs. I deemed the tradeoff acceptable,55 
given the early stage of research in this arena, and given my interest in testing theories, some of 
which have undergone little empirical scrutiny. One shortcoming of this experimental design was 
that it is difficult to tease apart whether the actions taken by entrepreneurs in this study are 
driven by cognitive bias or are fully rational. A future study can help nail down this issue by 
asking for individuals’ reasoning after they opine which uncertainties concern them in the 
study’s opportunity. 
As this was a pilot study, there are several elements of the design that can be improved in 
a future iteration. For instance, perhaps using a more robust manipulation check (i.e., which 
measures individuals’ ability to sense differences in the levels of uncertainty) will allow for more 
confidence in understanding whether the treatment was sufficiently strong to influence behavior. 
In addition, a more robust sample population that is exposed to different types of opportunity 
55 As a personal note, I designed the pilot in part so that I could gain first-hand experience in designing an 
experiment, see how the process works, and learn first-hand what the benefits and weaknesses are, etc. because that 
fits my long-term research goals. I knew that, as a novice, I would make a number of mistakes, but was hopeful that 
I would be able to get enough wisdom into the process that I could take my design to my colleagues at SC (some of 
the leading experimentalists in management and accounting) and revamp the experiment so as to make the study 
publishable in a top-tier journal. That being said, I made every effort to prepare for and minimize potential issues, 
and was mentored by several fantastic faculty members at UIUC as to how to best go about this process. In the end, 
one of the major weaknesses of the study was the sample size. Rather than grow the sample size around an 
experimental model that has some flaws, my goal is to rework the entire experiment, running the gauntlet of my new 
department, after the completion of the dissertation.  
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situations would have more reliable results. As it stands, there is cause for reasonable doubt that 
the opportunity in question was too complex for individuals to follow. Finally, experimentally 
testing different types of uncertainty (rather than simply technical) would allow me to tease out 
whether this effect is restricted to technically-trained individuals, or whether it extends out to 
other functions.  
Second, I chose to study decision-making among set of six loci of uncertainty. More 
rigorous theoretical and empirical work is needed to understand A) whether these are the 
appropriate loci for prospective entrepreneurs to consider, and B) how these specific loci 
influence evaluation. This exploratory piece does not adequately consider the individual and 
combined effects of these loci of uncertainty. More theory is needed to understand both the 
relevant loci of uncertainty, and their effect on current and potential entrepreneurs.  
An additional possible limitation to this study is that the participants may not have been 
“expert enough”, or varied enough in their expertise, to capture the true interactions between 
uncertainty and individual experience. Similar to the overconfidence exhibited by recently-
graduated undergraduate students as compared to freshly-minded PhD students, perhaps those in 
the study did not respond in the same way as those with greater years of experience56. In 
addition, the size of the sample provides a cause for some concern, given the number of variables 
analyzed. While overfit model tests suggest the sample size is sufficient, a larger sample would 
allow me to explore the treatment effects of several loci of uncertainty. Another potential 
limitation is the high correlation between entrepreneurial experience and successful 
entrepreneurial experience. Despite the high failure rate of entrepreneurship, most of the 
56 While I coded for years of experience, I believe that the sample group limited the potential effects that 
could be seen from multiple years of experience due to a lack of variation in years of experience.  
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respondents who listed prior experience also said that it was successful. Finally, I restricted the 
examination to the effects of anticipated outcomes and differences in (uncertainty perceptions) 
on the decisions that were made. Potentially important contextual factors such as competencies 
and previous experience of the entrepreneur, incentives, and team decision process issues, while 
partially addressed through controls and manipulations, were not examined in this study. Future 
research, using this pilot study as a base, is needed to explore these and other likely influences on 
new venture decisions. 
Future Research 
This examination involves a study of how individuals evaluate the loci of uncertainty of a 
potential opportunity. An initial question raised by this study is whether affecting different loci 
of uncertainty will have the same effect on non-technical functional experts as on technical 
experts. Another area of future work would be to develop a theory concerning how a team comes 
together in evaluating, and weighing, different loci of uncertainty. While this study’s findings 
provide further support for the established wisdom that prior entrepreneurship matters in 
entrepreneurship, we lack an established framework to evaluate just how and why experience is 
important in new firm creation. For instance, related industry experience to the new venture idea 
also has a complex relationship with new venture performance. Depending on the measure of 
performance—anything from opportunity evaluation to long-term growth performance—industry 
experience is frequently found to be unrelated to the success of the venture (Delmar & Shane, 
2006; Gruber et al., 2013b). Similarly, with respect to prior entrepreneurial experience, could it 
be that prior failure and prior success have different effects on entrepreneur’s enthusiasm 
towards and evaluation of opportunities? Finally, digging deeper into the construct of uncertainty 
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and the ways in which the character of uncertainty is evaluated (i.e., “Knightian” vs. “Risk 
Assessment”) has led to several interesting follow-on studies. Much of the literature on 
uncertainty has focused on how it is perceived, but what of those areas that are unknown 
unknowns? Because individuals are unable to act upon the uncertainty that they cannot see, do 
they simply ignore it or is there a ‘hedging’ behavior that occurs due to the perception of an 
unknown uncertainty? There is ample space for research to be done in this arena, such as 
evaluating how uncertainty resolution can occur, depending on the manner in which that 
uncertain element is presented (unknown vs. risk) in the agent’s mind.  
CONCLUSION 
This pilot study attempted to separate the effects of uncertainty perception from past 
experience, narrowly limiting the design to technical expertise and technical uncertainty. The 
goal of the study is to pilot a unique research design to better understand how individuals 
evaluate business opportunities subject to differing loci of uncertainty. Despite the high 
aspirations entrepreneurs may have for their new ventures, they often face severe information 
deficits regarding the future development of their business, e.g. as to whether the product can be 
manufactured at scale, whether a market exists, whether revenues will exceed costs, as well as a 
host of other uncertainties (Alvarez, Barney, & Anderson, 2013; Sarasvathy, 2001). While it has 
long been argued that high priority should be given to research explaining how an individual 
interprets uncertainty in a given situation, there is a great deal of work left to accomplish 
(McKelvie et al., 2011). Taking into account function-specific uncertainty (Raffiee and Feng, 
2014), this study represents an initial foray into understanding entrepreneurial decision-making 
in the face of uncertain environments. This essay links together individual expertise and 
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experience with various relevant loci of uncertainty. Responding to the call for research linking 
both the external uncertainty of the venture with individual characteristics (Gruber et al., 2015), 
this essay begins to unpack how the nature of the uncertainty faced by entrepreneurs affects their 
judgment of a new venture opportunity. A follow-on study building on this work should be able 
to offer a more nuanced look into the evaluation of uncertainty, both by entrepreneurs and 
managers, as well as examine how entrepreneurs’ functional expertise and past experiences may 
affect their perceptions of uncertainty. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
The objective of this dissertation was to attempt to understand underlying, individual-
level drivers of new venture idea evaluation, early-stage experiential search, and 
commercialization in a coherent theoretic framework. By grounding the analysis in the context of 
academic entrepreneurship, this work hopes to shed light on multiple stages of the 
entrepreneurial process. This “engaged scholarship” approach provides an opportunity not only 
to address the technology-market linking problem in academic entrepreneurship mentioned in the 
introductory chapter, but the findings from this focused view can be reflected outwards, 
generating insights into and questions for the broader entrepreneurship, innovation, and 
management literatures. I summarize the research questions addressed in each essay, the 
principal findings, and future questions arising from this work in Table 5.1. 
The first essay weaves together the entrepreneurship and innovation literatures. By 
looking at opportunity identification as a type of cognitive (or local) search, and market 
application (or opportunity) evaluation as a type of costly experiential search (Gavetti & 
Levinthal, 2000), several insights emerge. First, consistent with recent critiques about the 
ambiguity surrounding the “opportunity” construct (Davidsson, 2015), I find different effects of 
industry and entrepreneurial experience on experiential search for market applications than on 
the identification of opportunities. While experienced entrepreneurs may perform more local 
search, in terms of identifying more new business ideas, prior to launching the firm (Gruber et 
al., 2008), this same effect does not carry through to experiential search. In addition, while 
functional experts are theorized to have better ability to recognize patterns and opportunities 
(Furr et al., 2012), the pattern that emerges from this study is that teams combining individuals 
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of various levels of expertise lead to greater levels of firm search. This finding aligns with the 
assertion that environmental uncertainty has a strong effect on the link between individual traits 
and behaviors (Dane, 2010; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006).  It contributes to the broad 
entrepreneurship and innovation literatures by explicitly theorizing on experiential search at a 
small-firm level, as well as moving beyond the recognition of opportunities to observe and 
predict the firm’s behavior in testing and evaluating potential market applications prior to 
commercialization. 
The first study informs the following two pieces. It suggests that expertise may narrow 
the experiential search of boundedly-rational entrepreneurs in their efforts to commercialize their 
technology, and it submits that the compositional variables have diverging effects from the 
general entrepreneurship literature. For instance, a “broad” knowledge base in the founding team 
can lead to more or less exploration, depending on the type of expertise. The second study takes 
up where this leaves off, by examining the effects of expertise and logics on the time taken to 
commercialize a technology. The first study also informs the experimental approach taken in the 
third study (Chapter 4) by suggesting that expertise may limit entrepreneur’s experiential search, 
but leaves open the question of whether this also happens at the cognitive level, as well as 
whether this same effect will be seen for non-academic entrepreneurs with varying levels of 
technological expertise. Further, this study suggests that a context with high uncertainty may 
require more grounded theorizing to understand the relationships between founding team 
composition and the early-stage behaviors of the venture, which impacts the experimental design 
of Chapter 4.   
The second study builds on the first study by continuing the notion that technical 
knowledge and expertise may not be sufficient for the venture to innovate their technology. 
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Similarly based in the context of technology-based entrepreneurship, this essay explored the joint 
effects of founder knowledge, expertise and logics on the firms’ time to commercialize. Building 
on the notion that technology-based entrepreneurship requires more than technically-qualified 
scientists (Gittelman & Kogut, 2003; Powell & Sandholtz, 2012), this essay mixes in insights 
from institutional logics literature to explain why simply mixing technical expertise with 
business acumen may not produce the right management flavor (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Sauermann & Stephan, 2013; Wry et al., 2014). Explicitly, I attempt to explain that the vast 
chasm between research and commercial logics is one of the underlying reasons for the poor 
performance of academic entrepreneurship (Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005; Wennberg et al., 2011). I 
find that, indeed, the ‘complementary’ academic- and business-led teams perform only 
marginally better than teams composed of only academics. Instead, I find that less-embedded 
founders enable the diverse knowledge domains to properly mix into a unified venture. 
Assuming that time to sales is a measure of a technology-based firm’s ability to create a hybrid 
logic, the findings also suggest that these less-embedded founders are able to assist in the 
creation of hybrid ventures.  
The second study contributes to technology-based entrepreneurship literature by focusing 
on the diverging effects of founder embeddedness in institutional logics. It builds on recent work 
studying upper echelons in technology-based firms by expanding upon prior experience-based 
founder attributes found to affect early- and late-stage ventures. In addition, it contributes to the 
literature on technology-based entrepreneurship by explicitly measuring commercialization from 
the earliest stages of the firm, while much of the extant literature does not observe these firms 
until the receipt of venture-capital funding.  
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The third study tries to take the insights learned from the earlier essays to build upon the 
underlying notion that both environmental uncertainty and expertise affect entrepreneurial 
behavior in material ways. To better understand differentiating effect of uncertainty, and the 
focusing effect of expertise, this study employed an experimental design intent on linking 
technical expertise with uncertainty perception in new venture idea evaluations. This study 
confirmed and expanded the idea that there is a ‘dark side’ to expertise, in that experts tend to not 
recognize or weigh elements of uncertainty that fall outside their domain of expertise. This seems 
to hold true not only for technical expertise, but also for entrepreneurial experience, suggesting a 
possible mechanism for the lack of clear findings on the effect of prior entrepreneurial 
experience (Eesley et al., 2014a; Gruber et al., 2015). This study also attempts to clarify the 
nature of uncertainty through an exposition on the various loci of uncertainty comprising 
“general” or “environmental” uncertainty.  
In general, this dissertation contributes to literatures in entrepreneurship (opportunity 
recognition and evaluation, judgment, and technology-based), innovation (search and 
technological recombination), institutional logics, and management (upper-echelons and top-
management team). The findings across the three studies suggest that combining founders with 
domain-based knowledge, expertise and logics with knowledgeable founders who are either less 
experienced in the field, or come from a different context, has important pre- and post-entry 
effects. This adds to the existing literature, giving another dimension to the assertion that having 
founders with diverse backgrounds generates a performance premium for startups (Beckman et 
al., 2007; Eesley et al., 2014a). This dissertation also highlights the role of founder’s knowledge, 
expertise and logics in shaping direction of the venture’s early start-up stages, the unexpected 
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role of less-embedded founders in these processes, and the importance of grounding theory in 
context (Carpenter et al., 2004).   
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This dissertation is just one slice of a broad stream of literature, and therefore has many 
limitations. The first limitation of this work stems from the author; it is hoped that this work does 
not represent the magnum opus, but rather an opusculum that can be built upon for future work. 
Another critique is the setting of academic entrepreneurship. The context-driven theorizing, 
while useful for making specific predictions about entrepreneurial behavior and providing 
grounding for new theory, is also a limitation to the generalizability of this body of work. In 
addition, the samples generating the findings and predictions of this study are smaller, and less 
random, than ideal, leading to potentially biased results. Apart from the myriad limitations listed 
in each work, the author is hopeful that the reader will find and report other ways to improve this 
research.   
Disentangling these contingencies and performance implications is an important project 
for future research, and one which I am committed to pursuing. Using a survey-based approach, I 
believe that I can build on the foundation laid in this dissertation to examine several of the above 
questions with respect to the evolution of the firm and the founding team, using the theories 
employed within this dissertation. Data have already been gathered so as to expand this work to 
more universities, doubling the current sample size, which will allow for a survey-based 
approach to examine the underlying cognitions behind the actions taken by technology-based 
entrepreneurs in their search, evaluation and exploitation of market applications and new venture 
ideas.  
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Another overarching question connecting all three studies relates to the generalizability 
of the academic entrepreneurship context. The narrowed scope of the dissertation to the early 
start-up phases in academic entrepreneurship enabled much tighter connections between the 
empirics and the theory than can often be obtained through more general studies. The nature of 
academic technologists’ training and environment may affect their early behaviors and choices 
more strongly than that of other technology-based founders. This suggests the dissertation is 
potentially limited with respect to technology-based entrepreneurship outside of the academic 
context, which is one fruitful area of future study for the author, as only a small amount of 
research have compared the two groups of technology-based startups (Ensley & Hmieleski, 
2005; Lowe & Ziedonis, 2006). 
As highlighted in Table 5.1, the dissertation opens rich venues for future research. A 
particularly relevant question connecting all three studies relates to the growth dynamics 
experienced by the founding team in the process of transitioning towards a (more) 
professionally-managed management team, as the new venture evolves and grows into an 
established firm. These transitions are always difficult, and are often involved in the early demise 
of these growing firms, and yet there is very little work done on the underlying factors which 
would improve the ordeal (Flamholtz & Randle, 2000; Wasserman, 2012). How does this 
changeover improve, depending on the mixture of experience, logics and expertise within the 
founding team? While the second study (Chapter 3) confirms extant findings on the long-term 
performance effects of the founding team (Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Fern et al., 2012; 
Schoonhoven et al., 1990), it does not account for the addition of new management. This should 
interact with the effects of the founding team in interesting, and unexplored ways.  
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Additional questions can be asked in more general settings. For instance, the number and 
variety of opportunities in complex technological domains are abundant, but only some inventors 
seek to explore them prior to exploitation. Does this effect hold for less-complex situations? 
How can this myopic tendency be improved in individuals, teams and firms? In addition, how do 
the findings about mixing various levels and types of expertise generalize outside the context of 
academic startups?  
Critical questions that emerge in both studies 1 and 3 (Table 5.1) relate to the post-entry 
performance of technology-based firms. Do teams that perform more experiential search reap the 
rewards from their diligent and costly search? Is there some level at which this search demands 
too much from the venture, resulting in adverse performance effects? Similarly, entrepreneurs 
who recognize more business opportunities tend to pick superior opportunities to exploit 
(Dencker & Gruber, 2015); is there a similar effect for entrepreneurs who are better able to 
perceive multiple types of uncertainty, or are the performance effects of this negated by 
entrepreneurs’ attribution bias (Eggers & Song, 2015)? Is there a mixture of knowledge, 
experience, expertise levels and logics which will enable the venture to both evaluate multiple 
uncertainty types as well as test multiple market applications and opportunities, can this 
overcome the overconfidence effect? These questions are beyond the scope of my dissertation 
buy are nevertheless important in improving our understanding of drivers of entrepreneurship, 
innovation, and early-stage firm performance. My dissertation provides a first step in the 
examination of these fascinating phenomena. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the study shows that the effects of founder knowledge, expertise, and 




technological complexity of academic entrepreneurship seems to suggest care in applying 
findings to similar domains, such as entrepreneurial ventures exploring and exploiting new 
venture ideas or large firms searching for innovations. Future research should be cognizant of 
these issues when studying team demography, rather than theorizing knowledge complementarity 
as two pieces of a puzzle, to explicitly take into the account the costs of trying to join two 
inherently different domains. This dissertation also underscores the importance of environmental 
uncertainty, as the types and levels of uncertainty appear to influence each stage of the 
entrepreneurial venture. The study thus provides a unique opportunity to shed light on a unique 
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Variable 13 14 15 16 
13       Tech: Biomedical/Ag 
 
1.00    
14       Tech: Communication -0.20 1.00   
15       Tech: Engineering -0.29 -0.20 1.00  













Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12    
1 >1 SBIR 0.37 0.48 1.00 
2 # SBIR 1.78 3.91 0.59 1.00 
3 Serial Entrepreneur 0.17 0.37 0.00 -0.07 1.00 
4 Industry Experience 0.14 0.23 -0.08 -0.06 0.42 1.00 
5 Knowledge-Breadth 0.14 0.34 0.21 0.09 0.07 -0.04 1.00 
6 All-Expert Team 0.44 0.50 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.09 -0.07 1.00 
7 Mixed Expertise 0.13 0.33 0.15 0.13 0.03 -0.07 0.16 -0.33 1.00 
8 Licensed Technology 0.45 0.50 0.24 0.17 0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.16 0.01 1.00 
9 # Founders 2.18 1.13 -0.01 -0.02 0.32 0.30 0.25 -0.29 0.32 0.00 1.00 
10 Undergraduate 0.04 0.20 -0.09 -0.06 -0.07 -0.13 -0.06 -0.18 -0.08 -0.14 -0.05 1.00 
11 Age 15.14 9.62 0.00 0.06 -0.13 -0.07 -0.07 0.04 -0.06 -0.20 -0.13 0.06 1.00 
12 Tech: Software/EE 0.30 0.46 -0.33 -0.21 0.02 0.06 -0.20 -0.07 -0.08 -0.21 -0.03 0.15 -0.02 1.00 
13 Tech: Biomedical/Ag 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.05 -0.10 -0.09 -0.37  
14 Tech: Communication 0.12 0.33 -0.05 0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.11 -0.08 0.09 0.00 0.14 -0.24   
15 Tech: Engineering 0.22 0.42 0.18 0.07 -0.09 -0.15 0.06 0.08 -0.07 0.10 -0.10 -0.01 0.10 -0.35   
16 Tech: Other 0.12 0.33 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.08 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.08 -0.12 -0.24     
Variable 
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  MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 
        Control Group: Controls FULL--NBR FULL--IRR FULL-Logit 
  DV= # SBIR DV= # SBIR DV=# SBIR DV= 0/1 SBIR 
        
Licensed Technology 0.40** 0.45** 1.57** 0.63*** 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.31) (0.23) 
# Founders -0.01 -0.06 0.95 -0.16 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) 
Undergraduate -1.43** -1.28** 0.25** -0.81 
 (0.60) (0.61) (0.15) (0.72) 
Tech: Software/EE -1.59*** -1.67*** 0.20*** -1.71*** 
 (0.31) (0.32) (0.06) (0.38) 
Tech: Biomedical/Ag 0.07 -0.05 0.93 0.18 
 (0.32) (0.33) (0.30) (0.23) 
Tech: Communication -0.16 -0.27 0.70 -0.50 
 (0.35) (0.36) (0.25) (0.41) 
Tech: Engineering -0.24 -0.33 0.70 0.12 
 (0.33) (0.34) (0.23) (0.36) 
University #1 -0.82** -0.88*** 0.46*** -1.02*** 
 (0.33) (0.34) (0.15) (0.36) 
University #2 -1.01** -1.01** 0.42* -1.47*** 
 (0.46) (0.47) (0.19) (0.51) 
University #3 0.69** 0.57 2.43** -0.11 
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.91) (0.42) 
University #4 0.31 0.33 1.40 -0.23 
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.45) (0.36) 
University #5 -0.38 -0.44 0.70 -0.36 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.23) (0.36) 
Age - - - 0.03* 
ln(Age) 1.00 1.00 1.00 (0.01) 
Knowledge Breadth   0.60** 1.82** 1.33*** 
 
 (0.27) (0.49) (0.34) 
Industry & Academic   -0.54** .58** -0.03 
Experience (H1)   (0.24) (0.14) (0.28) 
Mixed Expertise   0.87*** 2.35*** 1.61*** 
(H2)  (0.32) (0.75) (0.39) 
Entrepreneurial  0.41 1.50 0.42 
Experience (H3)  (0.32) (0.49) (0.37) 
Expert-only  0.43*    
 (0.23)    
Constant_ 0.05 -1.529*** 0.21*** -0.22 
  (0.44) (0.39) (0.08) (0.5) 
Log Likelihood -836.5 -822.9 -822.9 -291.5 
LnAlpha 1.14 1.07 1.04 -20.91 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)   
Alpha 3.14 2.92 2.83  
  (0.32) (0.30) (0.29)   
LR Test of Alpha=0 G2=1117 G2=1101 G2=1066   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
N Obs 561 561 561 561 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Variable MEAN SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Time To Sales 4.35 3.88 0 25 1            
2 Academic & Business 0.20 0.40 0 1 -0.05 1           
3 Serial Academic  0.04 0.20 0 1 0.02 -0.09 1          
4 Academic & Student  0.12 0.32 0 1 -0.02 -0.16 -0.07 1         
5 Academic_Student_Business 0.06 0.23 0 1 -0.10 -0.12 -0.05 -0.05 1        
6 Serial Academic_ Student  0.14 0.12 0 1 -0.09 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 1       
7 Student & Business 0.06 0.24 0 1 -0.07 -0.13 -0.05 -0.09 -0.06 -0.03 1      
8 Academic Only 0.42 0.49 0 1 0.21 -0.39 0.24 -0.27 -0.19 -0.09 -0.21 1     
9 Student Only 0.42 0.49 0 1 -0.06 -0.20 -0.08 -0.14 -0.10 -0.05 -0.11 -0.34 1    
10 Team Size 2.21 1.11 1 7 -0.13 0.17 -0.05 0.14 0.37 0.05 0.13 -0.38 -0.11 1   
11 IT-Software 0.31 0.46 0 1 -0.03 0.00 -0.11 -0.03 -0.07 -0.01 0.17 -0.19 0.15 -0.06 1  
12 IT-Hardware 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.17 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.00 0.08 -0.23 1 
13 Life Sciences 0.25 0.44 0 1 -0.02 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.09 -0.14 0.05 -0.40 -0.20 
14 Medical Instruments 0.22 0.41 0 1 0.12 -0.10 0.08 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.12 0.22 -0.06 -0.08 -0.36 -0.18 
15 Other Industry 0.11 0.32 0 1 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.03 -0.07 0.06 0.06 -0.25 -0.12 
16 Venture Capital ($) 13300000 34700000 0 316000000 -0.14 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.03 -0.09 -0.06 0.18 -0.06 0.16 
17 # SBIR Grants 2.43 6.14 0 59 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.16 -0.03 -0.03 -0.09 0.09 -0.13 -0.02 -0.13 0.06 
18 Recession Year 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.01 0.11 -0.09 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.08 -0.08 0.05 -0.01 -0.05 
19 Licensed Technology 0.50 0.50 0 1 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.12 0.18 -0.17 0.00 -0.21 -0.08 
20 Beginning Year 2000.30 5.07 1989 2008 -0.16 -0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.08 -0.11 0.08 0.08 0.01 -0.09 
   Table 3.2 (continued) 
Variable 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Life Sciences 
1 
       
Medical Instruments -0.30 1       
Other Industry -0.21 -0.18 1      
Venture Capital ($) -0.06 -0.08 0.12 1     
# SBIR Grants 0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.03 1    
Recession Year 0.02 -0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.02 1   
Licensed Technology 0.18 0.11 -0.01 0.00 0.15 -0.31 1  





Table 3.3: Competing-Risks Model 
   
Hazard Ratios Shown Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Independent Variable DV: Time to Sales DV: Time to Sales DV: Time to Acquisition 
H1 Serial Academic  1.27 1.26 4.38 
  (0.26) (0.26) (5.39) 
H2A Academic & Student  1.16 0.95 1.34 




2.10*** 1.72** 0.00*** 
  (0.45) (0.39) (0.00) 
 Serial Academic & Student  3.38*** 2.75*** 0.00*** 
  (0.79) (0.67) (0.00) 
 Student & Business 0.76 0.62 3.26* 
  (0.26) (0.21) (2.00) 
 Academic Only --- 0.83 0.62 
  --- (0.14) (0.45) 
 Academic & Business 1.39* --- --- 
  (0.26) --- --- 
 Student Only 1.30 1.04 0.79 
  (0.22) (0.21) (0.59) 
 Team Size 0.99 0.99 1.19 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.24) 
 Recession Year 0.77 0.79 1.70 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.97) 
 Licensed Technology 1.27* 1.26* 0.35* 
  (0.17) (0.16) (0.19) 
 IT-Software Industry 0.57*** 0.57*** 2.63 
  (0.10) (0.10) (2.75) 
 IT-Hardware Industry 0.65* 0.66* 3.89 
  (0.15) (0.15) (4.63) 
 Life Sciences Ind. 0.68** 0.68** 1.32 
  (0.13) (0.15) (1.69) 
 Medical Instruments 0.83 0.83 1.36 
  (0.16) (0.16) (1.69) 
 Time-Varying Covariates       
 Venture Capital 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00* 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 Phase 1 SBIR Grants 1.02*** 1.02*** 0.24*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
 University Dummy Y Y Y 
 Observations 1,680 1,680 1,680 
 Log Likelihood -1701 -1702 -136 






Table 3.4: Competing-Risks Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
INDUSTRY: IT_Software IT_Hardware Life Sciences 
Medical 
Instrument Other 
(H1) Serial Academic  0.00*** 2.12** 0.51 1.11 0.11** 
 (0.00) (0.64) (0.37) (0.33) (0.11) 
(H2A) Academic & Student  0.62 0.51 2.67 2.04 1.48 
 (0.26) (0.22) (1.68) (0.94) (0.95) 
(H2B) Academic, Student, 
Business 1.70 2.83*** 2.51 2.79** 4.86*** 
 (0.79) (1.04) (1.87) (1.43) (2.67) 
Serial Academic, Student  5.17*** 6.56*** 14.78** 1.03 7.27*** 
 (2.39) (4.31) (19.97) (0.53) (6.206) 
Student & Business 0.24*** 2.22** 5.00 0.00*** 0.98 
 (0.13) (0.81) (6.26) (0.00) (0.76) 
Academic Only 0.53* 0.58 1.89 0.70 0.69 
 (0.19) (0.19) (1.16) (0.27) (0.38) 
Student Only 0.56* 1.07 4.09* 0.72 1.40 
 (0.19) (0.42) (3.02) (0.36) (1.05) 
Team Size 1.05 0.71** 1.22 1.09 1.15 
 (0.15) (0.10) (0.21) (0.13) (0.18) 
Recession Year 0.52* 1.11 0.21 0.32* 0.52 
 (0.18) (0.41) (0.26) (0.20) (0.23) 
Licensed Technology 0.60* 1.46 1.44 1.37 0.73 
 (0.17) (0.37) (0.77) (0.39) (0.24) 
Time-Varying       
Venture Capital ($) 
 
  1.00** 1.00* 1.00 1.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
# SBIR Grants 1.08*** 1.01 0.98 1.00 1.04*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
      
Observations 620 504 209 537 179 
Log Lik -90.29 -90.29 -90.29 -90.29 -90.29 
* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%    









Table 4.1: The Loci of External Uncertainty 
Locus Definition References 
Technological 
Uncertainty regarding the characteristics of the new technology (ie., 
performance or costs), about the relation between the new technology and the 
technical infrastructure in which the technology is embedded, and about the 
possibility of choosing alternative (future) technological options.  
Sinha & Noble, 2008; 
Song & Montoya- 
Weiss, 2001 
Demand 
Uncertainty about consumers' preferences with respect to the new technology, 
the compatibility of the new technology with consumers' characteristics, 
development of demand over time, market size, acceptance rate, etc.  
Mises, 1949; Eckhardt 
& Shane, 2003; 
Agarwal et al, 2004 
Industry 
Uncertainty about the actions of competitors, suppliers and buyers, especially 




Uncertainty regarding the availability, amount, and source of financial, 
material, and human resources needed for the project; also, uncertainty 




Uncertainty regarding the nature, structure, and stability of markets, the legal 
& regulatory environment, etc.  
Oliver & Holzinger 
2008; North 2005 
Ecological 
Unpredictability of the physical environment, including climate and weather, 





Table 4.2: Technical Uncertainty Manipulation 
Scenario #    Technical Expertise    Non-Technical Expertise 
1: High Technological Uncertainty 22 41 
2:  Low Technological Uncertainty 18 42 
 
 





Ratio of uncertainties corresponding to participants’ expertise 
over total number of uncertainties 
P1, P2, P3 
Comparison 
"1" if the same or greater number of uncertainties are listed 
within the locus of experience compared to number of 
uncertainties in other loci of uncertainty. 
P2 (Alternate) 
Concern "1" if the loci of uncertainty of most concern matches expertise  P2 (Alternate) 


























Technical  19 6 13 18 
Sales/Marketing 20 3 17 25 








Table 4.6: Tobit Analysis Comparing “High” and “Low” Technological Uncertainty Condition  
                DV: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  
Focus Comparison  Concern Count 
HIGH UNCERTAINTY CONDITION:     
Technical Expertise 0.321* 0.731** 0.148 -0.677 
 0.153 0.202 0.135 -1.153 
Sales Expertise 0.187+ 0.768** 0.293* -1.156 
 0.113 0.162 0.139 -1.092 
Strategic Expertise 0.497** 0.382* 0.425** -0.756 
 0.134 0.151 0.163 -1.092 
Success Ent'l Exper. (%) 0.047 -0.189 -0.167 -0.894+ 
 0.093 -0.099 -0.136 -0.501 
Upper Management Exp 0.211 -0.187 0.028 0.231 
 0.131 -0.149 0.143 0.648 
Functional Mangmt Exp -0.005 0.028** 0.01 -0.046 
 0.008 0.011 0.01 -0.039 
LOW UNCERTAINTY CONDITION:     
Technical Expertise 0.241 0.366+ 0.223 0.473 
 0.163 0.212 0.114 0.910 
Sales Expertise 0.131 0.848** 0.317** 0.916 
 0.134 0.162 0.114 0.900 
Strategic Expertise .389* 0.432* 0.237 1.473 
 0.182 0.201 0.161 1.038 
Success Ent'l Exper. (%) -0.099 -0.204 -0.221+ -2.219*** 
 -0.107 -0.146 -0.111 0.528 
Upper Management Exp 0.059 -0.071 0.221 0.14 
 0.212 -0.17 0.201 0.556 
Functional Mangmt Exp -0.002 -0.004 0.01 0.017 
 0.007 0.001 0.01 0.038 
Sigma 0.276 0.377 0.401 1.85 
  0.023 0.026 0.028 0.142 
F (14, 109) 4.23 7.66 4.82 1.5 
Pseudo R-squared 0.626 0.348 0.241 0.05 









Table 4.7: Tobit regressions predicting uncertainty evaluations 











Technical Expertise 0.292** 0.541** 0.305* -0.638 -0.739 
 (0.11) (0.14) (0.15) (0.87) (0.88) 
Sales Expertise 0.169* 0.828** 0.426** -0.59 -0.64 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.85) (0.89) 
Strategic Expertise 0.433** 0.362* 0.553** 0.01  -0.05 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.91) (0.91) 
Prior Ent'l Experience          -1.20**  
    (0.39)  
Success Ent'l Exper. (%) -0.028 -0.197* -0.126  -1.46** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.10)  (0.37) 
Upper Management Exp 0.17 -0.11 0.07 -0.31 -0.09 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.49) (0.48) 
Functional Mangmt Exp -0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  
 (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01 ) (0.01) (0.03 ) 
Years of Experience 0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.01 0.00 
 0.00  (0.01) (0.00 ) (0.02) (0.02) 
High Technical Uncert. 0.04  -0.04 0.10  -1.19** -1.14** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.36) (0.35) 
Cross-functional Exper. 0.01  0.09* 0.04  0.15  0.16  
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.16) (0.15) 
Engagement 0.00 -0.11+ -0.05 0.31  0.41  
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.27) (0.27) 
Locus of Control 0.01  -0.01 0.01  -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) 
Creative Self-Efficacy -0.04 -0.08+ 0.00  0.21  0.20  
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.27) (0.27) 
Risk Propensity 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.02  0.00  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant -0.04 0.81** -0.07 2.71  2.85  
 (0.25) (0.34) (0.42) (2.16) (1.95) 
Sigma .299 .408 .419  1.85 1.82 
 (.02) (.02) (.02) (.14) (.13) 
F (14, 109) 14.95 11.26 4.16 2.4 2.68 
Pseudo R-squared 0.365 0.271 0.131 0.05 0.05 
Legend: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01         
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Table 4.8: Uncertainty 
Uncertainty Corresponding Loci of Uncertainty in Opportunity Scenario 
Technology 
“Isaac has just successfully patented a new process…”; “but has not yet attempted to 
manufacture them on a commercial scale”; “believes no other lab has similar method” 
Resource 
“Isaac has no business (or management) experience”; “VCs want to see product sales before 
they will commit to funding the company” 
Industry 
“[Catalysts] are they used to convert carbon-based refuse into high octane fuel and high-
quality wax”; “the only global supplier of high-purity supports is Sasol.” 
Institutions “The ‘green’ nature of the catalysts;” “Isaac believes more funding is very likely.” 
Demand 
“Potential clients apply in-house treatments to supports purchased from a third party;” 
“resulting in cheaper and more effective catalysts than the leading competitor;” “each 
[potential customer gave]…Isaac verbal commitments to purchase his firm’s supports.” 
Ecological 
“The ecological impact of the catalyst’s byproducts is minimal;” “Isaac’s firm will have zero 
liability with respect to disposal and cleanup of the product.”  
 
 
Table 4.9: OLS Regression Analysis  










          
Technical Expertise 0.293* 0.546** 0.315+ -0.569 
 -0.12 -0.15 -0.16 -0.5 
Sales Expertise 0.171+ 0.835** 0.440** -0.57 
 -0.09 -0.11 -0.14 -0.44 
Strategic Expertise 0.435** 0.370** 0.569** -0.216 
 -0.13 -0.13 -0.17 -0.5 
Prior_Ent Expertise -0.028 -0.193* -0.121 -0.534* 
 -0.07 -0.1 -0.1 -0.26 
Upper Managerial Exp 0.172 -0.11 0.073 0.227 
 -0.13 -0.12 -0.14 -0.32 
Functional Managerial Exp -0.001 0.007 0.005 0.031 
 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
 
Exhibit 4.1:  
Proposed New Venture Idea 
For the final project in your Executive MBA program, Professor Paul Magelli has assigned you to assist 
Isaac Johnson, a graduating PhD student in Chemistry with an emphasis on nanotechnology, in 
evaluating his new business opportunity. 
  
A hopeful entrepreneur, Isaac has just successfully patented a new process in catalyst development. 
Manufacturing catalysts requires a support, a recipe, and an application process. The nanotechnology 
patent describes a process which creates the support upon which the metal compound is applied to form 
a catalyst (i.e., a substance that increases the rate of a chemical reaction without itself undergoing any 
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permanent changes).  These treated supports (ie, catalysts) are then used to convert carbon-based 
refuse (i.e., garbage, animal and plant waste) into high octane fuel and high-quality wax.  
 
Isaac has manufactured small batches of supports in his laboratory, but has not yet attempted to 
manufacture them on a commercial scale. While Isaac plans to build his own plant in the future, he has 
acquired an agreement from a failing plant outside of Chicago to lease their space and equipment for one 
year.    
 
Most potential clients (i.e., Phillips-66) apply in-house treatments to supports purchased from a third 
party. The only global supplier of high-purity supports (there are a few regional players in the market) is 
Sasol, located in South Africa. According to Isaac's lab reports, his process creates a support that allows 
the recipe to be 'applied' more consistently, resulting in cheaper and more effective catalysts, than the 
leading competitor, Sasol. Isaac just returned from meetings with each of the three largest petroleum 
companies in the nation, and each responded very enthusiastically to the product, giving Isaac verbal 
commitments to purchase his firm's supports.   
 
He also believes that no other lab has a similar method of production, as the process underlying the 
standard industry support has been the dominant model for over 85 years. In addition, Isaac recently 
received an industry analysts’ report that made it clear that Sasol's technology is at least three years 
away from reaching parity with the results generated in Isaac's lab. 
 
Sasol’s supports are currently selling for $6.75 per pound, and at current prices of commodity-level 
materials, Isaac estimates that his supports could be produced for under $3 per pound. 
 
Isaac has no business (or management) experience, and has little desire to manage the company. 
However, a well-known Angel investor caught wind of the project through university connections and have 
not only expressed great interest in the project, but have agreed to mentor Isaac in managing the 
company. Isaac has approached various venture capitalists (VCs) for funding, but due to the frequent 
failure of ‘university start-ups,’ the VCs want to see products sales before they will commit to funding the 
company. However, the ‘green’ nature of the catalysts recently resulted in a large SBIR grant from the 
government, and Isaac believes more funding is very likely. Isaac enlisted the help of the Biology 
department, who ascertained that the ecological impact of the catalyst's byproducts is minimal, 










Table 5.1: Dissertation Summary: Questions, Findings and Future Research 










Different drivers for 
experiential vs 
cognitive search; the 
‘types’ of knowledge 
brought into the firm 
have different effects; 
levels of expertise 
matter. 
 Does increased search have 
performance implications for 
the firm? For how the 
product’s innovativeness? 
How does partnering or 
mentoring moderate this 
relationship?   
Study 2 
 







Founder expertise at 




improve with business 
partners, but technical 
partners serve as 
emulsifiers,  
combining diverging 
logics, leading to 
shorter time to sales 
How do founders’ logics 
affect firm trajectory over 
time?  
Do student-led firms 
experience different 
















focuses attention on 
loci of uncertainty 
within their domain to 
the exclusion of other 
loci; entrepreneurial 
experience leads to 
perception of fewer 
uncertainties  
 How does expertise expand 
and constrain individuals’ 
ability to evaluate and 
pursue new (venture) ideas?  
How do team dynamics 
affect the attention founders 
give to loci of uncertainty? 
What role does 
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